Valery Lazarev’s research while affiliated with Stanford University and other places

This paper examines structural change in Russia’s transition in 1990–2002 as measured by the changing composition of output, employment, and end use of GDP. Using an international panel data sets as a frame of reference, it calculates a series of indexes to determine the extent to which the Russian economy is converging towards market economies in the course of market transformation. Our methodology lets us analyze the changes in the structural profile of the economy using the entirety of the available data rather than individual performance indicators. We find that Russia has become structurally similar to the benchmark market economies in the upper-middle income group and the lower tier of high-income countries. At the same time, the extent of labor reallocation remains inadequate and Russia’s pattern of consumption remains distorted due to the incomplete price liberalization.

This paper examines structural change in the Russian economy in 1990-2001, as measured by the changing composition of output and consumption, using international panel data sets as a frame of reference. It calculates a series of indexes to determine the extent to which the Russian economy is converging towards market economies. Although the Russian structure of output is becoming increasingly similar to that of upper-middle and the lower tier of high-income countries, the structure of Russian manufacturing is inconsistent with its income level and the extent of labor reallocation remains inadequate. Russia's pattern of consumption remains distorted due to the incomplete price liberalization.

Until now, there has been little scholarly analysis of the Soviet Gulag as an economic, social, and political institution, primarily owing to a lack of data. This collection presents the results of years of research by Western and Russian scholars. The authors provide both broad overviews and specific case studies as they examine:* The various forms of coercion and the channels through which coerced labor was distributed under Stalinism's heyday, from the late 1930s to the early 1950s* Why the Gulag emerged and its perceived economic rationale* The chronology of the Gulag from the first major projects—such as the White Sea–Baltic Canal—to the unfinished plans of the 1950s* The day-to-day costs of maintaining the Gulag and the great hidden cost of coercion—the loss of productivity* How the Soviet leadership desperately sought to find the right balance between extreme coercion and extreme material incentives for the labor force—and how material incentives played an increasingly greater role in later years* How Stalin's death provided the excuse for radical reform and the end of the Gulag. Seen together, these contributions present an extraordinary portrait of a major aspect of the Soviet approach to economic achievement whose results should provide an invaluable lesson to future generations.

We use unique archival data on the allocation of vehicles, i.e. cars and trucks, in the 1930s by a three-person commission of top Soviet officials for an empirical investigation of resource allocation by a dictatorship. Two distinct models of dictatorial allocative behavior, namely, an economic planning model and a political gift exchange model, are considered. We use censored regression and ordered probit to show that the political gift exchange model is supported strongly by the data, but the economic model is rejected. Moreover, the political model explains better the rejection of petitions rather than their success, suggesting that the dictator preferred unconstrained decision-making discretion. We argue that the dictator used gift exchange to purchase loyalty against uncontrolled market exchanges and that political bias in resource allocation was undermining the dictator's power in the long run.

Using original archival sources, this article traces the allocation of vehicles by the Soviet economy and shows the complicated reality of the system’s operation. ‘Planned’ distribution was anything but orderly as decrees overturned quarterly plans, wholesalers ignored planning instructions by keeping vehicles for themselves or redirecting them to others, and the producer intervened through its control of the planning ‘aftermarket’. Existing stocks of vehicles were redistributed by administrative mobilizations that were resisted and thwarted by those losing vehicles. Behind the scenes, ‘grey’ markets reallocated used vehicles.