Tina Langer’s research while affiliated with Trier University and other places

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is the change in liking due to the paring of an affectively meaningful and a neutral stimulus. Starting with the exemplary question of why we like the iPhone, this article provides an overview of past and present research and gives an outlook to future research on this topic. We outline four different theoretical EC accounts and discuss how each account is consistent with current empirical evidence.

It is a psychological truism that thought shapes language. However, the idea that language constrains cognition is less well understood and has been debated in philosophy, linguistic, and psychology. The goal of the present research was to investigate the influence of language, as given in linguistic categories, on the formation of evaluations in an interpersonal impression formation context. Specifically, we examined the role of different verb classes in the formation of interpersonal (dis-)likes within an evaluative conditioning (EC) paradigm. EC refers to the change in liking in a conditioned stimulus (CS) as a result of its' pairing with an unconditioned stimulus (US). In contrast to traditional EC accounts that assume the rigid and unrestricted change in valence due to CS–US co-occurrence, we found that EC was moderated by language, that is, by the linguistic status of the US. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

a b s t r a c t The present research investigated the role of cognitive balance vs. associative transfer of valence in atti-tude change. Participants first formed positive or negative attitudes toward several source individuals. Subsequently, participants were shown source–target pairs along with information about the source–tar-get relationship ('likes'/'dislikes'). Afterwards, participants' attitudes toward the sources were changed by means of information that was opposite to the initially induced attitude. In a control condition, initial source attitudes remained unqualified. Results in the control condition showed that initially formed atti-tudes and available relationship information produced target evaluations that were consistent with the notion of cognitive balance. However, when attitudes toward the sources changed, target evaluations directly matched attitudes toward individually associated sources, irrespective of the relation between source and target. These results suggest that associative transfer of valence can disrupt the emergence of cognitive balance after attitude change.

US-revaluation refers to the observation that subsequent changes in the valence of an unconditioned stimulus (US) after pairing it with a neutral, conditioned stimulus (CS) also changes the valence of the associated CS. Experiment 1 found evidence for the US-revaluation effect using an unobtrusive measure of evaluation. However, US-revaluation effects were more pronounced for positive-to-negative compared to negative-to-positive revaluations. Experiment 2 replicated this finding for self-reported evaluations, further showing that US-revaluation effects are stable over time and independent of explicit memory for the revaluating information. Using a modified paradigm, Experiment 3 ruled out method-related explanations for these findings and showed that changes in CS evaluations are correlated with parallel changes in US evaluations. These findings encourage the view of evaluative conditioning as an instance of stimulusÁstimulus (SÁS) rather than stimulus-response (SÁR) learning. Implications for basic and applied research are discussed.

One mechanism underlying the acquisition of interpersonal attitudes is the formation of an association between a valenced unconditioned stimulus (US) and an affectively neutral conditioned stimulus (CS). However, a stimulus (e.g., a person) is not always and necessarily perceived to be unambiguously positive or negative. An individual can be negative regarding abstract (trait) information but at the same time display a positive (concrete) behavior. The present research deals with the question of whether the valence of abstract or concrete information about a US is encoded and subsequently transferred to an associated CS. The central assumptions are that the valence of the concrete information is more important for the evaluation of the US, whereas the abstract information is more important for the evaluation of the CS. The rationale behind these assumptions is that the US is a psychologically proximal stimulus because it elicits a more direct affective reaction. The CS, however, is psychologically more distal because it is merely associated with the US and is therefore only experienced indirectly. It is postulated that the associative relation between US and CS constitutes a dimension of psychological distance. In four studies, the valence of abstract and concrete information about a number of USs was manipulated. Within an evaluative learning paradigm, these stimuli were associated with affectively neutral CSs. As predicted, ambivalent USs were evaluated according to the valence of the concrete information. The evaluation of CSs, however, was influenced more strongly by the valence of the abstract information. Moreover, in a subsequent lexical decision task, participants were faster to categorize abstract (vs. concrete) stimuli when the stimuli were preceded by a CS prime as compared to a US prime. The results provide first evidence that perceived psychological distance influences the evaluations of US and CS in an associative evaluative learning paradigm.