Thomas G. Walker’s research while affiliated with Emory University and other places

... Ferejohn and Weingast (1992) follow this convention but include a third point (Q) to represent the ideal point of the "enacting legislature" to distinguish it from the preferences of actors currently in Congress. Eskridge (1991aEskridge ( , 1991b and Epstein and Walker (1995) model congressional preferences by including ideal points of the median member of congress (M) and the median member of the "relevant gate keeping committee" within Congress (G) with regard to the particular issue the Court is considering. ...

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Path Dependence in Studies of Legal Decision Making

... One of the main reasons why research on European courts is lagging behind research on American courtsbesides different traditions with respect to law and politics on the two sides of the Atlantic (Kelemen 2011)is the lack of accessible multi-user databases that provide scholars visibility into the decision-making of European courts. 1 The US Supreme Court Database, for instance, is one of the most successful social science databases and facilitates quantitative research on judicial politics in the United States (Epstein et al. 2015). There is no equivalent for the main court of the European Union, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). ...

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The CJEU Database Platform: Decisions and Decision-Makers

... The primary data source for the signed network we consider herein is the Government Printing Office (2014) document: Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision. These data were supplemented by information obtained from multiple other sources including: Epstein et al. (2015), Root (2014), Vile (2010), Powe (2009), Gerhardt (2008), Hall (2005), Spriggs and Hansford (2001), Brenner and Spaeth (1995) and Eskridge (1988) 5 . This entailed identifying the overturned decisions in the larger network of Fowler and Jeon and marking the overturning links as negative citation ties. ...

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signed supreme court networks I

... After Justice Stevens, a Protestant, retired in 2010 and President Obama appointed Justice Kagan, who is Jewish, for the first time in its history, the Supreme Court contained no Protestant justices, as six justices then identified as Catholic (Chief Justice Roberts as well as Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor), while three identified with Judaism (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan). This was a significant departure from the prior period when Protestants dominated the Court, as about three-quarters of all Supreme Court justices have been Protestant (Epstein et al. 2021). ...

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The pew and the bench: The dynamics of religious affiliations of federal court judges

... A straightforward implication of this model is that the constitutional discretion of a court, even a final appellate court not bound by precedent, is not unlimited. To issue rulings that will be respected and obeyed, the Court must accommodate the preferences and expected reactions of the veto players (Ferejohn and Weingast 1992;McCubbins et al. 1994;Epstein and Walker 1996;Epstein and Knight 1997;Ginsburg 2005;De Figueiredo et al. 2008;Vanberg 2008;Jacobi 2010). ...

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The Judicial Review of Legislation in the United Kingdom: A Public Choice Analysis

... The study of the ideologies of Supreme Court justices has attracted many scholars [1,2]. Due to its inherently latent nature, many approaches have been taken to quantify judicial ideologies [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10]. One of the most popular quantifications is the Martin-Quinn score [10], which introduced a Bayesian item response model to estimate so-called "ideal points". ...

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The dynamics of ideology drift among U.S. Supreme Court justices: A functional data analysis

... My approach is exactly that of Owens, Wedeking, and Wohlfarth (2013). I locate actors using Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores (Epstein et al. 2007); that is, 1st Dimension DW-NOMINATE scores for legislators (Lewis et al. 2021) and Martin-Quinn (2002) scores transformed into DW-NOMINATE space for justices. JCS scores thus range from À1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative). ...

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On Separation of Powers and Obfuscation in US Supreme Court Opinions

... Although we agree with this argument, we believe that the theory of litigant status implies that important differences also exist within non-IFP/non-pro se litigants. doorstep each term (Epstein et al. 2007b). Each of these petitioners has lost in a lower court and is asking the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari (cert). ...

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US Supreme Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status

... Department of Justice 1988, 1). However, since 1955, there have been 213 plurality decisions (see Epstein, Segal, Spaeth, and Walker 2007). Figure 1 depicts the proportion of plurality decisions from 1946-2006 (Epstein, Segal, Spaeth, and Walker 2007). ...

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Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States Supreme Court

... This is a quantitative signal of the norm to consensus, which is an oft discussed aspect of the US Supreme Court[30,36,37]. Consensus is essential because the court has no constitutional mandate to enforce its laws but relies solely on perceived legitimacy, an important part of which is the size of the majority. ...

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Valence and interactions in judicial voting