June 1994
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9 Reads
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2 Citations
Critical Review
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June 1994
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9 Reads
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2 Citations
Critical Review
September 1993
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16 Reads
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167 Citations
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
July 1992
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29 Reads
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437 Citations
The Economic Journal
May 1992
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27 Reads
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222 Citations
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
July 1989
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9 Reads
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9 Citations
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
The authors argue that efficient water allocation is possible through markets as long as water rights are well-defined, enforced, and transferable. They provide a framework for considering third-party and free rider affects from water trades. From this framework, they consider the prospects for developing a market for instream flows. The analysis points to problems with the prior appropriation system for establishing instream flow claims but suggests that there is not reason for water policy to stand in the way of transferring existing consumption rights to instream uses. The authors conclude that changes in water policy which capitalize on market forces will result from conservationconservative coalitions.
... • The primary predictor, political ideology, is measured as the extent to which a jurisdiction is dominated by rightwing ideology. 4 Studies relying on general measures of political sentiment favoring less government intervention or indirect demographic proxies (e.g., income, race) were excluded (e.g., Ferris, 1986;Hefetz & Warner, 2012;Stein, 1990), as they might not directly capture political ideology. ...
September 1993
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
... If one individual has a right, someone else has a commensurate duty to observe that right [85]. According to Bromley, property is not a physical object but a benefit stream, and to have a property is to have control over an object's benefit stream [86]. The above definitions are in line with the definition of property rights put forward by Commons [87]: that a property right is the enforceable authority to undertake particular actions related to a specific domain. ...
July 1992
The Economic Journal
... In addition to the vision of state intervention (Daly;Cobb, 1989;Pearce;Turner, 1990) and the perspective of market logic (Anderson;Leal, 1990) as a regulatory mechanism for the appropriation and use of natural resources, there is a third institutional preference to drive the transition process towards a sustainable society. Civil society -through its community organizations, grassroots groups, social movements and non-governmental organizations -must build the predominant direction in the transformation to a sustainable society. ...
May 1992
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
... A common thread to these problems is economic inefficiency. Economic inefficiencies arise because externalities (such as downstream users and recreational benefits) are ignored [31], and there is an unequal enforcement of existing allocation standards [28]. These inefficiencies may possibly be alleviated from a stricter adherence to beneficial use standards, public review, and long-term leasing (as opposed to permanent allotment) of water rights with possibilities for extensions at the end of the leasing period [22,32]. ...
July 1989
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management