Suresh L. Paul’s scientific contributions

This chapter discusses the economic valuation of agro‐waste with an emphasis on developing countries. Specifically, a general overview of the cost‐benefit analysis technique of economic valuation is outlined to contextualize the costs and consequences of agro‐waste recycling and reclamation programs. We first enumerate all anticipated costs and benefits involved in the analysis. Then, a number of important practical issues that might affect the integrity of the analysis are identified. Lastly, we provide basis for rules that help decide the selection of one program versus another. To the best of our efforts, concepts throughout this chapter are presented using a simple writing style that is largely devoid of mathematical notation.

This chapter discusses the economic valuation of agro waste with an emphasis on developing countries. Specifically, a general overview of the cost-benefit analysis technique of economic valuation is outlined to contextualize the costs and consequences of agro waste recycling and reclamation programs. We first enumerate all anticipated costs and benefits involved in the analysis. Then a number of important practical issues that might affect the integrity of the analysis are identified. Lastly, we provide basis for rules that help decide the selection of one program versus another. To the best of our efforts, concepts throughout this chapter are presented using simple writing style that is largely devoid of mathematical notation.

Using a large sample of publicly traded firms from 1994-2002, we study the type of firms that female executives prefer to work in. We find that (1) female executives predominantly work in high risk firms and in high risk industries, (2) female CEOs have higher dismissal probability and female non-CEO executives (CFO, COO and President), in general, have lower tenure at office, and (3) there is significant self selection for female to work in high risk segments despite higher dismissal rates or lower tenure at job. Consistent with Bertrand and Hallock (2001), we find that, on average, female executives are paid lower than men, a result that is mainly driven by female in safer work segments. On the other hand, female executives in risky segments have comparable pay to their male counterparts. Using a size and industry male executive benchmark for each female executive, we also show that pay differential diminishes with the increase in job risk. Keywords: gender economics; corporate governance; CEO turnover; executive compensation JEL Classification: G30; G34; J16 Suggested Citation: Sahni, Herman and Paul, Suresh L., Women in Top Management and Job Self Selection (November 10, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870673 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2870673

Using a large sample of publicly traded firms from 1994-2002, we study the type of firms that female executives prefer to work in. We find that (1) female executives predominantly work in high risk firms and in high risk industries, (2) female CEOs have higher dismissal probability and female non-CEO executives (CFO, COO and President), in general, have lower tenure at office, and (3) there is significant self selection for female to work in high risk segments despite higher dismissal rates or lower tenure at job. Consistent with Bertrand and Hallock (2001), we find that, on average, female executives are paid lower than men, a result that is mainly driven by female in safer work segments. On the other hand, female executives in risky segments have comparable pay to their male counterparts. Using a size and industry male executive benchmark for each female executive, we also show that pay differential diminishes with the increase in job risk. Keywords: gender economics; corporate governance; CEO turnover; executive compensation JEL classification: G30; G34; J16

Using a large sample of publicly traded firms from 1994-2002, we study the type of firms that female executives prefer to work in. We find that (1) female executives predominantly work in high risk firms and in high risk industries, (2) female CEOs have higher dismissal probability and female non-CEO executives (CFO, COO and President), in general, have lower tenure at office, and (3) there is significant self selection for female to work in high risk segments despite higher dismissal rates or lower tenure at job. Consistent with Bertrand and Hallock (2001), we find that, on average, female executives are paid lower than men, a result that is mainly driven by female in safer work segments. On the other hand, female executives in risky segments have comparable pay to their male counterparts. Using a size and industry male executive benchmark for each female executive, we also show that pay differential diminishes with the increase in job risk.

Using a large sample of publicly traded firms from 1994-2002, we study the type of firms that female executives prefer to work in. We find that (1) female executives predominantly work in high risk firms and in high risk industries, (2) female CEOs have higher dismissal probability and female non-CEO executives (CFO, COO and President), in general, have lower tenure at office, and (3) there is significant self selection for female to work in high risk segments despite higher dismissal rates or lower tenure at job. Consistent with Bertrand and Hallock (2001), we find that, on average, female executives are paid lower than men, a result that is mainly driven by female in safer work segments. On the other hand, female executives in risky segments have comparable pay to their male counterparts. Using a size and industry male executive benchmark for each female executive, we also show that pay differential diminishes with the increase in job risk. Keywords: gender economics; corporate governance; CEO turnover; executive compensation JEL classification: G30; G34; J16

Of all the proposals that are voted upon in annual shareholder meetings, proposals aimed at protecting or eliminating shareholder rights are the ones that do not conform to the recommendations made by Institutional Shareholder Services. That is, proposals that eliminate rights pass despite ISS "AGAINST" recommendations and proposals that protect rights fail despite ISS "FOR" recommendations. Maug and Rydqvist (2009) document this discrepancy. In this paper, using 830 proposals that alter shareholder rights between 1994 and 2003, we hypothesize and find that the concentrated ownership within the firm and the design of statutory pass rate leads to the above discrepancy. We also find that the CEOs who favor the proposals that eliminate rights when ISS recommends "AGAINST" have a lower dismissal likelihood (both internal and external driven). Although, this result may suggest that these CEOs are entrenched, we find that post one year operating returns is approximately 3% higher than other firms in the sample. Our results broadly suggest that this discrepancy does not support "managerial entrenchment hypothesis".

Anti-takeover provisions, and in some sense, all governance provisions are viewed as vital instruments to prevent value decreasing attempts of takeover. Recent literature focuses on these provisions as instruments which facilitate managerial entrenchment. We study a sample of firms which repeal governance provisions and the reasons behind the repeal decision. The decision to adopt a governance provision is important and crucial for preserving shareholder value at a particular time and for specific reasons, while the decision to repeal also adds value for some firms in recent years. Firstly, we find evidence that the firms which repeal are mature firms with higher total assets, higher leverage, higher Q and lower R&D expenses compared to the firms which adopt provisions. We also find evidence supporting the life cycle hypothesis that firms adopt provisions close to the IPO stage and repeal them when mature. Secondly, we find that firms which repeal provisions do so when there is no imminent takeover threat. Thirdly, we find that managers of firms that repeal provisions are not entrenched and decision to repeal reveals their good quality. Lastly, we find that irrespective of their purpose, provision repeal tends to get positive market response.