Sonja Schierbaum’s research while affiliated with University of Wuerzburg and other places

What justifies a comparison is that both Zagzebski’s Moral Exemplarism and Wolff’s Perfectionism have the practical goal of providing guidance for moral improvement. Both accounts threaten to be overdemanding, but for different reasons: Wolff requires distinct cognition for moral improvement, and this cognition is difficult to acquire. Zagzebski requires conscientious reflection for making sure that admiration picks out the “really” admirable. My aim is to show that while Wolff has the resources within his theory to meet this difficulty, Zagzebski does not. In Wolff’s account, the philosopher has an important, mediating role: he can compensate the difficulties. In Zagzebski’s account, however, it is not easy to see how the corruptibility of admiration by sociocultural factors can be compensated. Therefore, the practical purpose of moral improvement threatens to be seriously undermined by the moral relativism implied by admiration.

This is a collection of sixteen essays by a diverse group of international scholars that offers a wide-ranging and contemporary perspective on the major aspects of Christian Wolff’s ethics. The volume focuses on Wolff’s German Ethics, arguably his most important and influential text on moral philosophy, but many of the chapters also consider the development of the basic tenets of Wolff’s moral theory in his later Latin writings. The contributions cover a range of topics, including the systematic structure of the text itself and the relation between Wolff’s ethics and the preceding natural law tradition. Many chapters pay special attention to the core concepts of Wolff’s moral philosophy, such as obligation, perfection, the highest good, and happiness. Other notable topics include Wolff’s conception of moral judgment and moral education, as well as the role of psychology and anthropology in his ethical thought. The volume also contains discussion of the influence of Wolff’s ethics on subsequent figures such as C. A. Crusius, G. F. Meier, and Kant. As a whole, the volume seeks to establish the importance of Wolff’s German Ethics within the history of ethics as well as inspire others to engage with his thought.

The aim of this paper is to show that, unlike proponents of Humean accounts of intentional action, Ockham can also answer the fundamental question of why we desire anything at all. For Ockham, desire cannot be the starting point of the explanation, since desire presupposes yet another kind of appetitive act that is objectual, or non-propositional, in its nature. Ockham calls this love (amor). It should become clear that Ockham's approach, even in his day, is not common. It is, however, worthy of detailed examination because it furthers a deeper and more complete understanding of intentional action by shedding light on this more fundamental question. In his terminology, love is the most basic kind of unconditional willing, not least because it is purely objectual: we appreciate persons as ends, not as means. The explanation of intentional action has to start somewhere. And, for Ockham, it starts with love for persons.

Contemporary discussions of self-knowledge usually start from the assumption that self-knowledge is a distinct form of knowledge to which a subject has privileged access. This paper focuses on our access to our own desires by discussing the voluntarist position of Christian August Crusius (1715–1775), a still undeservedly neglected pre-Kantian philosopher. The general aim is to show that it follows from Crusius’s account of access to one’s own desires as the most relevant kind of mental act, this access in fact lacks the marks of privileged access, namely, transparency and infallibility. The paper argues that Crusius presents access to one’s desires as one of the requirements for moral action, the account of which is one of the main goals of his philosophical system. The paper thus aims to show that it is plausible that, because moral action should depend on our free, rational efforts, access to and knowledge of our own desires is not privileged.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy annually collects the best current work in the field of medieval philosophy. The various volumes print original essays, reviews, critical discussions, and editions of texts. The aim is to contribute to an understanding of the full range of themes and problems in all aspects of the field, from late antiquity into the Renaissance, and extending over the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian traditions. Volume 10 ranges widely over this terrain, including Christina Van Dyke on humility among women authors, Daniel Davies and Alexander Lamprakis on al-Fārābī in Hebrew translation, Reginald Chua on Aquinas and the Trinity, Can Löwe on the soul’s relation to its powers, John Morrison on the indiscernibility of identicals, and Boaz Schuman on Buridan’s logic. In addition, the volume features critical reviews of recent books by David Piché and Tobias Hoffmann, authored by Nicholas Faucher and Sonja Schierbaum.

Any account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one’s body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus’s account is close to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ accounts, whereas Ockham’s account is incompatible with them.

My general aim in commenting on Băltuță’s paper is to elucidate the metaphor of a dialogue she uses to characterize the general, methodological framework of her undertaking. For this purpose, I turn to a certain strand of the contemporary discussion of the role of the historian of philosophy. According to Băltuță, the determination of the limits of such a dialogue is a matter of degree, not of principle. I agree with her. My concern is that the determination of the limits of the dialogue is thwarted if the central, contemporary notion that is taken to be applicable to the historical account in question is used equivocally. In my view, there is a serious concern that Băltuță’s account equivocates on the term “intentional,” making it difficult to determine the limits of the dialogue between contemporary and medieval views on the intentionality of pain. My specific aim in this comment is to show that although Băltuță equivocates on the term “intentional,” her analysis of Kilwardby’s account can be adjusted such that her argument succeeds in showing that pain is in fact an intentional state for Kilwardby.

In this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius’s conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius’s distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius’s conception of rational desire is normative in that we necessarily desire things that are compatible with our nature, such as our own perfection. Therefore, a desire is rational if the desired object is apt to satisfy the desires compatible with our nature. From a contemporary perspective, such a normative conception of rational desire might not appear very attractive; it is apt, however, to stimulate a debate on the normative criteria and the role of judgment for rational desire, which is the ultimate aim of this paper.

In this paper, I discuss Christian Wolff’s conception of motivating and normative reasons. My aim is to show that in the discussion of error cases, Wolff pursues a strategy that is strikingly similar to the strategy of contemporary defenders of nicht-psychologist accounts of motivating reasons. According to many nicht-psychologist views, motivating reasons are facts. My aim is to show that Wolff’s motivation in pursuing this strategy is very different. The point is that due to his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Wolff has to show that error cases are compatible with the PSR. The issue is worth discussing because it is not yet sufficiently explored what motivating reasons are, according to Wolff, and how they relate, in substance, to normative reasons. Methodologically, my approach can be characterized as one of “mutual illumination”: I think it is possible to highlight some crucial ambiguities of Wolff’s conception against the backdrop of the contemporary conception of motivating reasons, but also to question the importance and role of the ontological question of what motivating reasons are in contemporary discussions against the backdrop of Wolff’s position.

Ockham defines intuition as the kind of cognition on the basis of which it is not only possible to evidently judge that a thing exists when it exists, but also that a thing does not exist when it does not exist. He makes a further distinction between natural intuition and supernatural intuition. The aim of this paper is to determine what, according to Ockham, can be judged evidently by means of natural intuition and what can only be judged evidently by means of supernatural intuition. It is commonly assumed that by natural intuition we can make only affirmative judgements, whereas by supernatural intuition we can make both affirmative and negative judgements. The paper shows that this way of contrasting the two is mistaken. The paper argues instead that also natural intuition, according to Ockham, enables us to make both affirmative and negative judgements.