Seung Huh’s research while affiliated with Incheon National University and other places

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Publications (1)


Profitability of Noisy Certification in the Presence of Loss Averse Buyers*
  • Article

August 2023

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3 Reads

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2 Citations

Journal of Industrial Economics

Seung Huh

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Dmitry A. Shapiro

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Sung H. Ham

We study how the inaccuracy of a costly certification technology affects a monopolistic seller's profitability. We compare three scenarios: no certification, a 100% accurate certification, and a 50% accurate certification that produces accurate evaluations half the time. The noisy certification environment is never the most profitable and, depending on the buyers' loss aversion, can be the least profitable. However, a noisy certification can be more profitable than an accurate one, as it discourages the over‐certification that occurs in an accurate certification environment. Experimentally, the noisy certification is shown to be the least profitable treatment, whereas the accurate certification is shown to be the most profitable.

Citations (1)


... Certifications are widely used to reduce information asymmetry when certain organizational behaviors are hidden or challenging to supervise (King et al., 2005) or by sellers when asymmetry affects the quality of their products and services (Huh et al., 2023). The development of management standards for administrative processes that cover an extensive range of business activities is considered especially important for organizations (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2010;Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). ...

Reference:

Determinants and benefits of over‐certification: A signaling theory perspective
Profitability of Noisy Certification in the Presence of Loss Averse Buyers*
  • Citing Article
  • August 2023

Journal of Industrial Economics