Sarah R. Beck’s research while affiliated with University of Birmingham and other places

Causation is a fundamental way to make sense of both social and non-social domains. High levels of autistic traits have been linked to enhanced rationality, suggesting a more normative way of reasoning. We aimed to systematically compare causal reasoning tendencies across social and non-social domains and evaluate their relation to self-reported autistic traits and thinking styles. We used a causal reasoning task with three binary (present/absent) variables forming common cause networks (X←Z→Y) representing social and non-social domains. Causal mechanisms in the social domain represented social relationships, while causal mechanisms in the non-social domain represented economics and meteorology. We recruited 76 participants from the general population and measured their levels of autistic traits and thinking styles on self-reports. We found that participants consistently violated the normative rules of causal reasoning. We also identified systematic differences across domains. However, we did not identify meaningful differences between clusters of reasoners in their levels of self-reported autistic traits and thinking styles. We conclude with that people violate the normative rules of causal reasoning differently across domains. However, we cannot conclude that this relates to levels of autistic traits or thinking styles. Lay Abstract We regularly think about cause-and-effect relationships in the world around us. Previously, researchers reported that people with higher levels of autistic traits reason more consistently and rule-based. However, they have not compared social, involving living things, and non-social, involving non-living things, worlds in relation to people's levels of autistic traits. We used a causal reasoning task to test this. In this task, there were causal scenarios with binary variables, meaning a variable can be either present or absent. The scenarios either reflected a non-social mechanism, for example, economics, or a social mechanism, for example, an interpersonal relationship. Our participants, who did not necessarily have a clinical diagnosis, completed this task and two self-report questionnaires. We found that people did not follow the rules of causal reasoning. We also found that people's responses differed between social and non-social scenarios. We found that this was unrelated to people's self-reported autistic traits and thinking styles. We are confident that people differ in their use of reasoning rules in their causal reasoning, and this happens differently between social and non-social scenarios. Highlights People consistently violate the normative rules of causal reasoning. This happens differently across social and non-social domains. Neither the levels of self-reported autistic traits nor thinking styles differ between the clusters of decisive and indecisive reasoners, yet further exploration is suggested.

Enhanced rationality has been linked to higher levels of autistic traits, characterised by increased deliberation and decreased intuition, alongside reduced susceptibility to common reasoning biases. However, it is unclear whether this is domain-specific or domain-general. We aimed to explore whether reasoning tendencies differ across social and non-social domains in relation to autistic traits. We conducted two experiments ( N ¹ = 72, N ² = 217) using a reasoning task with social and non-social scenario comparisons to evaluate the specific information participants used when making judgments about children, in the social domain, and objects, in the non-social domain. We consistently found a greater reliance on behaviour-based information in the non-social domain, compared to the social domain, indicating a more deliberative approach. In Experiment 1, we found a correlation between autistic traits and the proportion of behaviour-based information, suggesting a more deliberative approach, when making judgments about children, and not about objects. In Experiment 2, with a larger sample, shortened version of the reasoning task, and requests for written justification, we did not identify a significant correlation between these variables. With this study, we introduce a novel scenario-based reasoning task that systematically compares the social and non-social domains. Our findings highlight the complex nature of the relationship between reasoning style and autistic traits.

Autistic people often experience challenges in social contexts, and when decisions need to be made quickly. There is evidence showing that autistic people have a tendency for greater deliberation and lower intuition, compared to non-autistic people. This has led to the researchers' proposal that autism is associated with an enhanced level of rationality. However, these theories have been mostly explored through the lens of either only non-social domain or only social domain. To address this gap, we recruited autistic adults and carefully matched them with non-autistic adults for comparison. We used a task representing both social and non-social interactions in a comparison structure and asked participants' moral judgements on scenarios' main characters. This was complemented by subjective and objective measures of reasoning. Our findings did not reveal meaningful differences between groups in terms of deliberation. However, we did observe that autistic participants self-reported lower levels of intuition, compared to non-autistic participants. Autistic people consistently rate themselves as less intuitive than their counterparts. Nevertheless, objective evidence supporting this across tasks and studies is inconsistent.

Objective Anticipated regret has been implicated in health‐related decision‐making. Recent work on influenza vaccination has suggested that anticipated relief, too, may influence individuals' decisions to engage in positive health behaviours. To explore these affective components further and address the generality of possible mechanisms underlying these associations, we examined whether anticipated relief and anticipated regret independently predict testicular self‐examination (TSE) intention and behaviour. Given claims about differences in their nature and function, we distinguished between counterfactual relief (relief that a worse outcome did not obtain) and temporal relief (relief that an unpleasant experience is over). Design Prospective correlational. Methods At Time 1 (July 2022), 567 cis‐gendered males were asked to complete measures of anticipated regret, anticipated counterfactual and temporal relief, measures of the Theory of Planned Behaviour and measures of anxiety and shame. One month later, the same participants were recontacted and asked about their engagement in TSE in the previous month. Results Anticipated counterfactual relief and anticipated regret are independent, positive, predictors of intention to engage in TSE and, indirectly, TSE behaviour itself. Interestingly, anticipated temporal relief was negatively associated with intention to engage in TSE and, indirectly, behaviour. Conclusions Our results suggest that it may be the counterfactual nature of anticipated regret and anticipated relief that underlies their positive association with TSE and other health‐promoting behaviours. Interventions designed to increase engagement in preventive health behaviours, such as TSE, may benefit from the consideration of both positively and negatively valenced counterfactual emotions.

School-aged children have consistently shown a surprising developmental lag when attempting to innovate solutions to tool use tasks, despite being capable of learning to solve these problems from a demonstrator. We suggest that this “innovation gap” arises from tool tasks with more complex spatial relations. Following Fragaszy and Mangalam’s new tooling theory, we predicted that innovating a new “sticker slide” task should be more challenging when two tools need to be used at the same time (concurrently) rather than one at a time (sequentially), despite the similarity of the other task elements. In line with previous work, both versions of the task were challenging for all ages of children (4–9 years) that we tested. However, the youngest group showed particularly extreme difficulties, which was marked by not a single child innovating the concurrent version. Although success significantly increased with age, even the oldest group failed to reach 50% success on the concurrent version of the task, whereas the majority of the two older groups could solve the sequential version. Thus, in this first study of concurrent tool use in children, we found support for the prediction that increasing the complexity of spatial relations in tooling exacerbates the innovation gap.

Background When facing the consequences of decisions, people often experience evaluative emotions such as regret. The experience of regret is the result of the comparison between the actual outcome of one’s actions and a better counterfactual outcome that could have occurred had one acted differently in the past. Despite increasing interest in counterfactual thinking and regret, little is known about the type of cognitive processes involved with regret –whether it is underpinned by reflective or intuitive processes. The extant literature provides contradictory evidence: theoretical assertions and developmental work point towards reflective processes, requiring access to capacity-limited cognitive resources whereas, some experimental and neuroscientific evidence point towards intuitive processes. Methods In the current study, adults ( N = 20) completed a commonly used gambling task known to elicit regret under high or low working memory load. Results Ratings of regret were not affected by concurrent working memory load (Bayes Factors provided strong evidence for the null hypothesis). Conclusions We conclude that the experience of regret in a commonly used gambling task is unaffected by concurrent working memory load. This suggests that, in adults, regret is not always reliant on reflective cognitive processes and does not require access to central cognitive resources.

People's emotional states are influenced not just by events occurring in the present but also by how events have unfolded in the past and how they are likely to unfold in the future. To what extent do young children understand the ways in which past events can affect current emotions even if they are no longer ongoing? In the current study, we explored children's ability to understand how others feel at the cessation of events-as events change from being present to being past. We asked 97 4-to 6-year-olds (40.2% female) and 35 adults (54.3% female) to judge how characters felt once particular types of events had ended relative to how they felt during these events. We found that from age 4, children judged (as adults do) that the character would feel positive at the cessation of negative events-what we refer to as temporal relief. This understanding of relief occurs earlier than has been shown in previous research. However, children were less likely than adults to judge others as feeling sad at the cessation of positive events-what we refer to as temporal disappointment. Overall, our findings suggest that children not only understand that the cessation of events can affect others' emotions but also recognize that people feel differently following the cessation of positive, negative, and neutral events.

Background When facing the consequences of decisions, people often experience evaluative emotions such as regret. The experience of regret is the result of the comparison between the actual outcome of one’s actions and a better counterfactual outcome that could have occurred had one acted differently in the past. Despite increasing interest in counterfactual thinking and regret, little is known about the type of cognitive processes involved with regret –whether it is underpinned by reflective or intuitive processes. The extant literature provides contradictory evidence: theoretical assertions and developmental work point towards reflective processes, requiring access to capacity-limited cognitive resources whereas, some experimental and neuroscientific evidence point towards intuitive processes. Methods In the current study, adults ( N = 20) completed a commonly used gambling task known to elicit regret under high or low working memory load. Results Ratings of regret were not affected by concurrent working memory load (Bayes Factors provided strong evidence for the null hypothesis). Conclusions We conclude that the experience of regret in a commonly used gambling task is unaffected by concurrent working memory load. This suggests that, in adults, regret is not always reliant on reflective cognitive processes and does not require access to central cognitive resources.

Objective Anticipated regret has been found to predict vaccination intentions and behaviours. We examined whether anticipated relief also predicts seasonal influenza vaccination intentions and behaviour. Given claims about differences in their antecedents and function, we distinguished between counterfactual relief (relief that a worse outcome did not obtain) and temporal relief (relief that an unpleasant experience is over). Design Cross‐sectional. Methods Unvaccinated participants ( N = 295) were recruited online in November 2020. Participants completed measures of anticipated regret, anticipated counterfactual relief, and anticipated temporal relief and measures of theory of planned behaviour constructs (attitudes, norms, perceived control, and intentions). One month later, the same participants were re‐surveyed and asked to report their vaccination status. Results Although all anticipated emotion measures were associated with intentions and behaviour, only anticipated counterfactual relief and regret independently predicted vaccination intentions in regression analyses. Mediation analysis showed both anticipated counterfactual relief and regret were indirectly, via intentions, associated with behaviour. Conclusions Results suggest that, regardless of valence, counterfactual emotions predict vaccination intention and, indirectly, behaviour. Furthermore, participants may differ in their sensitivity to the anticipation of positive versus negative counterfactual emotions. These findings may permit more precise targeting of interventions to increase vaccine uptake.

The use of tool sets constitutes one of the most elaborate examples of animal technology, and reports of it in nature are limited to chimpanzees and Goffin's cockatoos. Although tool set use in Goffin's was only recently discovered, we know that chimpanzees flexibly transport tool sets, depending on their need. Flexible tool set transport can be considered full evidence for identification of a genuine tool set, as the selection of the second tool is not just a response to the outcomes of the use of the first tool but implies recognizing the need for both tools before using any of them (thus, categorizing both tools together as a tool set). In three controlled experiments, we tested captive Goffin's in tasks inspired by the termite fishing of Goualougo Triangle's chimpanzees. Thereby, we show that some Goffin's can innovate the use and flexibly use and transport a new tool set for immediate future use; therefore, their sequential tool use is more than the sum of its parts. VIDEO ABSTRACT.