January 2024
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39 Reads
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2 Citations
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January 2024
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39 Reads
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2 Citations
April 2023
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100 Reads
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1 Citation
October 2021
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29 Reads
June 2019
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128 Reads
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6 Citations
March 2019
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16 Reads
March 2019
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163 Reads
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2 Citations
February 2007
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120 Reads
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48 Citations
Judgment and Decision Making
Some decision situations are so objectionable or repugnant that people refuse to make a choice. This paper seeks to better understand taboo responses, and to distinguish choices that are truly taboo from those that are merely difficult or confusing. Using 22 scenarios that describe potentially taboo issues, Experiment 1 explores reasons for disapproval of the scenarios. We measure a large number of possible reasons for disapproval and a variety of preference responses (including willingness to accept), in order to test for subtleties in taboo responses. We also test cognitive and affective responses to the scenarios. Experiment 2 further explores the interaction, found in Experiment 1, between affective and cognitive factors. Taken as a whole, our results show that people are able to indicate their disapproval consistently across a variety of preference elicitation methods, that their disapproval is better understood as an attitude measure than as an economic valuation (even when the measure is in monetary terms), and that taboo responses are driven primarily by affect.
August 2006
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41 Reads
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11 Citations
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
August 2006
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10 Reads
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2 Citations
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
August 2006
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31 Reads
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42 Citations
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors.
... It has been proposed that raising the question of whether to opt for childhood immunizations, in particular, measles-mumps-rubella, may alert parents to controversies of which they were previously unaware (Pattison & Pareek, 2001). It has also been stated that physicians often feel it is better policy not to disclose all the possible medical complications of drug treatments because this may "needlessly confuse patients or frighten them into avoiding needed treatment" (Keown, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1984). If this is so, then it would be reasonable to regard it as risky to provide information on adverse effects of immunizations as this may discourage parents from immunizing their children. ...
January 1984
... Incentivizing independent ratings may lead to a 159 focus on understanding each option as opposed to contrasting them against one another. This is 160 illustrated in the literature on preference reversals in risky choice (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; 161 Tversky et al., 1990), where participants arrive at different apparent preferences depending on ...
August 2006
... The existence of elicitation effects may be indicative of some degree of preference construction (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1992;Slovic 1995;Lichtenstein and Slovic 2009) among contingent valuation respondents. The standard neoclassical economics view of preferences is based on what Fischhoff (1991) calls a "philosophy of articulated values," which can be placed on one end of a continuum of philosophies for preference construction. ...
August 2006
... File generated with AMS Word template 2.0 an advanced degree (Grounds & Joslyn, 2018;Grounds et al., 2017). This is not to say that members of the public have a deep theoretical understanding of probabilistic information (Grounds et al., 2017;Murphy et al., 1980) but rather, that they have a "working understanding" that allows them to better estimate the likelihood of threatening events. ...
January 1980
... For discussions of risk regulation generally, seeBreyer (1993),Margolis (1996),Noll and Krier (1990),Pollack (1996),Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein (1985), orLohmann and Hopenhayn (1998). ...
December 1985
... Existing studies have documented several exceptions to this assertion in the form of behavioral biases that are pervasive in the human decision-making process under uncertainty and lead to suboptimal economic welfare outcomes. Some of the notable instances include overconfidence biases (Barber & Odean, 2001;Fischhoff & Slovic, 1980;Gervais & Odean, 2001), overreaction biases (Bondt & Thaler, 1985), loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;Odean, 1998;Shefrin & Statman, 1985), herding behavior (Huberman & Regev, 2001), psychological accounting behavior (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), miscalibration of probabilities (Lichtenstein et al., 1982), hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997), and regret (Bell, 1983;Clarke et al., 1994). These EMH critics argue that investors are frequently, if not always, irrational, exhibiting predictable and financially destructive behavior. ...
April 1982
... Individuals who focus more on positive than negative information about options are biased (e.g., optimistic bias; Weinstein & Lyon (1999)). Biases are cognitive failures (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973;Slovic et al., 1982) that influence individual behavior but also have broader implications for societal outcomes. For example, biases can affect hiring decisions, interpersonal relationships, and even policy-making (DeMarree et al., 2014). ...
April 1982
... The perceptions of real risks are different because they are affected by a wide range of related, cognitive, contextual, and individual factors (Slovic et al., 2010). Farmers' perceptions of long-term or shortterm climate change are the first important indicator of the adaptation process (Demeritt et al., 2009). ...
August 1987
... Notably, users' perception of costs, risks, and benefits in particular as well as perceptions by lay persons more generally do often not match the more objective expert estimations (e.g. Savadori et al., 2004;Slovic et al., 1985). Hence, to better comprehend and predict user acceptance of on-site systems, a fuller understanding of the costs, risks, and benefits as perceived by users is necessary. ...
June 2019
... This aligns with previous research, including studies by Azadi et al. [35], Wei et al. [65], and Wu et al. [63]. Risk perception in the context of CC is understood as the process by which individuals detect and interpret signals from various sources, forming a mental assessment of the likelihood and severity of present or future CC-related damages [97,98]. Understanding how farmers perceive these risks is crucial for promoting effective adaptation measures and developing relevant strategies by agricultural stakeholders and policymakers [99]. ...
December 1980
Health Physics