Sarah Gordon’s research while affiliated with Florida Institute of Technology and other places

Spyware, Adware, Bots. In each case, there is significant evidence that there is an increasing financial motivation behind the writing and distribution of these programs. In this paper, the concept of using our knowledge of these financial motivators to combat malicious software is introduced. Can attacks on business models actually provide relief that technology alone cannot? Can we deploy our technology differently, in order to receive direct benefits of this indirect attack on revenue streams? Our conclusion is that not only is this a possible solution, but that it may be an extremely effective one. This is illustrated by a description of our business model attack generator, MARK - the Multihost Adware Revenue Killer. Using MARK, we demonstrate simple but effective attacks against Malicious-code generated revenue streams. However, the creation and deployment of MARK raises thorny legal and ethical questions, as the impact of the technology is widespread and could easily be targeted at legitimate online marketing models. Do the ends justify the means?

The idea of Cybercrime is not new, yet there is significant confusion amongst academics, computer security experts and users as to the extent of real Cybercrime. In this paper, we explore the breadth of computer-based crime, providing a definition of the emerging terms “Cybercrime” and “crimeware”. We then divide Cybercrime into two distinct categories: Type I Cybercrime, which is mostly technological in nature, and Type II Cybercrime, which has a more pronounced human element. We then use two case studies to illustrate the role of crimeware in different types of Cybercrime, and offer some observations on the role of cognition in the process of Cybercrime. Finally we provide several suggestions for future work in the area of Cybercrime.

The term cyberterrorism is becoming increasingly common in the popular culture, yet a solid definition of the word seems to be hard to come by. While the phrase is loosely defined, there is a large amount of subjectivity in what exactly constitutes cyberterrorism. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, this is somewhat disconcerting. In an attempt to define cyberterrorism more logically, a study is made of definitions and attributes of terrorism and terrorist events. From these attributes a list of attributes for traditional terrorism is developed. This attribute list is then examined in detail with the addition of the computer and the Internet considered for each attribute. Using this methodology, the online world and terrorism is synthesized to produce a broader but more useful assessment of the potential impact of computer-savvy terrorists. Most importantly, the concept of ‘traditional’ cyberterrorism, which features the computer as the target or the tool is determined to be only a limited part of the true risk faced. Finally, the authors discuss the impact this new view of cyberterrorism has on the way in which one should build one’s defenses. In particular, the breadth of the issue poses significant questions for those who argue for vertical solutions to what is certainly a horizontal problem. Thus, the validity of special cyberterrorism task forces that are disconnected or loosely connected with other agencies responsible for fighting the general problem of terrorism is questioned, and a broader, more inclusive method suggested.