Samuel L. Perry’s research while affiliated with University of Oklahoma and other places

How do Americans perceive the orientation of political entities toward religion? Building on group identity theories and burgeoning Christian nationalism research, I theorize Americans' perceptions of friendliness, neutrality, or unfriendliness toward religion will be contingent on the interplay between the specific entity, “identity congruence” (how partisan and ideological identities correspond to the partisan character of the entity), and Christian nationalism. Analyses of data from a large, nationally representative sample of Americans support my expectations. Both Christian nationalism and congruence on political identities predict how Americans perceive the posture of the Democratic Party, Republican Party, and Supreme Court toward religion. Yet associations differ depending on whether friendliness to religion challenges the entity's legitimacy (e.g., the Supreme Court). Interactions also show the influence of Christian nationalism and political identities on perceptions of friendliness are contingent on one another and the entity. Findings reveal how religious evaluations reflect group interests in complex ways.

This article considers the too-often limited reach of public sociology, focusing on the case of “Christian nationalism.” Despite growing media attention to Christian nationalism, partly reflecting current events along with considerable efforts to engage in public sociology on the topic, I anticipate public awareness of the term is concentrated in theoretically predictable ways. Given the growing conservative skepticism toward academics (particularly sociologists) and increasingly siloed media consumption, I theorize Americans most familiar with “Christian nationalism” would be sociologists’ “choir,” namely, those who are more educated, less religious, more liberal/Democratic, and who trust more liberal news sources. Drawing on two representative surveys fielded in mid-September and November/December of 2022, findings affirm the strongest predictors of Americans hearing/reading more about “Christian nationalism” were being more liberal, educated, being non-Christian (in one survey), and trusting more liberal news sources (in another survey). Interactions show exposure to the term among liberals, Democrats, and those who trust liberal news sources increases substantially with educational attainment. Despite the considerable amount of sociological research and public sociology addressing “Christian nationalism,” those most aware of the term in late 2022 were educated, liberal/Democratic, seculars most likely to already be exposed to and trust the work of sociologists. In other words, to the extent public sociologists have sought to inform the public about “Christian nationalism,” they have likely been “preaching to the choir” more than to those most susceptible to embracing the ideology (less educated, conservative/Republican, Christians). I conclude by discussing implications for sociology’s public impact as a discipline.

Religious conservatism is associated with Americans’ skepticism toward climate-related science and policy. Yet the specific religious beliefs that are causally responsible for this dynamic, if any, remain unclear. In this study, we theorize that belief in divine (versus human) control over Earth’s future climate reduces belief in humans’ responsibility for climate change as well as concern about its severity. Regression analyses with national survey data (n=5,321) demonstrate that believing “God would not allow humans to destroy the Earth” is associated with lower concern about climate change. Next, a pre-registered survey experiment (n=3,333) finds that manipulating belief in God’s—vis-à-vis humans’—control of Earth’s climate affects the perceived severity of climate change and need for policy intervention. Our manipulation also reduced demand for climate- related information from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association. Our results establish an important causal link between a religious belief and climate change attitudes in the U.S. public.

Four preregistered experiments ( N = 4,307) explored whether anti-Christian bias claims can discreetly signal White allyship among Christian American adults. In Experiments 1 and 2, reading about anti-Christian bias led White, but not Black, Christians to perceive more anti-White bias. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate the connection between Christian and White can be leveraged by politicians in the form of a racial dog whistle. In Experiment 3, White Christians perceived a politician concerned about anti-Christian bias as caring more about anti-White bias and more willing to fight for White people (relative to a control). This politician was also perceived as less offensive than a politician concerned about anti-White bias. In Experiment 4, Black Christians perceived a politician concerned about anti-Christian bias as less offensive than one concerned about anti-White bias yet still unlikely to fight for Black people. Results suggest “anti-Christian bias” can provide a relatively palatable way to signal allegiance to White people.

Religion remains among the most powerful and pervasive forms of social behavior around the world, including the United States. Yet academic sociology has long ignored its relevance and is consequently neglecting a responsibility to provide accurate and comprehensive explanations of social life to the world. I consider several reasons for this neglect, including the uncomfortable topic of anti‐religious bias within the discipline. I propose that correcting our collective suspicion toward religion, religious people, and the specialists who study them is not only ethical, but it helps us do better science, prevents us from excluding minorities who are also more likely to be religious, and helps us earn the trust of the wider public. I conclude by calling for a reprioritization of religion in the discipline.

By several metrics, the sociology of religion subfield and its specialists are marginalized within academic sociology. Though various reasons for that marginalization have been ventured, systematic evidence is limited. This study used a 2022 survey experiment to assess how academic sociologists perceive the sociology of religion and its specialists and the potential biases influencing their evaluations. Sociology faculty and trainees (N = 536) were randomly assigned to evaluate one of six sociology subfields and their respective specialists. Sociology of religion was rated as the least mainstream, but was rated middle-of-the-pack in scientific rigor, need within sociology departments, and interest to undergraduates. Though sociologists of religion were rated comparably to specialists in other subfields on characteristics indicating intellectual rigor, they were more often characterized as “religious” and “conservative,” and participants who characterized religion specialists as such downgraded the subfield on nearly every metric. Additional analyses show lower ratings were not due to generalized negativity toward “me-search.” And secular sociologists were more likely than religiously affiliated ones to downgrade the religion subfield when its specialists were perceived as “conservative.”

Background Americans who believe government policies should bolster religion's influence tend to favor rigid in‐group/out‐group distinctions and hierarchies. Yet given that religious and political views are fundamentally racialized, we theorize racial identity moderates the link between favoring government‐supported religion and views toward political solidarity and compromise. Objective This study extends our understanding of how beliefs about religion and politics involve not only different, but contradictory orientations to political solidarity and compromise contingent on racial identity. Methods We estimate binary logistic regression models using data from Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel, Wave 92, a nationally representative survey of over 9200 Americans. Results Main effects indicate that favoring government‐supported religion is associated with rejecting political compromise, but unassociated with measures of solidarity. Interactions, however, show main‐effects mask considerable racial variation. Substantively, the link between favoring government‐supported religion and rejecting political compromise is limited to White Americans. Yet Black Americans who favor government‐supported religion become significantly more likely to recognize shared values despite political differences and Black Americans who favor government‐supported religion see less difference between Democrats and Republicans, while their White counterparts see more. Conclusions Favorability toward government policies supporting religion does not necessarily represent “us versus them” orientations. Rather, the association is racially contingent.

Sometimes a work of history is so timely that it seems as if the author intentionally delayed publication for just the right moment. Such is the case with J. Russell Hawkins's The Bible Told Them So. Even amid contemporary white evangelical hysteria over “critical race theory” supposedly infiltrating public schools, and with political campaigns aimed to whitewash America's racial past, Hawkins reminds us that the theological foundations for such movements were laid long before Donald J. Trump. Hawkins begins with the premise that our popular conception of the civil rights movement was that Christian faith animated only one group of participants—Black Christians. Conversely, southern white evangelicals often cited theology as the primary reason for opposing integration. Focusing on Southern Baptists and Methodists in South Carolina, Hawkins details how white evangelicals drew on biblical and theological arguments to oppose racial integration in their churches, public schools, and denominational colleges in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, as integration won the day at the legal and institutional levels, and as explicitly racist theological arguments for segregation grew unpopular, Hawkins describes how white evangelicals responded. This may sound familiar: they pulled their kids out of public school, citing declining educational standards, changed their focus to family values, and developed “a theology of colorblindness” (p. 127).