December 2024
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Highlights What are the main findings? Simplification of several complex theoretical attacks on DNP3 shows they can be executed with simpler methods, such as bypassing IP allow-list restrictions using ARP spoofing and dynamic NAT table modifications. Practical implementation of man-in-the-middle attacks demonstrated the ability to bypass IP allow-list restrictions on IEDs in a controlled environment, addressing challenges like sequence numbers and checksum adjustments. Real-world defense mechanisms, including protocol hardening, encryption, and anomaly detection, effectively mitigate or prevent DNP3 attacks when implemented correctly. What is the implication of the main finding? Recognizing that simpler methods can replicate complex attacks highlights the importance of robust basic security measures, such as IP allow-listing and protocol monitoring. The feasibility of bypassing standard configurations necessitates the integration of advanced authentication and encryption protocols in OT systems to strengthen security. Defense-in-depth strategies, supported by regulatory standards like NERC CIP, underscore the importance of operational measures, including continuous monitoring and SOC practices, for effective cybersecurity in critical infrastructure. Abstract OT (operational technology) protocols such as DNP3/TCP, commonly used in the electrical utility sector, have become a focal point for security researchers. We assess the applicability of attacks previously published from theoretical and practical points of view. From the theoretical point of view, previous work strongly focuses on transcribing protocol details (e.g., list fields at the link, transport, and application layer) without providing the rationale behind protocol features or how the features are used. This has led to confusion about the impact of many theoretical DNP3 attacks. After a detailed analysis around which protocol features are used and how, a review of the configuration capabilities for several IEDs (Intelligent Electrical Devices), and some testing with real devices, we conclude that similar results to several complex theoretical attacks can be achieved with considerably less effort. From a more practical point of view, there is existing work on DNP3 man-in-the-middle attacks; however, research still needs to discuss how to overcome a primary hardening effect: IEDs can be configured to allow for communication with specific IP addresses (allow list). For purely scientific purposes, we implemented a DNP3 man-in-the-middle attack capable of overcoming the IP allow-list restriction. We tested the attack using real IEDs and network equipment ruggedized for electrical environments. Even though the man-in-the-middle attack can be successful in a lab environment, we also explain the defense-in-depth mechanisms provided by industry in real life that mitigate the attack. These mechanisms are based on standard specifications, capabilities of the OT hardware, and regulations applicable to some electrical utilities.