Ronald Fadel's research while affiliated with Stanford University and other places

Publications (3)

Article
We consider how many bits need to be exchanged to implement a given decision rule when the mechanism must be ex post or Bayesian incentive compatible. For ex post incentive compatibility, the communication protocol must reveal enough information to calculate monetary transfers to the agents to motivate them to be truthful (agents' payoffs are assum...
Conference Paper
We propose a model that formalizes the beliefs of agents in strategic environments and restricts their possible behaviors, without the typical epistemic assumptions used in game theory. We formalize the beliefs of an agent using outsmarting belief systems (OBS) and then propose the notion of belief stability to explain why some OBSs, in particular...
Conference Paper
We consider the communication complexity of implementing a given decision rule when the protocol must also calculate payments to motivate the agents to be honest in an ex post equilibrium (agents' payoffs are assumed to be quasi-linear in such payments). We find that the communication cost of selfishness when measured with the average-case communic...

Citations

... The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (grants SES 0318447, ITR 0427770). Preliminary results from this work were reported in an extended abstract [7]. The authors thank Kester Tong for excellent research assistance. ...
... Van Zandt (2007) shows the difference between EPIC and DSIC in dynamic mechanisms under private values. Fadel and Segal (2009) examine the communication costs for determining an allocation and calculating the monetary transfer that induces incentive compatibility. They show that additional cost exists for calculating EPIC monetary transfers other than the communication cost of finding the desirable allocation. ...