Robert Young’s research while affiliated with Western University of Health Sciences and other places

This paper fits into a growing literature about the conceptualisation and measurement of strategic voting. Here we compare the results obtained by applying a ‘direct’ method of measurement based on respondents' reported preferences and behavior with those produced by an ‘indirect’ method that relies on modeling the voting act in both the absence and presence of variables about the parties' chances of winning. Our data are derived from a three-party contest in an single-member plurality system, the 1999 election in the province of Ontario. We find that the two methods converge closely in predicting the aggregate amount of strategic voting, a surprisingly low 4–6%. The direct method, however, is more useful when it comes to identifying which particular individuals did and did not vote strategically.

Secessions, even peaceful ones, are revolutionary events. This fact is obscured in some recent work on secession by economists, who neglect damage caused to the real economy while focussing on public ?nance. A converse mistake is made by other analysts when confronted with the passions and turmoil of secession. Some hold these characteristics to be beyond modelling while others build over-general models: more appropriate tools are game theory and the analysis of discourse. Finally, polarization is a phenomenon that links secessions with other kinds of revolution. Polarization involves political competition and “mutually pro?table antagonism”, and deserves further work.

According to the rational choice model, the calculus of voting takes the form of the equation R = BP - C, where the net rewards for voting (R) are a function of the instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome compared to others (B) and the probability (P) of casting the decisive vote that secures these benefits, minus the costs of becoming informed and going to the polls (C). Here, we provide a systematic test of this model. The analysis relies on two surveys, conducted during the 1995 Quebec referendum and the 1996 British Columbia provincial election, in which very specific questions measured each element of the model. As well, this study incorporates two other factors that can affect the propensity to vote – respondents' level of political interest and their sense of duty. We find that B, P, and C each matter, but only among those with a relatively weak sense of duty. The feeling that one has a moral obligation to vote is the most powerful motivation to go to the polls. We conclude that the rational choice model is useful, but only in explaining behaviour at the margins of this important norm.

The study presents the findings of an experiment conducted during the 1993 Canadian federal election campaign. Students in two universities were exposed to a ten-minute presentation about the rational model of voting and the 'paradox' that so many people vote when it is apparently irrational on a cost-benefit basis. Our data indicate that exposure to the presentation decreased turnout in the election by seven percentage points. This result contributes to the debate about the effect of rational-choice models on real political behavior. More important, the experimental panel data permit the presentation's effect to be decomposed, and this helps explain why people do vote. In this study, turnout was reduced mainly because the presentation diminished the respondents' sense of duty, an effect that was indirect, because there was no reference in the presentation to such motives. Framing the voting act in rational-choice terms induced some students to reconsider whether they should feel obliged to vote. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Rational choice theory has yet to provide a satisfactory explanation of voter turnout. One such account, minimax regret, is analyzed using data from a survey involving students at two Canadian universities during the 1993 Canadian federal election campaign. While the minimax regret hypothesis is supported at the bivariate level, it fails to pass a multivariate test in which other components of the calculus of voting are included. Minimax regret appears to be little more than a rationalization on the part of those having a strong sense of duty to vote. Peer Reviewed http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68661/2/10.1177_106591299504800408.pdf

Résumé Le texte examine 1'évolution de l'aide financière directe du gouvernement fédéral à I'industrie manufacturière canadienne entre 1960 et 1980. L'aide fournie, sans être négligeable, est moins substantielle que d'aucuns le laissent parfois entendre. Elle augmente sensiblement jusqu'en 1971 et diminue quelque peu par la suite. Le texte tente de démontrer que l'évolution de cette aide peut être interprétée en bonne partie comme un mécanisme de compensation à la réduction de la protection tarifaire et qu'elle est peu influencée par la conjoncture économique. Une dernière section traite des avantages et des coûts politiques de l'aide financière directe par rapport à d'autres instruments d'intervention: on suggère que la principale caractéristique de l'aide financière directe est sa discrimination, discrimination dont se méfient les milieux industriels.

In the discourse of Canadian political science, the term “province-building” has gained wide currency. Although not often defined explicitly, it denotes the recent evolution of more powerful and competent provincial administrations which aim to manage socioeconomic change in their territories and which are in essential conflict with the central government. In this analysis, the generalizations which constitute province-building are examined and most are found not to be adequately supported by the evidence now available. Some lines of research are indicated and it is suggested that this emotive and misleading concept be abandoned.RésuméDans la science politique au Canada, le concept de « province-building » est mainteriant courant. Le concept est rarement défini clairement mais il renvoie essentiellement à la constitution de gouvernements provinciaux compétents et puissants, qui cherchent à gérer le développement économique à l'intérieur de leurs frontières et qui entrent en conflit avec le gouvernement fédéral. Le texte réexamine les propositions qui constituent la thèse du « province-building ». La plupart de ces propositions ne sont pas confirmées par les faits et donnees disponibles. On conclut que le concept devrait être tout simplement abandonné. Quelques pistes de recherche sont finalement suggérées.

L’examen, sur une période de vingt ans, des programmes et des montants consacrés par les gouvernements du Québec et de l’Ontario à l’aide financière directe aux entreprises manufacturières est l’occasion d’aborder la question de la politique industrielle sous un angle nouveau. Ainsi, malgré la multiplication des programmes, il est étonnant de constater que la somme des subventions, prêts et cautionnements ne représente qu’une faible proportion des dépenses gouvernementales, de la valeur ajoutée et des investissements manufacturiers. D’autre part, on remarque que l’evolution de l’aide financière, contrairement à l’opinion la plus répandue, subit d’importantes fluctuations, dont nous tentons d’identifier les causes. Enfin la comparaison entre les deux provinces montre que si l’aide québécoise est la plus généreuse, les objectifs, et donc l’intention des Iégislateurs, sont fort comparables. En ce sens, on ne saurait affirmer que le Québec soit plus interventionniste que l’Ontario sa voisine.