Robert Meksin’s research while affiliated with New School and other places

If retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) is to play a role in the formation of collective memories, it should be long lasting. Although several studies have found that RIF is short-lived, there is other evidence to suggest that repeated selective practice schedules with a temporal gap between each practice trial may increase the durability of RIF. We tested this possibility in three experiments, focusing on socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting (SSRIF). In two experiments, participants studied scientific or story materials, then listened to someone selectively recall the material repeatedly, either in rapid succession or over an extended time period, and finally recalled the original materials either immediately, after a 1-week delay, or after a 3-week delay. A third experiment examined selective practice in free-flowing conversations. In each instance, RIF was found with repeated selective practice with a temporal gap between trials. The results are discussed in terms of the role RIF might play in the formation of collective memory.

When recalling autobiographical events, people not only retrieve event details but also the feelings they experienced. The current study examined whether people are able to consistently recall the intensity of past feelings associated with two consequential and negatively valenced events, i.e. the 9/11 attack (N = 769) and the COVID-19 pandemic (N = 726). By comparing experienced and recalled intensities of negative feelings, we discovered that people systematically recall a higher intensity of negative feelings than initially reported - overestimating the intensity of past negative emotional experiences. The COVID-19 dataset also revealed that individuals who experienced greater improvement in emotional well-being displayed smaller biases in recalling their feelings. Across both datasets, the intensity of remembered feelings was correlated with initial feelings and current feelings, but the impact of the current feelings was stronger in the COVID-19 dataset than in the 9/11 dataset. Our results demonstrate that when recalling negative autobiographical events, people tend to overestimate the intensity of prior negative emotional experiences with their degree of bias influenced by current feelings and well-being.

Despite considerable cognitive neuroscience research demonstrating that emotions can influence the encoding and consolidation of memory, research has failed to demonstrate a relationship between self-reported ratings of emotions collected soon after a traumatic event and memory for the event over time. This secondary analysis of data from a multisite longitudinal study of memories of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, asked the question of whether emotional language use could predict memory over time. In the 2 weeks following the 9/11 attacks, participants (N = 691; Mage = 36.8; 72% identifying as male; 76% identifying as white) wrote narratives about how they learned of the attacks and the impact of the attacks on them. Language features of these narratives were extracted using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count program and used to predict three types of memory: (a) event memory accuracy, (b) flashbulb memory consistency, and (c) emotion memory consistency. These outcomes were assessed at the time of writing, 1, 3, and 10 years after the 9/11 attacks. Results of linear mixed-effects models indicate that greater use of negative emotion words in narratives predicts better event memory accuracy 3 and 10 years after the attacks and worse flashbulb memory consistency 10 years after the attacks. However, emotion word use does not predict emotion memory consistency across time. We also examine whether other exploratory linguistic predictors are associated with memory over time. These findings suggest that written language may serve as a potential early indicator of memory over time.

When recalling autobiographical events, people retrieve not only the event details, but also the feelings they experienced. Past work with different measures of memories for feelings remain inconclusive, suggesting that people are either highly consistent or inconsistent with remembering feelings. The current study examined whether people are able to consistently recall the intensity of previous feelings associated with consequential and negatively valenced emotional events, i.e., the 9/11 attack (N = 769) and Covid-19 pandemic (N = 726). By comparing the initial and recalled intensities of negative feelings, we found that people systematically recall more intense negative feelings than they initially reported – overestimating the intensity of past negative emotional experience. The Covid-19 dataset further showed that people whose emotional well-being improved more demonstrate smaller biases in remembered feelings. Across both datasets, the remembered intensity of feelings correlated with initial feelings and were also influenced by current feelings, although the impact of the current feelings was stronger in the Covid-19 dataset than the 9/11 dataset. Our results suggest that when recalling negative autobiographical events, people tend to overestimate the intensity of experienced negative emotional experience with the degree of bias influenced by current feelings and well-being.

Despite considerable cognitive neuroscience research demonstrating that emotions can influence the encoding and consolidation of memory, research has failed to demonstrate a relationship between self-reported ratings of emotions collected soon after a traumatic event and memory for the event over time. This secondary analysis of data from a multi-site longitudinal study of memories of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, asked the question of whether emotional language use could predict memory over time. In the two weeks following the 9/11 attacks, participants (N = 691) wrote narratives about how they learned of the attacks and the impact of the attacks on them. Language features of these narratives were extracted using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count program and used to predict three types of memory: (1) flashbulb memory consistency, (2) event memory accuracy, and (3) emotion memory consistency. These outcomes were assessed at the time of writing, one, three, and 10 years after the 9/11 attacks. Least absolute shrinkage and selection operator regressions were used to narrow down language predictors examined. Results of linear mixed-effects models indicate that greater use of emotion words in narratives predicts decreased flashbulb memory consistency, event memory accuracy, and emotion memory consistency over time. Similarly, the use of cognitive processing words predicted decreased event memory accuracy, and emotional memory consistency. We also report other exploratory linguistic predictors associated with memory over time. These findings suggest that assessing language usage may serve as a sensitive means of measuring emotion for predicting its influence on memory over time.

A flashbulb memory is a highly detailed and vivid autobiographical memory for the circumstances in which one first learned of a surprising, consequential and emotionally arousing event. How retelling of different features of a flashbulb memory changes over time is not totally understood. Moreover, little is known about how the emotional feeling experienced by individuals when they learned about the event modulates these changes. In this study, we explored changes over time in American individuals’ retelling of their flashbulb memories of the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001. We conducted textual analysis of 824 testimonies collected from the same 206 individuals 1 week, 11, 25 and again 119 months after the attack. Results showed individuals were more likely to report temporal and emotional details in their retelling early after the event and spatial details in their long-term retelling. In addition, the intensity of emotions felt upon hearing the news about the attack influenced how individuals reported their flashbulb memories over time. Overall, this study provides further support for theories suggesting different rates of forgetting for different canonical features of emotional arousal events.

The jury is a defining component of the American criminal justice system, and the courts largely assume that the collaborative nature of jury deliberations will enhance jurors’ memory for important trial information. However, research suggests that this kind of collaboration, although sometimes improving memory, can also lead to incomplete and inaccurate “collective” memories. The present research examines whether jury deliberations, where individuals collaboratively recall and discuss trial evidence to render unanimous verdicts, might shape jurors’ memories through the robust phenomena of Within‐Individual and Socially Shared Retrieval‐Induced Forgetting (WI‐RIF and SS‐RIF, respectively). The results revealed no WI‐RIF or SS‐RIF. However, we did find evidence in the direction of Within‐Individual and Socially‐shared Retrieval Induced Facilitation (WI‐RIFA and SS‐RIFA, respectively) in speakers’ and listeners’ narrative and open‐ended recall of evidentiary details. The present results are discussed in terms of whether jurors’ goals during deliberation and the deliberation structure (e.g., six or more discussants) protect against forgetting, or whether possible methodological issues (e.g., the vast amount of information presented) eliminated WI‐RIF and SS‐RIF and, in turn, make drawing conclusions surrounding the mnemonic impact of jury deliberation difficult. Regardless, the present results suggest jury deliberations are quite limited in terms of how much evidence is actually discussed compared to the total of what could be discussed, and our methodology provides an ecologically valid baseline for future research to better understand the mnemonic consequences associated with jury deliberations and, in turn, jury decision making.

Flashbulb memories related to negative arousing event inform on traumatic memory processes, as well as trauma related disorder such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. These memories are not immutable photographs of the past experience, and there is now a general consensus about their retention over time. However, little is known on whether contextual and emotional aspects of memories change over the long-term. This longitudinal study aims to directly look at the textual content of testimonies provided by 206 participants at four times from 1 week to 10 years after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Our results suggest progressive changes and reconstruction in flashbulb memories over time. Memory for temporal and emotional details decreased, whereas memory for spatial details increased. We observed that intensity of the emotional response at the time of the event modulates the content of flashbulb memories and their change over time. As described for autobiographical memories, heightened emotional arousal during the event leads to attention focus on emotional salient stimuli increasing their recall one week after the attacks. Beyond the theoretical aspects of flash memory and the traumatic memory generated by this study, we show that the textual analysis of testimonies allows the subtle exploration of the dynamic mnemonic processes.

In the aftermath of a national tragedy, important decisions are predicated on judgments of the emotional significance of the tragedy in the present and future. Research in affective forecasting has largely focused on ways in which people fail to make accurate predictions about the nature and duration of feelings experienced in the aftermath of an event. Here we ask a related but understudied question: can people forecast how they will feel in the future about a tragic event that has already occurred? We found that people were strikingly accurate when predicting how they would feel about the September 11 attacks over 1-, 2-, and 7-year prediction intervals. Although people slightly under- or overestimated their future feelings at times, they nonetheless showed high accuracy in forecasting (a) the overall intensity of their future negative emotion, and (b) the relative degree of different types of negative emotion (i.e., sadness, fear, or anger). Using a path model, we found that the relationship between forecasted and actual future emotion was partially mediated by current emotion and remembered emotion. These results extend theories of affective forecasting by showing that emotional responses to an event of ongoing national significance can be predicted with high accuracy, and by identifying current and remembered feelings as independent sources of this accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record