Robert J. Barro’s research while affiliated with Harvard University and other places

In a rational-choice approach to religious conversion, the conversion rate depends on a person’s costs of switching religions and the costs of having one’s religion deviate from the type viewed as ideal. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) waves for 1991, 1998, 2008, and 2018 allow for calculations of country-wide conversion rates based on religious adherence at the time of each survey and a retrospective question that gauges adherence when the respondent was raised. The analysis applies to eight types of religion in 58 countries (129 total observations). The rate of conversion depends positively on measures of religious pluralism, negatively on official restrictions that inhibit conversion, negatively on a history of Communism, negatively on real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and positively on years of schooling. These empirical findings accord with predictions from the theoretical framework.

Empirical research on the determinants of economic growth typically neglects the influence of religion. To fill this gap, this study uses international survey data on religiosity for a broad panel of countries to investigate the effects of church attendance and religious beliefs on economic growth. To isolate the direction of causation from religiosity to economic performance, the estimation relies on instrumental variables suggested by an analysis in which church attendance and religious beliefs are the dependent variables. The instruments are variables for the presence of state religion and for regulation of the religion market, the composition of religious adherence, and an indicator of religious pluralism. Results show that economic growth responds positively to religious beliefs, notably beliefs in hell and heaven, but negatively to church attendance. That is, growth depends on the extent of believing relative to belonging. These results accord with a model in which religious beliefs influence individual traits that enhance economic performance. The beliefs are an output of the religion sector, and church attendance is an input to this sector. Hence, for given beliefs, higher church attendance signifies more resources used up by the religion sector.

Rates of COVID deaths, hospitalizations, and cases differ markedly across U.S. states, as do rates of vaccination. This study uses cross-state regressions to assess impacts of vaccinations on COVID outcomes. A number of familiar issues arise concerning cross-sectional regressions, including omitted variables, behavioral responses to vaccination, and reverse causation. The benefits from a field context and from the broad range of observed variations suggest the value from dealing with these issues. Results reveal sizable negative effects of vaccination on deaths, hospitalizations, and cases up to early December 2021, although vaccine efficacy seems to wane over time. The findings for deaths apply to all-cause excess mortality as well as COVID-related mortality. The estimates imply that one expected life saved requires 248 additional doses, with a marginal cost around $55000, far below typical estimates of the value of a statistical life. Results since December 2021 suggest smaller effects of vaccinations on deaths and, especially, hospitalizations and cases, possibly because of diminished effectiveness of vaccines against new forms of the virus, notably the omicron variant. A further possibility is that confidence engendered by vaccinations motivated individuals and governments to lessen non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as masking and social distancing.

In long-term data, the dynamic efficiency condition, r>g, holds when g is the growth rate of GDP if r is the return on equity, re, but not if r is the risk-free rate, rf. This pattern accords with a disaster-risk model that fits observed equity premia. The equilibrium may feature rf≤g, which does not signal dynamic inefficiency. In contrast, re>g is required for dynamic efficiency, implied by the model, and consistent with data. With complete markets, the representative consumer's transversality condition translates into a no-Ponzi constraint on the public debt that the government can issue asymptotically. Therefore, fiscal changes do not affect the net wealth of the representative consumer, and Ricardian Equivalence holds. This result also holds in an example with incomplete markets where individual ownership of capital stocks cannot be fully diversified.

El artículo aborda el reconocimiento oficial de santos y beatos en Latinoamérica y lo reconoce como un fenómeno decididamente moderno, en el marco de un proceso de fuga de católicos por conversiones hacia el protestantismo. En este contexto, la Iglesia católica ve las beatificaciones y canonizaciones como un arma apostólica para competir con el protestantismo y también con el comunismo. Se busca aumentar el entusiasmo por el catolicismo a través del reconocimiento de modelos de inspiración para la gente en América Latina. Esto encaja con el aumento de los nombramientos de beatos —mártires y confesores—, especialmente en América Latina, que comenzó con Juan Pablo II después de 1978 y continuó con Benedicto XVI y Francisco. También se ha buscado aumentar las categorías de personas que optan a la santidad, como laicos y casados, así como mártires pertenecientes a otros grupos etnolingüísticos indígenas.

A key issue for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is whether non-pharmaceutical public-health interventions (NPIs) retard death rates. Good information about causal effects from NPIs comes from flu-related excess deaths in large U.S. cities during the second wave of the Great Influenza Pandemic, September 1918-February 1919. The measured NPIs are in three categories: school closings, prohibitions of public gatherings, and quarantine/isolation. Although an increase in NPIs flattened the curve in the sense of reducing the ratio of peak to overall flu-related excess death rates, the estimated effect on overall deaths is small and statistically insignificant. These findings differ from those associated with COVID-19 in the sense that facemask mandates and usage seem to reduce COVID-related cases.

This paper investigates the quantity of safe assets. First, we estimate that the average safe-asset ratio (ratio of safe to total assets) in 34 OECD countries was 37% in 2015. Further, we document that this ratio is relatively stable over time. Second, we build a heterogeneous-agent model with rare disasters and risk aversion coefficients that accounts for i) the average level of the safe-asset ratio; ii) the stability of this ratio over time; iii) the observed risk-free rate of around 1.0% per year; and iv) the empirical unlevered equity premium of about 4.2%. The model also replicates the observed highly concentrated distributions of wealth and equity. Finally, Ricardian equivalence holds in our model: issuing additional government bonds has no effect on rates of return and the net quantity of safe assets. Surprisingly, the crowding-out coefficient for private bonds with respect to public bonds is around -0.5, a value found in empirical studies.

Data for 48 countries during the Great Influenza Pandemic imply flu-related deaths in 1918-1920 of 40 million, 2.1 percent of world population, implying 160 million deaths when applied to current population. Regressions with annual information on flu deaths 1918-1920 and war deaths during WWI imply flu-generated economic declines for GDP and consumption in the typical country of 6 and 8 percent, respectively. Higher flu death rates also decreased realized real returns on stocks and, especially, on short-term government bills.

Although economic growth has historically been an engine of prosperity in the United States, recent trends have generated uncertainty regarding the prospects for sustaining such growth. Economists disagree about the relative importance of many factors affecting future growth, including rapid technological advances, immigration, the growth of the financial sector, problems with the educational system, increasing income inequality, an aging population, and large fiscal imbalances that have not been addressed by the political system. This collection of chapters, authored by many of today's leading economists, addresses the prospects for economic growth in the United States over the next few decades. During a time of great economic uncertainty, this book engages with both sides in the debate over economic growth, focusing on policy options that increase the prospects for vigorous economic growth in the future.