April 2025
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2 Reads
Society
Historical understanding does not fit neatly into the categories of knowledge recognized by “analytic” philosophy. As a form of study, it is empirical and evidence-based, but does not issue in explanations that aim to be universal or law-like. It does not work with controlled experiments and has at most an indirect relation to the goals of prediction or control. In addition, it is guided by an effort to capture the outlook of a particular period and the historical subjects in it, while at the same time recognizing that the historian stands outside that outlook and must retain a critical relation to it. The relative absence of attention to the specificities of historical understanding in contemporary philosophy finds expression in philosophical methodology as well, particularly in the increasing role of thought-experiments and the refinement of case descriptions under the pressure of counter-examples. Here, the contrast of such thinking with historical understanding is stark. No one has the authority to stipulate what shall count as the relevant description, or what counts as mere “noise” versus what counts as the heart of the matter. A good part of the work of historical writing is finding and articulating the right level of description, the right vocabulary, one that does justice to both the contending parties at the time, and the heterogenous mix of relevant factors involved. Historical consciousness involves a sensitivity to how much is already presumed in the form of description of events, forces, and relations, well before any explicit presentation of an explanation of those events. These forms of thought and the questions they raise do not get much explicit attention in contemporary philosophy and it would benefit philosophical practice if they did.