Ramesh Thakur’s research while affiliated with Australian National University and other places

R2P is the international community’s organising principle for responding to mass atrocity crimes. It reflected and contributed to the shift from power towards norms as the pivot on which history turns. The old, discredited and discarded ‘humanitarian intervention’ represents the national interest and power end of the intervention spectrum. R2P is an effort to insert the global justice and normative end and has much better prospects of a convergence of legality and legitimacy in the use of force. It will be easier to prevent unilateral use of force by great powers if their interventionist instincts are moderated by the discipline of multilateral norms. R2P has a secure future because it is demand-driven. On the realism side of the ledger, many leaders rule on the basis of brute force and occasionally will commit atrocities. On the normative side, the better angels of most people in many countries will demand effective and timely action by governments and the UN to halt the atrocities and punish the perpetrators. R2P is the answer to the challenge of global justice being done and being seen to be done, both by states as the primary units of the global order but also by peoples in whom sovereignty ultimately resides. And it does so by reconciling several inherent tensions between competing interests, competing values, and competing interests and values: between the UN Security Council and the General Assembly; between human and national security; between states and the international community; between institutionalised indifference and unilateral intervention; and between the global North and South.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, encompassing the three symbiotically linked responsibilities to prevent, respond and rebuild, was unanimously adopted at the United Nations World Summit in 2005. The responsibility to rebuild needs to be re-elevated to prominence as an integral component of R2P: conceptually, normatively and operationally; and its institutional homes in the UN system and the Secretary-General’s role clarified. The 2009 three pillar formulation of R2P works well in most contexts, but is problematic in that it buries and loses sight of the critical importance of the original ICISS third ‘responsibility to rebuild’ and reconstruct war-raved societies to the point of being viable and self-sustaining once again. Because R2P was adopted at a world summit, I begin by highlighting the distinctive attributes of summit diplomacy. Next, I derive some key lessons from the major international interventions of the twenty-first century and recall the context in which R2P was originally formulated in order to highlight the distinctive features of its contribution to international policy. I then describe three dimensions of the responsibility to rebuild – recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation – and the strategies and steps needed for the rebuilding agenda. Recalling that Security Council authorization of R2P coercive operations is a non-negotiable prerequisite, I suggest that the responsibility to rebuild can be reintroduced and implemented through the administrative and political leadership roles of the Secretary-General.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has served as the normative anchor of global nuclear orders since 1968. Remarkably successful with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation, it has failed to achieve nuclear disarmament. In 2017, geopolitical tensions had intensified in several regions across the world; there were no nuclear arms control negotiations between any of the nuclear-armed states and two of the leaders of countries with nuclear weapons appeared volatile and unpredictable. With fewer warheads but spread amongst more countries, some in conflict-prone regions, nuclear risks and threats have grown, as has the realisation that the world lacks the capacity to cope with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. Like-minded states and civil society advocates teamed up to heighten the consciousness of nuclear dangers and convened a United Nations-mandated conference to negotiate a prohibition treaty adopted on 7 July. In the ensuing bifurcated global nuclear order, it has become necessary to reconcile latent tensions between the two nuclear regimes, for example with regard to safeguards standards, institutional linkages, and enforcement agencies.

By refusing to sign the new UN Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty, Japan has put itself on the wrong side of history, geography, legality, morality, and humanity. The treaty is part of the broad historically progressive trend since 1945 to limit and abolish nuclear weapons and their use. The normative architecture includes the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, regional nuclear weapon-free zones, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Geographically, global nuclear risks and threats exist in especially acute form in the Asia-Pacific and most states of the region voted solidly for the ban treaty. The NPT’s legal obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons was strengthened by the World Court’s Advisory Opinion in 1996. Most countries and peoples of the world overwhelmingly abhor the bomb as deeply immoral. The ban treaty expresses their collective moral revulsion and is rooted in humanitarian principles.

The responsibility to rebuild needs to be re-elevated to prominence as an integral component of R2P: conceptually, normatively and operationally; and its institutional homes in the un system and the Secretary-General's role clarified. The 2009 three pillar formulation of R2P works well in most contexts, but is problematic in that it buries and loses sight of the critical importance of the original iciss third ' responsibility to rebuild' and reconstruct war-raved societies to the point of being viable and self-sustaining once again. We derive some key lessons from the major international interventions of the twenty-first century and recall the context in which R2P was originally formulated in order to highlight the distinctive features of its contribution to international policy. We then describe three dimensions of the responsibility to rebuild – recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation – and the strategies and steps needed for the rebuilding agenda. Recalling that Security Council authorisation of R2P coercive operations is a nonnegotiable prerequisite, we suggest that the responsibility to rebuild can be reintroduced and implemented through the administrative and political leadership roles of the Secretary-General.

The stability of the global order is a function of the reconciliation between universal ethical principles and power asymmetries. Both principles and power are embedded in international institutions. As relative power shifts away from the West, the ability of the latter to exempt themselves from the reach of global norms—on human rights, international criminal justice, the rule of law, the use of force, the possession of nuclear weapons—will lessen. They will have to accommodate to the new normal either by bringing their conduct within the operation of international normative instruments, or else risk mass defections from global regimes. The relative loss of power means they have a material interest in strengthening, not weakening, a rules-based global order.

The five countries known as brics, while not homogeneous in interests, values, and policy preferences, do have a common interest in checking US/Western power and influence through collaboration with non-Western powers. They vary considerably but all are ahead of other developing countries on population, military power, economic weight, geopolitical clout, and global reach and engagement. They are unrepresentative of the typical developing country in terms of interest, capacity, and resources, but they can represent the interests and goals of developing countries as a group on those issues for which the North–South division is salient. The diversity within brics, their differences from other developing countries, and their potential to reflect and represent the global South are explored with respect to climate change, finance, trade, aid, human rights and intervention, and development. It remains unclear whether brics can morph from a countervailing economic grouping to a powerful political alternative.