Peter Godfrey-Smith’s research while affiliated with The University of Sydney and other places

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Publications (24)


Simulation scenarios and philosophy
  • Article

December 2024

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1 Citation

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Peter Godfrey‐Smith

Support US OCTOPUS Act to keep octopuses wild
  • Article
  • Full-text available

August 2024

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437 Reads

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2 Citations

Science

Jennifer Jacquet

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Peter Godfrey-Smith

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[...]

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Richard York
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Evolutionary relationships between some animal groups. Branches are not to scale, ranks are mixed, and many groups are omitted (including ctenophores, whose placement is uncertain). The “Bilaterian LCA” is the last common ancestor of extant bilaterian animals. This is the last common ancestor of a human and an octopus. “Loph/Ecdys LCA” is the last common ancestor of Lophotrochozoa and Ecdysozoa, hence the last common ancestor of an octopus and a bee. Red shading on branches indicates conspicuous behavioral complexity.
Inferring Consciousness in Phylogenetically Distant Organisms

July 2024

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15 Reads

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3 Citations

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

The neural dynamics of subjectivity (NDS) approach to the biological explanation of consciousness is outlined and applied to the problem of inferring consciousness in animals phylogenetically distant from ourselves. The NDS approach holds that consciousness or felt experience is characteristic of systems whose nervous systems have been shaped to realize subjectivity through a combination of network interactions and large-scale dynamic patterns. Features of the vertebrate brain architecture that figure in other accounts of the biology of consciousness are viewed as inessential. Deep phylogenetic branchings in the animal kingdom occurred before the evolution of complex behavior, cognition, and sensing. These capacities arose independently in brain architectures that differ widely across arthropods, vertebrates, and cephalopods, but with conservation of large-scale dynamic patterns of a kind that have an apparent link to felt experience in humans. An evolutionary perspective also motivates a strongly gradualist view of consciousness; a simple distinction between conscious and nonconscious animals will probably be replaced with a view that admits differences of degree, perhaps on many dimensions.



Reafference and the origin of the self in early nervous system evolution

February 2021

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449 Reads

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54 Citations

Discussions of the function of early nervous systems usually focus on a causal flow from sensors to effectors, by which an animal coordinates its actions with exogenous changes in its environment. We propose, instead, that much early sensing was reafferent ; it was responsive to the consequences of the animal's own actions. We distinguish two general categories of reafference—translocational and deformational—and use these to survey the distribution of several often-neglected forms of sensing, including gravity sensing, flow sensing and proprioception. We discuss sensing of these kinds in sponges, ctenophores, placozoans, cnidarians and bilaterians. Reafference is ubiquitous, as ongoing action, especially whole-body motility, will almost inevitably influence the senses. Corollary discharge—a pathway or circuit by which an animal tracks its own actions and their reafferent consequences—is not a necessary feature of reafferent sensing but a later-evolving mechanism. We also argue for the importance of reafferent sensing to the evolution of the body-self , a form of organization that enables an animal to sense and act as a single unit. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens’.


Integration, lateralization, and animal experience

January 2021

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42 Reads

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8 Citations

Mind & Language

Many vertebrate animals approximate, to various degrees, the “split‐brain” condition that results from surgery done in humans to treat severe epilepsy, with very limited connection between the left and right sides of the upper parts of the brain. The split‐brain condition has been the topic of extensive philosophical discussion, because it appears, in some circumstances, to give rise to two minds within one body. Is the same true of these animals? This article attempts to make progress on two difficult topics—animal experience, and the consequences of the human split‐brain condition—by considering both at once.


Reafference and the origin of the self in early nervous system evolution

October 2020

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68 Reads

Discussions of the function of early nervous systems usually focus on a causal flow from sensors to effectors, by which an animal coordinates its actions with exogenous changes in its environment. We propose, instead, that much early sensing was reafferent; it was responsive to the consequences of the animal's own actions. We distinguish two general categories of reafference – translocational and deformational – and use these to survey the distribution of several often-neglected forms of sensing, including gravity sensing, flow sensing, and proprioception. We discuss sensing of these kinds in sponges, ctenophores, placozoans, cnidarians and bilaterians. Reafference is ubiquitous, as ongoing action, especially whole-body motility, will almost inevitably influence the senses. Corollary discharge – a pathway or circuit by which an animal tracks its own actions and their reafferent consequences – is not a necessary feature of reafferent sensing but a later- evolving mechanism. We also argue for the importance of reafferent sensing to the evolution of the body-self, a form of organization that enables an animal to sense and act as a single unit.


Scientific Realism and Epistemic Optimism

October 2020

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37 Reads

Many people understand scientific realism as including a qualified commitment to the reality of the posits of current scientific theories, and/or optimism about the capacity of science to give us theories that are largely true. Devitt is an example, and I’ll use his views to develop some criticisms of this approach. I’ll also discuss structural realism, pessimistic inductions from the history of science, and related topics.


Communication and representation understood as sender–receiver coordination

June 2020

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79 Reads

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31 Citations

Mind & Language

Modeling work by Brian Skyrms and others in recent years has transformed the theoretical role of David Lewis's 1969 model of signaling. The latter can now be understood as a minimal model of communication in all its forms. In this article, we explain how the Lewis model has been generalized, and consider how it and its variants contribute to ongoing debates in several areas. Specifically, we consider connections between the models and four topics: The role of common interest in communication, signaling within the organism, meaning, and the evolution of human communication and language.


Models, Fictions, and Conditionals

January 2020

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17 Reads

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11 Citations

This chapter discusses recent debates about scientific models and fictional or imaginary systems. Model-based science often apparently deals in non-actual or fictional systems, and does so by design. This practice raises questions about the relationships that can exist between such models and their real-world targets, especially about the evident empirical utility of some highly idealized scientific models. The chapter considers a range of recent treatments of models and offers an account that gives a central role to counterfactual conditionals. This chapter takes these conditionals to be the typical output of scientific modeling. These conditionals raise many problems of their own, but understanding models in these terms does enable some progress.


Citations (17)


... These views entail that no silicon-based system can be conscious as a matter of principle. 121 Peter Godfrey-Smith, who has argued for such a view, is "skeptical about the existence of non-animal" consciousness at present, including AI consciousness (Godfrey-Smith, 2020), though he also notes that his view "would not suggest a barrier to artificial consciousness per se, but a need for new architectures if such systems were to be built" (Godfrey-Smith, 2024). Other theorists express skepticism about AI consciousness on current hardware for similar reasons (Seth, 2021;Shiller, 2024). ...

Reference:

Taking AI Welfare Seriously
Inferring Consciousness in Phylogenetically Distant Organisms

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

... It resonates because I will often think such things, then do such things. My brain must have a model of me, a causal model, as knowing which way I am looking at a street crossing makes the difference between a safe and fatal next step (Jekely et al., 2021). The brain uses Peter behaving as the avatar for Peter thinking. ...

Reference:

Agency
Reafference and the origin of the self in early nervous system evolution

... Looking at the data on people with split brains, de Haan et al. [22] pointed out that perception appears to be lateralized while actions are bilateral. Discussing what these studies tell us, Godfrey-Smith [33] pointed out that a person or animal is a coherent unified agent, presumably with consciousness. As an agent, it has a point of view (also see [34]). ...

Integration, lateralization, and animal experience
  • Citing Article
  • January 2021

Mind & Language

... The striking behavioural abilities and flexibility of Octopus vulgaris and other cephalopods have populated literary and scientific domains for centuries [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. The common octopus is one of the best studied animals among cephalopod molluscs, due to the physiology, richness of the behavioural repertoire, and marked learning capabilities [7,[12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22]. ...

Octopus experience
  • Citing Article
  • January 2019

Animal Sentience

... While this approach may face formidable economic realities, the shift to proactive welfare protection has an important role to play in the policies and ongoing debate about the expansion of aquaculture. An example of a proactive approach is the recent ban in octopus farming in a jurisdiction in the United States (Washington State) (49) and a proposed national ban (50), in part because of welfare concerns as many species of octopus are primarily solitary and carnivorous, with the potential to be cannibalistic, and demonstrate high levels of behavioral flexibility and cognitive complexity (51,52). Second, the reliability and utility of research addressing aquaculture expansion will benefit from foregrounding the heterogeneity of the industry and considering a broad spectrum of trade-offs with intensified specificity. ...

The octopus mind and the argument against farming it

Animal Sentience

... 16 Note that Canguilhem did not hold that animal diseases are a mere social construction and I have highlighted the importance of a phenomenological view of animal health and suffering elsewhere [48]. To tie the concept of health to the notion of subjectivity, however, might lead us to restrict these concepts to all and only those animals deemed conscious, thus transforming the debate into an even more perplexing one about the boundaries of animal sentience [49][50][51]. among veterinarians we can conceive of two extreme cases: either the concept is merely constructed for human purposes such as animal farming and slaughter, thus classifying animals as pathological would be akin to the way in which drapetomania was hypothesized as a disease that explained why African slaves fled from captivity; or despite the involvement of human interests and funding for research into minimizing pathologies that cause a loss of yield, we find that there is no differences in how biologists treat the concept, i.e. in a purely objective way. The possibilities are manifold. ...

Petition to Include Cephalopods as "Animals" Deserving of Humane Treatment under the Public Health Service Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals

... It does not require that the agent's internal states possess intrinsic meaning. All that is needed is some behavioural regularity, not internal representations and therefore not even an intended meaning (see Grim et al. 2004a;Grim et al. 2004b;Planer & Godfrey-Smith 2021). Because of this, one cannot second-guess the meaning of some object or event without knowing of other agents' responses to it; the whole point of communication and many other social interactions is to base one's behaviour on other agents' behaviour. ...

Communication and representation understood as sender–receiver coordination
  • Citing Article
  • June 2020

Mind & Language

... The idea that the content of a model can be captured via a counterfactual conditional, where the antecedent is a conjunction of all of the model's assumptions and the consequent a conjunction of all the predictions that follow from these, is not new (see Godfrey-Smith, 2020;McLoone, 2021;Plutynski, 2006;Sober, 2011;Sugden, 2009). Examining which assumptions go into models brings up another typical feature of counterfactuals in science: many are counternomics or countermetaphysicals. 1 This is not surprising considering the fact that models usually contain idealisations, abstractions, approximations, analogies, etc. Idealising away from problematic features is necessary in order to make phenomena mathematically and computationally tractable, and abstracting away from explanatory irrelevant features is needed for explanatory success, which often requires striking a balance between generality and depth (see Strevens, 2008). ...

Models, Fictions, and Conditionals
  • Citing Chapter
  • January 2020

... The philosopher Karl Popper is still enormously popular with natural scientists in general and biologists in particular, even though in recent discussion in academic philosophy of science, he definitely seems to be fading (Godfrey-Smith, 2007). As an example of his popularity we can read the following statement from the cladists: "we agree with Medawar's characterization of Popper as 'incomparably the greatest philosopher of science that has ever been' … and we urge every systematist to acquire some knowledge of his work. ...

Popper’s Philosophy of Science: Looking Ahead
  • Citing Chapter
  • June 2016