Per Anders Rudling's research while affiliated with Lund University and other places

... 23 Both had collaborated with the Nazis and were collectively responsible for the deaths of thousands of Jews and of up to one hundred thousand Poles. 24 Despite its initial collaboration, a faction of the OUN led by Stepan Bandera broke with the Germans after declaring an independent Ukrainian state in 1941. Bandera himself ended the war incarcerated in a German concentration camp. ...

... given the order to leave Lviv on 7 June. The unit was disbanded in August, with its members being sent as a part of Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 to Belarus (Kal'ba 2008;Rudling 2020). In early 1943, this group was disarmed and its officers were arrested. ...

... Similar examples could be found in the sterilization programmes in the Czech Republic (Shmidt 2020). In Ukraine, racial configuration was modelled on eugenic ideology (Rudling 2019). In Bulgaria, the ultimate aim of eugenics programmes was to engineer a new national identity through an endorsement of an ideal Bulgarian "race".I nHungary, it was a popular belief that eugenics would add to the social transformation of the Hungarian nation. ...

... The polarised division in Belarusian memory is most pronounced in relation to the short period of Belarusian independence in the early twentieth century, when the short-lived Belarusian People's Republic (BNR) and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) offered differing visions and experiences of national cultures and autonomies. The opposition between these visions is captured in debates on what are to be the national colours (Leshchenko 2004;Rudling 2017). The white-red-white flag first appeared as Belarus' flag in 1918 during the brief independence of the BNR. ...

... The Concept tends to glorify the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) presenting them as any other victims of Nazism (Kontseptsiya 2018, 51-53). This is problematic due to the collaboration of many nationalist leaders with the Nazis (Burakovskiy 2011;Oldberg 2011;Rossolinski-Liebe 2012;Rudling 2016). The authors of the Concept are critical of the idea of dedicating a central memorial to the Jewish Holocaust and name this point of view "an incorrect vision, which is popular in Jewish, Western, Liberal-Russian, and other post-Soviet circles" (Kontseptsiya 2018, 5). ...

... In the years since the publication of the 2009 special issue, the import of these observations, regarding the contestation of commemoration, has only increased. Recent studies have been published examining the repression (and resurfacing) of collective pasts in a variety of settings, including: the ways that war memorials were used to placate the seditious working classes following the bloody First World War (Abousnnouga & Machin, 2013); the pressure brought by Ukrainian-Canadian lobby groups to ignore or whitewash Ukrainian antisemitic atrocities during World War II in the Canadian Museum for Human Rights (Ball & Rudling, 2014); a racialised debate in response to a monument erected to an enslaved Black woman, which exposed the myth of Bermuda's benign slavery (Swan, 2012); the manipulation of public history in post-Communist Europe (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014); and the disruptive and affective dimensions to the transnational counter-monumental installations known as Stolpersteine (Krzyżanowska, 2016;Rheindorf, 2019;Wodak, 2018). In response, Laws are often enacted to counteract or frustrate these discursive challenges, enforcing a particular narrative at the expense of others, whether this might mean the French state's use of law to maintain a particular narrative of French colonialism (Löytömäki, 2013), the different political functions of memory laws in Western and Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Russia (Koposov, 2017) or erasing the history of the Palestinian minority in order to amplify the memory the Jewish majority in Israel (Gutman & Tirosh, 2021). ...

... At the same time, in spring 1943, the Division SS "Galicia" was formed through the mobilization of Ukrainian volunteers and members of the police battalions (Rudling, 2012b). Regarding the formation of the Division and the recruitment of the Ukrainian population, initially the OUN-UPA did not express a consistent position. ...

... In the region, eugenic programme was considered an important aspect of nation formation often a shift between national discourse and science of improvement that was apparent in nearly all nations in CEE. For example, eugenics in Russia was not just an intellectual exercise, as part of the processes of nation formation in the 1920s, eugenics was aimed at a specific composition of the Russian nation and "races" (Rudling 2014). Also, the construction of Belarusian nation was based on the eugenic activities already established in Germany and Soviet Russia. ...

... In 1965, a large memorial "To the Victims of Fascism" was opened in Ukrainian Donetsk. In 1969, the Memorial Complex Khatyn' was completed in Belarus, on the site of a former village where the Slavic population was fully exterminated by the Nazis (Rudling 2012;Kotljarchuk 2013). A focus on civilian victims created opportunities for including the memory of Roma and Jewish genocides into the major memory narrative of the Nazi occupation. ...

... The Ukrainian diaspora in the West (especially in Canada) was responsible for the development of the "fighting and suffering regime," in which the OUN and the UPA were portrayed as brave heroes who died for an independent Ukrainian state, and Holodomor was constructed into a major Ukrainian national trauma. The construction of this memory discourse included creation of narratives focusing on monumental "national" traumas and building of monuments to commemorate Holodomor and resistance fighters (e.g., a monument to Roman Shukhevych in Edmonton, Canada, and a monument to the Ukrainian war veterans also in Edmonton) (Rudling 2011a). ...