Pablo Querubin's research while affiliated with New York University and other places

Publications (6)

Article
Full-text available
The outbreak of COVID-19 has called for swift action by governments, often involving the adoption of restrictive measures such as lockdowns. In this context, leaders have faced a trade-off between imposing stringent measures to limit the contagion, and minimizing the short-run costs on their national economy, which could impact their electoral pros...
Article
This study uses discontinuities in U.S. strategies employed during the Vietnam War to estimate their causal impacts. It identifies the effects of bombing by exploiting rounding thresholds in an algorithm used to target air strikes. Bombing increased the military and political activities of the communist insurgency, weakened local governance, and re...
Article
Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them to do so. This article theorizes about two drivers of brokers' efforts: (1) incentives-monetary rewards or sanctions-and monitoring and (2) partisan attachment. We examine our theory using data on the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE)...
Article
In many democracies a small subset of individuals enjoys a de facto electoral advantage. The existence of political dynasties, where individuals from a narrow set of families obtain larger vote shares and are more likely to access office, illustrates this phenomenon. In this paper, I study political dynasties in the Philippines and provide evidence...
Article
Despite its prevalence, little is known about when parties buy turnout. We emphasize the problem of parties monitoring local brokers with incentives to shirk. Our model suggests that parties extract greater turnout buying effort from their brokers where they can better monitor broker performance and where favorable voters would not otherwise turn o...

Citations

... After all, more mobile societies are likely to transport and transmit the virus at a higher rate than less mobile societies, so the public health benefits of stringent policy responses should be higher [13], which would imply a positive association between mobility and policy stringency. On the other hand, it may be more economically and politically costly for policymakers to impose stringent regulations on a more geographically mobile society [14,15], which would imply a negative association between mobility and policy stringency. In considering these costs and benefits of policy stringency as a function of mobility, our estimations in Tables 1, 2 imply that on net, higher mobility seems to impact the cost side of policy stringency more than the benefit side. ...
... Our research adds to the body of evidence pointing to a negative legacy of hardline military policies. There is a continuing debate about the effectiveness of winning hearts and minds versus hardline policies like indiscriminate bombing (Dell & Querubin, 2017). The latter was the mainstream strategy of the United States following WWII because Japan's postwar recovery was seen as a successful precedent along this line. ...
... For example, when brokers are strong supporters who share the partisan leaning of the patron, they seem to have fewer incentives to be disloyal. This is the case of the Mexican Teachers' Union, as studied by Larreguy, Montiel Olea, and Querubin (2017), whose members are effective brokers when mobilizing voters in favor of their preferred party. Political parties can also offer private rewards, such as career advancement or resources (Camp 2015) and create incentives to deliver the votes (Szwarcberg 2014). ...
... políticos provindos do universo do entretenimento, que transportaram seu estilo "rude e falastrão" dessa esfera para a esfera política e incorporaram o discurso anti-establishment.Nenhum exemplo foi citado. Parlamentares eleitos em nível nacional que já tinham sido eleitos em outros níveis de governo foram definidos como contraexemplos de outsider.(Fergusson et al., 2021) Partidos de esquerda em eleições municipais Grupos políticos de esquerda que tradicionalmente foram excluídos da participação político-eleitoral, em um país dominado por elites nacionais da direita, dos partidos Conservador e Liberal. ...
... Empirical efforts have also been growing that helped uncover key insights and measurements sharpening Philippine political analysis. Typically, these academic endeavors center around explaining the persistence of political dynasties (Querubin 2016) and its relation to poverty (Mendoza et al. 2012). Others examined how politician family networks are strong predictors of candidacy and electoral success since "candidates for public office are disproportionately drawn from more central families, and family network centrality contributes to higher vote shares during the elections" (Cruz, Labonne, and Querubín 2017, 3034). ...
... O ur work seeks to better understand the relation between clientelist intermediaries and politicians-particularly in relation to brokers' decisions to remain loyal or cheat on their patrons. Territorial brokers (or intermediaries-we use these terms interchangeably) are important players in clientelist relations in several nations around the world (Gingerich 2014;Mares and Young 2016), and there is growing interest in political science about their preferences and decisions (Gottlieb 2017;Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015;Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016;Novaes 2018;Stokes et al. 2013;Zarazaga 2014). We define territorial brokers as people who live in the poorer neighborhoods they serve and solve day-to-day problems that their neighbors suffer regularly. ...