P. Pollard's research while affiliated with University of Central Lancashire and other places

Publications (18)

Article
Bachman (1993), studying a National Crime Survey sample between 1987 and 1990, concluded that rape survivors were not more likely to report to the police if the victimization was perpetrated by a stranger, and she suggested that because of recent legal reforms and media campaigns “particularly victims of date and acquaintance rape... may be no long...
Article
This paper reviews work on the relation between pornography and sexual aggression, covering experimental research on arousal, attitudes, and laboratory aggression, and some correlational studies. The termpornography is intended to cover the materials used in the relevant research, although not all of these would necessarily be seen as “pornographic...
Article
The study is concerned with the question of whether robust biases in reasoning can be reduced or eliminated by verbal instruction in principles of reasoning. Three experiments are reported in which the effect of instructions upon the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning is investigated. Belief bias is most clearly marked by a tendency for su...
Article
In studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, an interaction between logical validity and the believability of the conclusion has been found; in essence, logic has a larger effect on unbelievable than on believable conclusions. Two main explanations have been proposed for this finding. The selective scrutiny account claims that peo...
Article
This paper reviews the effects on subjects' judgements of a variety of factors that have been included in experimental depictions of rape. The focus is on attribution of responsibility or fault to the victim or attacker and related judgements, particularly regarding guilt and sanctions. Generally, females make more pro-victim judgements than do mal...
Chapter
Two experiments are reported in which subjects are asked to assess the validity of deductive arguments whose conclusions vary in prior believability. Both experiments demonstrate a "belief bias" effect, in which subjects tend to rate conclusions as more valid when they conform with prior beliefs. This finding is generalised over several procedural...
Article
Griggs and Cox (1982) reported a phrasing of the Wason selection task that produces considerable facilitation. Two experiments are reported here that break down aspects of this problem in an attempt to determine the key to this effect. In the first experiment, it is shown that neither the content of drinks and age per se, nor the evocation of a det...
Article
Several experiments are reported in which subjects are asked to make intuitive judgements about normally distributed samples. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated judgements about population means as a function of the mean, size and variability of the samples. Trends to take account of all three factors, in the normative direction, were shown, but samp...
Article
Recent investigations of intuitive statistical inference have been far less optimistic regarding man’s ability as an “intuitive statistician” than were Peterson and Beach in 1967. Work on judgments of variance and central tendency formed a significant part of Peterson and Beach’s review but is now regarded as peripheral. Work in this area is discus...
Article
Recent research on reasoning has shown that problem content is highly effective in mediating responses. This has been interpreted as support for the idea that reasoning responses are a function of the subjects' prior experience. However, although compelling, this interpretation is based on indirect evidence. When differential responses are observed...
Article
Three experiments are reported that investigate the weighting attached to logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Substantial belief biases were observed despite controls for possible conversions of the premises. Equally substantial effects of logic were observed despite controls for two possible response biases. A consistent interaction between...
Article
Kahneman and Tversky's (1972) construct of ‘representativeness’ as a mediator of statistical judgements has been subjected to several recent criticisms. The present study allows test of the hypothesis that individuals differ in their use of the representativeness heuristic. Tasks are devised which permit measure of two types of judgemental error at...
Article
This paper discusses some possible ways in which the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) may mediate subjects' responses to experimental 'reasoning' tasks. A brief review of some effects of availability in other areas is given and then the application of availability to reasoning data is considered with respect to problems employing...
Article
‘Food and drinks’ is a thematic content known not to produce differential performance to abstract content on the Wason selection task. To examine the effects of context on problem responses, this content was set in a ‘diet’ context, predicted to produce differential performance, and this context was compared both with the ‘food and drinks’ presenta...
Article
This paper concerns the differential effects of use of ‘thematic’, rather than abstract (symbolic), content on the ‘Wason selection task’. An effect of thematic content has been reported several times, originally by Wason & Shapiro (1971), but Manktelow & Evans (1979) report five experiments that failed to obtain an effect and argue against the val...
Article
On defining rationality unreasonably - Volume 4 Issue 3 - J. St. B. T. Evans, P. Pollard

Citations

... Although this processing operates automatically and is extremely beneficial (allowing for decision making to be quicker and more accurate), paradoxically, it has also been shown to be the source of what is known as cognitive bias causing (at times) judgment and decision making to be unreliable (e.g. Evans & Pollard 1990;Nickerson 1998;Nisbett & Ross 1980). This has been particularly notable when decisions are being made under conditions of uncertainty (e.g. ...
... First, our version of the Wason card selection task instructed participants to select two cards, whereas in the traditional version of the task, participants can select as many cards as they think are needed to determine a rule's veracity. Whereas the two-card selection method results in a dichotomous accuracy measure (i.e., correct or incorrect), continuous accuracy measures and strategy profiles can be computed when participants are told to select as many cards as they think are necessary (see Pollard & Evans, 1987;Stanovich & West, 1998b). Doing so would have provided more nuance to our understanding of how participants completed the Wason task and could lead to larger observed correlations by maximizing between-subjects variance. ...
... He instead points to patterns of illusions, which might be active during reasoning and could lead to faulty conclusions. Evans and Pollard (1981) criticized this line of argumentation, as it offers low practical relevance. Specifically, they consider that realistic tasks could also lead to biases, as personal experiences and emotions can influence the participants' behavior. ...
... A unique advantage of this new interpretation of certain normatively incorrect responses is that it avoids certain assumptions about individuals' understanding of the law of large numbers. While the work of Tversky and Kahneman suggested that the law of small numbers-an application to small numbers of the law of large numbers, which "guarantees that very large samples will indeed be highly representative of the population from which they are drawn" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, p. 106)-was related to the representativeness heuristic, subsequent research (e.g., Evans & Pollard, 1981;Kunda & Nisbett, 1986;Stohl, 2005) has demonstrated that individuals do not AIEM, número 11, mayo de 2017 always have a proper understanding of the law of large numbers. Consequently, as Chernoff and Russell (2012a) recognized, the assumption that when individuals appear to be employing the law of small numbers, they have an appropriate understanding of the law of large numbers to make such an application, is worthy of note. ...
... Bachman's (1993) study has been criticized for both conceptual and methodological reasons (e.g., Pollard 1995;Ruback 1993). For example, Clay-Warner and Burt (2005) reported that rape victims in the 1990s, regardless of if they knew their attacker or not, were more likely to report their assault to the police than those who were victimized prior to 1974. ...
... Training in logic is also shown to increase the understanding of logic rules such as logical necessity (i.e., a conclusion necessarily follows [or does not follow] from its premises and hence it is valid [or invalid]) and logical possibility (i.e., a conclusion is only possible given its premises and hence it is invalid). For example, Evans et al. (1994) found that whilst a simple instruction to consider logical necessity was not successful in reducing reasoning biases, more complex training including a more elaborated explanation of argument structures and a stronger emphasis on the concept of logical necessity improved reasoning accuracy by minimizing, but not eliminating, belief bias. Similarly, training participants in the logical necessity concept using verbal explanations and Venn diagrams has been successful in increasing the accuracy in evaluating logical (i.e., necessary) and pseudo-logical (i.e., possible) syllogisms (Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009). ...
... Studies investigating whether this is the case, however, report mixed results. Under some conditions, both infants (Gweon, Tenenbaum, & Schulz, 2010;Xu & Denison, 2009;Xu & Garcia, 2008) and adults (e.g., Evans & Pollard, 1985) show an ability to infer population properties from samples and even seem to take complex features of the sampling process into account (Gweon et al., 2010). However, a substantial body of research suggests that people are naïve with respect to several aspects of the processes that shape samples. ...
... learning task where, using our example, participants observe a series of destination/mode of transport pairs (Anderson & Sheu, 1995;Hattori & Oaksford, 2007). The trial-by-trial approach has been used only once before in studying conditional reasoning (Pollard & Evans, 1983). However, those experiments used a continuous rather than a discrete format (Anderson & Sheu, 1995;Hattori & Oaksford, 2007) that focuses attention on the conditional probabilities like providing samples from these distributions (Oaksford & Chater, 1996). ...
... The U.S. Presidential Commission on Obscenity and Pornography [12] concluded there was no evidence of a relationship between exposure to pornography and subsequent aggression, particularly in sexual crimes. Since the Commission revealed this conclusion, numerous experimental studies have investigated causal relationships between pornography exposure and aggressive behavior [4,[13][14][15][16][17]. Laboratory research has indicated exposure to sexually explicit material can facilitate aggressive behavior under certain conditions causing affective responses (e.g., anger). ...
... An influential approach in the judgment and decision making literature has proposed that people are "intuitive statisticians"-they can judge the statistical properties of the world reasonably accurately and their responses to the environment can be well described based on statistical concepts (e.g., Peterson & Beach, 1967). In research on the mind as an intuitive statistician, perceptions of sample means (for a review, see Peterson & Beach, 1967;Pollard, 1984) and correlations between variables (Kareev, 2004) have received much attention; however, little is known about how people conceptualize and perceive variance of stimuli in the environment, and whether their perception of variance is in line with the statistical notion. This is an important gap, as several influential models of decision making implicitly assume that people are sensitive to statistical variance (Markowitz, 1952;Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004). 1 From the scant amount of work on variance perception, Peterson and Beach (1967) concluded in their seminal overview that people's judgments largely align with statistical variance and that statistical variance could, therefore, serve as a good first approximation for describing people's judgments of variability in the environment. ...