Ozlem Onaran’s research while affiliated with University of Greenwich and other places

Purpose The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to reassert the persistent association of the decline in collective bargaining with the increase in income inequality, the fall in the share of wages in national income and deterioration in macroeconomic performance in the UK; and second, to present case studies affirming concrete outcomes of organisational collective bargaining for workers, in terms of pay, job quality, working hours and work-life balance. Design/methodology/approach The paper is based upon two methodological approaches. First, econometric analyses using industry-level and firm-level data for advanced and emerging economies testing the relationship between declining union density, collective bargaining coverage and the fall in the share of wages in national income. Second, it reports on ten in-depth case studies of collective bargaining each based upon analysis of collective bargaining agreements plus in-depth interviews with the actors party to them: in total, 16 trade union officers, 16 members and 11 employer representatives. Findings There is robust evidence of the effects of different measures of bargaining power on the labour share including union density, welfare state retrenchment, minimum wages and female employment. The case studies appear to address a legacy of deregulated industrial relations. A number demonstrate the reinvigoration of collective bargaining at the organisational and sectoral level, addressing the two-tier workforce and contractual differentiation, alongside the consequences of government pay policies for equality. Research limitations/implications The case studies represent a purposive sample and therefore findings are not generalisable; researchers are encouraged to test the suggested propositions further. Practical implications The paper proposes that tackling income inequality requires a restructuring of the institutional framework in which bargaining takes place and a level playing field where the bargaining power of labour is more in balance with that of capital. Collective bargaining addresses a number of the issues raised by the Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices as essential for “good work”, yet is at odds with the review’s assumptions and remedies. The case studies reiterate the importance of the development of strong workplace representation and bargaining at workplace level, which advocates for non-members and provides a basis for union recruitment, organisation and wider employee engagement. Originality/value The paper indicates that there may be limits to employer commitment to deregulated employment relations. The emergence of new or reinvigorated collective agreements may represent a concession by employers that a “free”, individualised, deinstitutionalised, precarious approach to industrial relations, based on wage suppression and work intensification, is not in their interests in the long run.

This paper estimates the effects of financialization on physical investment in the UK using panel data based on balance sheets of publicly listed non-financial companies supplied by Worldscope for the period 1985–2013. We find robust evidence of an adverse effect of not only financial payments (interests and dividends) but also financial incomes on the rate of accumulation. The negative impacts of financial incomes from interests and dividends are particularly strong for the pre-crisis period. Our findings support the ‘financialization thesis’ that the increasing orientation of the non-financial sector towards financial activities is ultimately leading to lower physical investment, hence to stagnant or fragile growth, as well as long-term concerns for productivity.

This paper estimates a multi-country demand-led growth model for the EU15. A decrease in the share of wages in national income in isolation leads to lower growth in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, whereas it stimulates growth in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland. However, a simultaneous decline in the wage share leads to an overall decline in EU15 GDP; hence, the EU15 as a whole is a wage-led economy. Furthermore, Austria and Ireland also experience a decline in growth when they decrease their wage share along with their trading partners. The results indicate that the decline in the wage share had significant negative effects on growth in the EU15 and supports the case for wage coordination. We present different wage-led recovery scenarios and the effects on prices, investment and net exports.

This paper estimates the effects of financialization on physical investment in the UK using panel data based on balance-sheets of publicly listed non-financial companies supplied by Worldscope for the period 1985-2013. We find robust evidence of an adverse effect of not only financial payments (interests and dividends) but also financial incomes on the rate of accumulation. The negative impacts of financial incomes from interests and dividends are particularly strong for the pre-crisis period. Our findings support the 'financialization thesis' that the increasing orientation of the non-financial sector towards financial activities is ultimately leading to lower physical investment, hence to stagnant or fragile growth, as well as long term concerns for productivity.

This paper estimates a multi-country demand-led growth model for EU15 countries. A decrease in the share of wages in national income in isolation leads to lower growth in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, whereas it stimulates growth in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland. However, a simultaneous decline in the wage share leads to an overall decline in EU15 GDP; hence EU15 as a whole is a wage-led economy. Furthermore, Austria and Ireland also experience negative effects on growth when they decrease their wage share along with their trading partners. The results indicate that a decline in the wage share has had significant negative effects on growth in the EU15 countries and supports the case of wage coordination. We present different wage-led recovery scenarios taking into account further effects of a change in the wage share on prices, nominal unit labour costs, investment, and net exports.

Several Nobel laureates economists have called for redistributive policies. This paper shows that there is a strong case for redistributive policies because the global increase of income inequality and wealth concentration was an important driver for the financial and Eurozone crisis. The high levels of income inequality resulted in balance of payment imbalances and rising debt levels. Rising wealth concentration contributed to the crisis because the increasing asset demand from the rich played a key role in the rise of the structured credit market and enabled poor and middle-income households to accumulate increasing amounts of debt. To tame the inherent instability of the current mode of capitalism it is necessary to reduce inequality.

The paper provides an overview of the concept of wage-led growth, both as an analytical concept and as an economic policy strategy. At the core of our analysis is the distinction between wage-led and profit-led demand regimes. The Kaleckian tradition in macroeconomics asserts that a higher wage share will have expansionary effects. Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) generalize the model by allowing for classical mechanisms. The paper presents a two-country short run model to clarify the key concepts surrounding a wage-led vs a profit-led demand regime. It distinguishes carefully between partial and total effects and it analyses demand regimes with respect to national as well as international changes in the wage share. We also review the empirical literature. Our reading is that the available evidence indicates that demand in most economies is domestically wage-led. Changes in functional income distribution also have supply-side effects. Available evidence suggests that higher wage growth induces higher productivity growth. Neoliberalism resulted in an increase in inequality and a decline in the wage share, but growth has nowhere been based on the profit-led growth process. Rather neoliberalism has given rise to either debt-led or export-led growth regimes. The paper concludes by outlining a wage-led growth strategy and by discussing its limitations.

This article analyzes the effects of globalization on implicit tax rates (ITRs) on labor income, capital income, and consumption in the EU15 and Central and Eastern European New Member States (CEE NMS). We find supportive evidence for an increase in the ITR on labor income in the EU15, but no effect on the ITR on capital income. There is evidence of convergence in terms of the ITR on consumption, as countries with higher than average ITR on consumption respond to globalization by decreasing their tax rates. There are important differences among the welfare regimes within the EU15. Social-democratic countries have decreased the tax burden on capital, but increased that on labor due to globalization. Globalization exerts a pressure to increase taxes on labor income in the conservative and liberal regimes as well. Taxes on consumption decrease in response to globalization in the conservative and social-democratic regimes. In the CEE NMS, there is no effect of globalization on the ITR on labor and capital income, but we find a negative impact on the ITR on consumption in the CEE NMS with higher than average ITR on consumption. (JEL H23, H24, H25, F19, F21)

Ten years after its introduction, the Euro is in an existential crisis. The crisis is the outcome of economic policies that have aimed at labour market flexibility and financial integration. The paper argues, firstly, that the aggregate demand regime in the Euro area is wage led. While an increase in wages (other things equal) does have a negative effect on investment and on net exports, it does have a positive effect on consumption. As the Euro area is a relatively closed economy the consumption effect overpowers the investment effect and the export effect. Secondly, we argue that in the Euro area two growth models have emerged: a credit-led and an export-led model. These have given rise to the imbalances that are at the heart of the Euro crisis. Wage flexibility has proven insufficient to prevent these imbalances. Thirdly, we advocate a system of coordinated wage bargaining that aims at wages rising in line with productivity growth and a substantially upward-revised inflation target. If the project of European economic integration is to survive, it needs a drastic change in direction. An important building block of this redirection is a rethinking of the role of wage policy.