Olivier Klein’s research while affiliated with Université Libre de Bruxelles and other places

In January 2022, several vaccination policies were debated to address the Omicron outbreak in Belgium. Considering variability in risk perception and vaccine uptake, this study aimed to understand differences in support and expectations for four scenarios, ranging from relaxed to restrictive vaccination policies, to inform policymakers. Using an online survey, 12,670 participants (46% female; M age = 45.9, SD = 13.38) reported their risk perception, number of vaccination doses (0/1, 2, 3 doses) as well as their support and several anticipated psychological outcomes for each scenario. Mixed model ANCOVA showed a pattern of preferential support for the relaxed scenario and more positive anticipated outcomes (general well‐being and government appraisals) compared to the restrictive policies, that were treated equivalently. An exception to this pattern was found when people were vaccinated with three doses and perceived high risk. Taken separately, risk perception and vaccination status were not sufficient to drive positive attitudes toward restrictive policies; only their interaction had an effect. Limitations include the self‐selected sample and the vignette methodology. The conjunct role of risk perception and vaccination status should be considered when discussing the introduction of restrictive vaccination policies. These findings inform vaccination strategies management during pandemics.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused considerable military casualties on both sides and widespread harm to Ukrainian civilians. While polls suggest that a slim majority of Russians endorse the invasion, the factors underpinning this support remain uncertain. We investigated factors associated with support for the war among Russians. In three large, diverse, samples of Russian adults (total N = 2856), we extend the dual process motivational model to the context of international warfare, focusing on two key ideologies: right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). Consistent with polling data, we find that approximately half of the participants support the war. Across studies, RWA, especially its submission facet, emerges as a strong and consistent predictor of increased support for the war in Ukraine. In contrast, the associations with SDO are weaker and more inconsistent, with anti‐egalitarianism playing only a minor role in opposing peace efforts. Additionally, factors such as Russian identification, nationalism, group efficacy, war‐related misperceptions and collective narcissism also contribute to war support. Our findings suggest that Russian support for the war may reflect broader support for the existing regime with backing for the military intervention serving as a demonstration of loyalty to Vladimir Putin and his government.

Conspiracy beliefs are prevalent among members of disadvantaged groups. Adopting a social identity perspective, we hypothesized that these beliefs would reduce the endorsement of internal attributions for inequalities that could negatively affect the image of disadvantaged ingroups. In Study 1 ( n = 1,104), conspiracy mentality was negatively associated with meritocracy beliefs, which attribute success and failure to internal factors. In Studies 2 to 5 ( ns = 179, 251, 221, 248), taking the perspective of a person exhibiting a high (vs. low) conspiracy mentality in a fictitious context reduced participants’ meritocracy beliefs, internal attributions for a privileged outgroup’s situation, and fostered negative attitudes toward the outgroup. However, it did not reduce internal attributions for the situation of a disadvantaged ingroup, nor did it improve attitudes toward the ingroup. Regarding intergroup comparison, conspiracy mentality seems to primarily deteriorate the perception of privileged outgroups rather than improve the perception of disadvantaged ingroups.

Conspiracy beliefs are prevalent among members of disadvantaged groups. Adopting a social identity perspective, we hypothesized that these beliefs would reduce the endorsement of internal attributions for inequalities that could negatively affect the image of disadvantaged ingroups. In Study 1 (n = 1104), conspiracy mentality was negatively associated with meritocracy beliefs, which attribute success and failure to internal factors. In Studies 2-5 (ns = 179, 251, 221, 248), taking the perspective of a person exhibiting a high (vs. low) conspiracy mentality in a fictitious context reduced participants’ meritocracy beliefs, internal attributions for a privileged outgroup’s situation, and fostered negative attitudes towards the outgroup. However, it did not reduce internal attributions for the situation of a disadvantaged ingroup, nor did it improve attitudes towards the ingroup. Regarding intergroup comparison, conspiracy mentality seems to primarily deteriorate the perception of privileged outgroups rather than improve the perception of disadvantaged ingroups.

For fifty years, the Western world has witnessed a noticeable decrease in overt expressions of prejudice, reflecting evolving social norms, whereby racism is perceived as something immoral and is often illegal. At the same time, it is clear that racist prejudice persists, largely rooted in historical and cultural legacies like colonialism. Because our egalitarian norms make prejudice undesirable, prejudice is predominantly conveyed in subtle ways, and tends to be rationalized (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In this context, gender equality ideology has been brought to the debate to legitimize a racist discourse against Muslims across different European countries. Politicians who hardly ever showed any sympathy for or even blatantly opposed gender-rights movements are found to profess gender-based arguments to support an anti-Muslim agenda. Threatened by purportedly sexist and illiberal Islam, these leaders argue that the ‘European egalitarian culture’ must be protected and reasserted. This opportunistic support for the gender movement on behalf of politicians has been pointed out by several authors (e.g., Delphy, 2006; Farris, 2017). In the present chapter, we explore social psychological perspectives that have been developed to tackle this paradox. In particular, we focus on the concept of ‘ideological malleability’, as introduced by Knowles and colleagues in 2009.

While, by default, people tend to believe communicated content, it is also possible that they become more vigilant when personal stakes increase. A lab ( N = 72) and an online ( N = 284) experiment show that people make judgements affected by explicitly tagged false information and that they misremember such information as true – a phenomenon dubbed the ‘truth bias’. However, both experiments show that this bias is significantly reduced when personal stakes – instantiated here as a financial incentive – become high. Experiment 2 also shows that personal stakes mitigate the truth bias when they are high at the moment of false information processing, but they cannot reduce belief in false information a posteriori, that is once participants have already processed false information. Experiment 2 also suggests that high stakes reduce belief in false information whether participants’ focus is directed towards making accurate judgements or correctly remembering information truthfulness. We discuss the implications of our findings for models of information validation and interventions against real‐world misinformation.

Conspiracy beliefs entail a scapegoating function by attributing the consequences of crises, such as economic downturns, to the secret action of outgroups. While conspiracy beliefs have been described as reactions to economic threats, we argue that this factor alone is not sufficient. Rather, perceiving one's ingroup as unfairly deprived compared to other groups (i.e., group relative deprivation) might be key to explaining the situation in terms of secret, intentional wrongdoings. Furthermore, individuals high in national narcissism (i.e., a perceived lack of recognition of the ingroup's greatness), may be especially sensitive to this dynamic. Three pilot studies ( N = 1237) attested the robustness of the link between group relative deprivation and conspiracy beliefs. Then, Study 1 ( N = 812) revealed that the effect of group relative deprivation on conspiracy beliefs was moderated by national narcissism. In Study 2 ( N = 728), we found effects of induced national narcissism and group relative deprivation on conspiracy beliefs in a fictitious setting. Study 3 ( N = 846) replicated the moderation of national narcissism on the link between group relative deprivation and conspiracy beliefs at the cross‐sectional level. Overall, these studies provide evidence that conspiracy beliefs in reaction to group relative deprivation are especially likely among collective narcissists. We discuss the scapegoating function of conspiracy beliefs during crises.

To manage the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, governments imposed public health measures requiring considerable effort and behavioral change from citizens. Grounded in self-determination theory, we investigate the relationship between citizens’ motivation for adhering to health-protective behavior and epidemiological changes in SARS-CoV-2. Specifically, we investigated the concurrent (Hypothesis 1) and prospective (Hypothesis 2) association between daily motivation quality and daily actual growth rates in infections and hospitalizations in Belgium, thereby also testing the explanatory role of behavioral adherence to account for this prospective association (Hypothesis 3). Data were collected during the first 12 months of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic using online surveys (N = 183,766; 7.2% missing days; 0% vaccinated; Mage = 50.41; 68.2% female) and the Google Mobility dataset. Multilevel models revealed that hospitalization rates (but not infection rates) are concurrently related to a better quality of motivation, with citizens identifying more with the value of measures and feeling less externally pressured to comply with them on a day with more hospitalizations. Across time, better quality of motivation predicted, respectively, lower infection and lower hospitalization rates 6 and 7 weeks later, with improved behavioral adherence, as assessed by self-reports and registered mobility, accounting for the benefits of motivation (i.e., mediation). We conclude that for a preventive policy to durably impact the epidemiological course, citizens need to fully identify with the importance of introduced health-protective measures such they volitionally adhere to them.

Individuals differ in their general propensity to believe in conspiracy theories, often referred to as conspiracy mentality. Because prototypical conspiracy theories exhibit a conspiratorial content (i.e., they claim that a conspiracy occurred) and an alternative status (i.e., they are rejected by authorities), it is unclear if conspiracy mentality captures a general tendency to believe in conspiracies, to endorse alternative narratives, or to believe in conspiratorial alternative narratives. To adjudicate between these interpretations, we carried out three experimental studies (Ns = 364, 772, 629) in which we experimentally manipulated the respective statuses (endorsed by authorities vs. rejected by the authorities) of competing conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial explanations for fictitious controversial events. Overall, conspiracy mentality predicted the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations and the rejection of non-conspiratorial explanations. However, these relationships were moderated by the respective statuses of these explanations. When authorities endorsed the conspiratorial explanation and rejected the non-conspiratorial explanation, the relationships were either nullified (in Studies 1 & 3) or attenuated (in study 2). These effects were driven by participants scoring low on the conspiracy mentality measures, who reported a lower endorsement of the conspiratorial explanation when it was rejected by authorities. They also reported a stronger endorsement of the non-conspiratorial explanation when it was presented as endorsed by authorities. By contrast, conspiracy believers’ endorsement of the explanations was unaffected by their status. These findings are informative of what conspiracy mentality scales capture and highlight the need to adopt more specific definitions in psychological research on conspiracy theories.