Natalie Martin’s research while affiliated with University of Nottingham and other places

This chapter employs the perspective of historical institutionalism to analyze and explain why Turkey’s EU accession process endures even though it has not significantly progressed since it began. It argues that its temporal approach, the concepts of critical junctures and path dependence help explain the processes of stasis and change inherent within it. The chapter starts with an outline of historical institutionalism and contextualizes its conceptual and theoretical value for the analysis of EU–Turkey relations, arguing that an underlying path dependence in the accession process is the result of security considerations. The chapter continues by identifying several critical junctures which have intervened, and both expedited and hampered the process. The opposition of member states, the Arab Spring, and authoritarian drift within Turkey are important factors in this context. On this basis, the analysis shows how progress achieved has typically been countered by opposition, often related to human rights concerns. As a result, the accession process has stagnated but has endured at the same time as security interests and human rights concerns have balanced each other over time.

The chapter examines the contemporary situation regarding news media freedom in Turkey and how it relates to the AKP’s relationship with the Kemalist establishment. It argues that, once the AKP acquired power in 2002, and won a second term in 2007, it set about trying to “defang” the military through the Ergenekon (ETÖ) investigations (with the help of allies, the Gülen movement). The military were the primary target, although several senior journalists were included and many more were persecuted, if not prosecuted, for reporting the main Ergenekon trials. However, whilst most journalists caught up in Ergenekon were there as an afterthought, this had changed by 2015, when Cumhuriyet was under the AKP spotlight. At this time, the intention was to stymie journalism about AKP policy (such as its alleged links to jihadism in Syria) which could damage the AKP’s electoral prospects and continuing consolidation of power. Journalism therefore had moved from being a secondary target to a primary one alongside increasing authoritarianism.

This chapter deconstructs the state of news media freedom in Turkey—and how it relates to the three major factions in Turkish politics: Kemalism, the Kurds and the Islamists. It examines the structural factors which have meant there is not a strong journalistic tradition because of the vested interests involved. Nevertheless, there has been enough of one for the government to feel the need to suppress it through securitisation. This chapter outlines the reason why this was done: to enable the continued consolidation of AKP power first against Kemalist domination, then Kurdish challenge and finally any kind of scrutiny or critique whatsoever. As this authoritarianism has increased it argues the securitisation has spiralled to the extent that any critique is now seen as opposition and is therefore securitised. Hence, as well as the Kemalists and Kurds the AKP now finds itself opposed to the Gülen movement, academics, civil society activists—and journalists.

The securitisation of news in Turkey, and its steep decline since 2012, is an indicator of the authoritarian drift now apparent in Turkish politics. Therefore, it is important to understand the nuances of the situation because this trend is significant for Turkey’s bilateral and institutional relationships. This chapter will establish definitions of “journalism”, “securitisation” and “authoritarianism” before outlining that the AKP has now securitised all forms of political opposition in Turkey, including journalism, in order to justify imprisoning them in such large numbers. It also details the methodology of the volume in terms of qualitative data collection and thematic data analysis.

This chapter establishes the nature of the news media and its journalism during the decades of Kemalism in Turkey. The illiberality of these governments and the clientelism which developed between the state and the news media owners has meant the journalistic tradition in Turkey is not strong, but it does exist. Moreover, it argues that securitisation of the new media with the aim of discrediting its journalism is not new and is especially relevant with regard to the Kurdish issue since the 1980s. Kurdish journalists have long had to choose between their personal security and doing their jobs as writing about the Kurdish issue was often conflated with support for the PKK. It argues that this approach was written into the constitution following the 1980 coup enabling the state to crackdown on anything deemed to be a threat to the “state”.

This chapter will examine how the dire state of news media freedom in contemporary Turkey intersects with the Kurdish issue. It starts with the initial optimism of AKP’s relationship with the Kurds, which was hailed as a new beginning based on religious kindred and a mutual distrust of the Kemalist establishment. However, this changed once the Kurdish mainstream political parties began to be a threat to ongoing AKP power. The subsequent KCK investigations were aimed at quelling the nascent grassroots Kurdish movement before it gained momentum. Journalism was included with the KCK operation but it was not the government’s primary target and instead was included more as a deterrent to the reporting of wider KCK illiberality. However, more recent persecution of Kurdish journalists has securitised journalism as “terrorism” in order to delegitimise its message and that of the Kurdish movement as a whole, particularly the HDP. Accordingly, any reporting of the Kurdish issue has been deemed to be in favour of political violence—rather than merely about it.

The Kemalists and the Kurds have been the established political opposition for the AKP in Turkey and were dealt with as an obstacle to the consolidation of the party’s ability to implement an Islamist agenda. The journalism associated with both transitioned from being a secondary target to a primary target—as the authoritarianism of the AKP increased. However, the ruling party’s relationship with the Gülen movement and associated media is more complex: Until 2013 Gülen was an AKP ally and complicit in the Ergenekon and KCK operations. Since then it has been the primary object of AKP securitisation because it was perceived as posing the greatest risk to the party’s ongoing dominance. This chapter outlines the Gülen–AKP relationship and subsequent split and how the news media was involved as well as how the securitisation of the Gülen movement has been used instrumentally to securitise other outlets as well.

This chapter concludes that the reason why Turkey tops the league tables, for the number of journalists in prison, is because “journalism” is a threat to the ongoing AKP power project. Any form of critique or scrutiny of AKP policy is now treated in this way. Hence the securitisation of news is a means of shoring up the AKP government and consolidating its power against its Kemalist, Kurdish and Gülenist rivals. As a modus operandi, securitisation is not new and was used by the Kemalist establishment for decades, particularly against the Kurds. However, it has intensified in the last decade: as the AKP has approached its goal of executive presidency, it has used increasingly authoritarian tactics. The current high level of securitisation—labelling journalists as terrorists—is the latest round in the ongoing battle within Turkish politics and is the means by which the AKP can consolidate its power whilst maintaining a democratic façade.