Nalini Ambady’s research while affiliated with Stanford University and other places

The current research investigates people’s perceptions of others’ lay theories (or mindsets), an understudied construct that we call meta-lay theories. Six studies examine whether underrepresented students’ meta-lay theories influence their sense of belonging to science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). The studies tested whether underrepresented students who perceive their faculty as believing most students have high scientific aptitude (a universal metatheory) would report a stronger sense of belonging to STEM than those who think their faculty believe that not everyone has high scientific aptitude (a nonuniversal metatheory). Women PhD candidates in STEM fields who held universal rather than nonuniversal metatheories felt greater sense of belonging to their field, both when metatheories were measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2). Undergraduates who held more universal metatheories reported a higher sense of belonging to STEM (Studies 3 and 4) and earned higher final course grades (Study 3). Experimental manipulations depicting a professor communicating the universal lay theory eliminated the difference between African American and European American students’ attraction to a STEM course (Study 5) and between women and men’s sense of belonging to STEM (Study 6). Mini meta-analyses indicated that the universal metatheory increases underrepresented students’ sense of belonging to STEM, reduces the extent of social identity threat they experience, and reduces their perception of faculty as endorsing stereotypes. Across different underrepresented groups, types of institutions, areas of STEM, and points in the STEM pipeline, students’ metaperceptions of faculty’s lay theories about scientific aptitude influence their sense of belonging to STEM.

Observing shifts in others’ eye gaze causes perceivers to shift their own attention in the same direction, and such gaze following has been regarded as reflexive. We hypothesized that effects of social hierarchy on reflexive gaze following are driven largely by power asymmetries. We used a standard gaze-cuing paradigm with 100 and 300 ms stimulus onset asynchronies. In Study 1, we compared gazers with a historically privileged social identity (European American/“White”) to gazers with a historically underprivileged social identity (African American/“Black”). White gazers elicited gaze following from both White and Black perceivers, whereas Black gazers only elicited gaze following from Black perceivers. In Study 2, we examined the role of perceiver power in these effects by experimentally manipulating felt power. White gazers elicited gaze following from both high-power and low-power White perceivers whereas Black gazers only elicited gaze following from low-power White perceivers. These results suggest that felt power may play a key role in stratified and interracial gaze following.

People belong to multiple social groups, which may have conflicting stereotypic associations. A manager evaluating an Asian woman for a computer programming job could be influenced by negative gender stereotypes or by positive racial stereotypes. We hypothesized that evaluations of job candidates can depend upon what social group is more salient, even when both are apparent. In three studies, using student (Study 1) and nonstudent (Studies 2 and 3) samples, we compared ratings of an Asian American female applicant after subtly making her race or gender salient in stereotypically male employment contexts. Consistent with our predictions, we found evidence that men rated her as more skilled (Studies 1 and 3), more hirable (Studies 1–3), and offered her more pay (Study 2) in science and technology-related positions when her race, rather than gender, was salient. The theoretical implications for person perception and practical implications in employment contexts are discussed.

Observers frequently form impressions of other people based on complex or conflicting information. Rather than being objective, these impressions are often biased by observers' motives. For instance, observers often downplay negative information they learn about ingroup members. Here, we characterize the neural systems associated with biased impression formation. Participants learned positive and negative information about ingroup and outgroup social targets. Following this information, participants worsened their impressions of outgroup, but not ingroup, targets. This tendency was associated with a failure to engage neural structures including LPFC, dACC, TPJ, Insula and Precuneus when processing negative information about ingroup (but not outgroup) targets. To the extent that participants engaged these regions while learning negative information about ingroup members, they exhibited less ingroup bias in their impressions. These data are consistent with a model of "effortless bias," under which perceivers fail to process goal-inconsistent information in order to maintain desired conclusions.

Trust and cooperation often break down across group boundaries, contributing to pernicious consequences, from polarized political structures to intractable conflict. As such, addressing such conflicts requires first understanding why trust is reduced in intergroup settings. Here, we clarify the structure of intergroup trust using neuroscientific and behavioral methods. We found that trusting ingroup members produced activity in brain areas associated with reward, whereas trusting outgroup members produced activity in areas associated with top-down control. Behaviorally, time pressure-which reduces people's ability to exert control-reduced individuals' trust in outgroup, but not ingroup members. These data suggest that the exertion of control can help recover trust in intergroup settings, offering potential avenues for reducing intergroup failures in trust and the consequences of these failures.

Theories linking the literatures on stereotyping and human resource management have proposed that individuals may enjoy greater success obtaining jobs congruent with stereotypes about their social categories or traits. Here, we explored such effects for a detectable, but not obvious, social group distinction: male sexual orientation. Bridging previous work on prejudice and occupational success with that on social perception, we found that perceivers rated gay and straight men as more suited to professions consistent with stereotypes about their groups (nurses, pediatricians, and English teachers vs. engineers, managers, surgeons, and math teachers) from mere photos of their faces. Notably, distinct evaluations of the gay and straight men emerged based on perceptions of their faces with no explicit indication of sexual orientation. Neither perceivers’ expertise with hiring decisions nor diagnostic information about the targets eliminated these biases, but encouraging fair decisions did contribute to partly ameliorating the differences. Mediation analysis further showed that perceptions of the targets’ sexual orientations and facial affect accounted for these effects. Individuals may therefore infer characteristics about individuals’ group memberships from their faces and use this information in a way that meaningfully influences evaluations of their suitability for particular jobs.

Beliefs about the malleability versus stability of traits (incremental vs. entity lay theories) have a profound impact on social cognition and self-regulation, shaping phenomena that range from the fundamental attribution error and group-based stereotyping to academic motivation and achievement. Less is known about the causes than the effects of these lay theories, and in the current work the authors examine the perception of facial emotion as a causal influence on lay theories. Specifically, they hypothesized that (a) within-person variability in facial emotion signals within-person variability in traits and (b) social environments replete with within-person variability in facial emotion encourage perceivers to endorse incremental lay theories. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Study 1 participants were more likely to attribute dynamic (vs. stable) traits to a person who exhibited several different facial emotions than to a person who exhibited a single facial emotion across multiple images. Hypothesis 2 suggests that social environments support incremental lay theories to the extent that they include many people who exhibit within-person variability in facial emotion. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, participants in Studies 2–4 were more likely to endorse incremental theories of personality, intelligence, and morality after exposure to multiple individuals exhibiting within-person variability in facial emotion than after exposure to multiple individuals exhibiting a single emotion several times. Perceptions of within-person variability in facial emotion—rather than perceptions of simple diversity in facial emotion—were responsible for these effects. Discussion focuses on how social ecologies shape lay theories.

Franklin, Stevenson, Ambady, and Adams observe that there is little cross-cultural research in the ability to perceive information (emotion, cognitions, etc.) from the eyes of an individual. The authors argue that the eyes play a major role in social interaction and looking at within- and between-culture use of information from the eyes, what is referred to as mind reading, is important to understanding nonverbal communication. The authors report on their research on this topic where they studied participants’ ability to mind read within and between cultures. While participants were accurate in their mind reading ability for both groups, they did show an advantage for their own culture. This advantage was marked by an increase in activity in the posterior superior temporal sulcus. This is consistent with other research on emotion recognition. The authors also report on their research looking at how gender can play a role in mind reading accuracy. Additionally, they studied how multiple category differences, gender and culture, may affect mind reading ability. They found that women were more accurate in the mind reading task than men regardless of culture. fMRI revealed that women showed greater activation of the inferior frontal gyrus and cerebellum during the task while men showed greater activation of the superior temporal sulcus. These areas are known for reading facial cues, expressing empathy, and mirroring behavior. Implications for how this work can affect nonverbal communication between cultures are discussed.

Power is accompanied by a sense of entitlement, which shapes reactions to self-relevant injustices. We propose that powerful people more strongly expect to be treated fairly and are faster to perceive unjust treatment that violates these expectations. After preliminary data demonstrated that power leads people to expect fair outcomes for themselves, we conducted four experiments. Participants primed with high (vs. low) power were faster to identify violations of distributive justice in which they were victims (Study 1). This effect was specific to self-relevant injustices (Study 2) and generalized to violations of interpersonal justice (Study 3). Finally, participants primed with high power were more likely to take action against unfair treatment (Study 4). These findings suggest a process by which hierarchies may be maintained: Whereas the powerless are comparatively less sensitive to unfair treatment, the powerful may retain their social standing by quickly perceiving and responding to self-relevant injustices. © 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.