Matto Mildenberger’s research while affiliated with University of California, Santa Barbara and other places

Survey research in the Global South has traditionally required large budgets and lengthy fieldwork. The expansion of digital connectivity presents an opportunity for researchers to engage global subject pools and study settings where in-person contact is challenging. This paper evaluates Facebook advertisements as a tool to recruit diverse survey samples in the Global South. Using Facebook’s advertising platform, we quota-sample respondents in Mexico, Kenya, and Indonesia and assess how well these samples perform on a range of survey indicators, identify sources of bias, replicate a canonical experiment, and highlight trade-offs for researchers to consider. This method can quickly and cheaply recruit respondents, but these samples tend to be more educated than corresponding national populations. Weighting ameliorates sample imbalances. This method generates comparable data to a commercial online sample for a fraction of the cost. Our analysis demonstrates the potential of Facebook advertisements to cost-effectively conduct research in diverse settings.

Lazar and Wallace make a compelling case that, although climate disasters undercut democratic legitimacy, "authoritarianism is not the answer." The authors of this essay agree, but do not view regime type as the primary constraint on climate-policy outcomes. Here, the authors draw on research on political institutions and climate policy to highlight two overlooked features of the conversation. First, even if democracy is better on average in addressing climate change, there is a lot of variation: Procarbon interests can capture the process in both autocracies and democracies, sometimes to very similar degrees. Second, there are dangerous feedback effects between climate change and democracy, because climate-induced instability can destabilize democracies, reduce the likelihood that green policies will work, and even prompt repression.

Sea-level rise caused by climate change poses enormous social and economic costs, yet governments and coastal residents are still not taking the mitigation and adaptation steps necessary to protect their communities and property. In response, advocates have attempted to raise threat salience by disseminating maps of projected sea-level rise. We test the efficacy of this ubiquitous communication tool using two high spatial-resolution survey experiments (n = 1,243). Our first experiment, in US coastal communities across four US states, exposes households on either side of projected sea-level rise boundaries to individually tailored risk maps. We find this common risk communication approach has the unintended consequence of reducing concern about future sea-level rise, even among households projected to experience flooding this century. In a second experiment on our sample (n = 737) of San Francisco Bay Area coastal residents, direct communications about impacts on traffic patterns does increase concern about future climate impacts. Map-based risk information increases support for collective spending on climate adaptation, but it does not increase individual intentions to contribute. Our results demonstrate the importance of empirically testing messaging campaigns for climate adaptation.

Kennard and Schnakenberg (KS) raise three concerns regarding Aklin and Mildenberger (“Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change,” Global Environmental Politics 20 (4): 4–27). In this response, we delineate where we agree and where we disagree with KS. We then consider whether the model presented by KS changes our assessment that free-riding concerns are not currently the binding constraint on global climate politics. We conclude with a refined statement of our original claim. We are grateful to Kennard and Schnakenberg’s (this issue; henceforth KS) stimulating comment on our article published in Global Environmental Politics (“Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change,” 20 [4]: 4–27, 2020). We welcome the opportunity to clarify and refine our argument. In summary, KS raise three concerns: first, the collective action model should not be confused with a solution to the collective action problem; second, one shouldn’t focus on a single equilibrium, given the results from the folk theorem; and third, reciprocity is off the equilibrium path anyway. Herein, we offer responses to each of these claims, highlighting where we agree with their criticism and where we do not. We then reconsider whether the model KS present changes our assessment that free-riding concerns are not currently the binding constraint on global climate politics. We conclude by briefly restating our main aim and discussing some fruitful research questions that derive from it.

Public attitudes toward climate change influence climate and energy policies and guide individual mitigation and adaptation behaviors. Over the last decade, as scientific certainty about the causes and impacts of, and solutions to the climate crisis has increased, cities, states, and regions in the United States have pursued diverse policy strategies. Yet, our understanding of how Americans’ climate views are changing remains largely limited to national trends. Here we use a large US survey dataset (N = 27,075) to estimate dynamic, state-level changes in 16 climate change beliefs, risk perceptions, and policy preferences over 13 years (2008-2020). We find increases in global warming issue importance and perceived harm in every state. Policy support, however, increased in more liberal states like California and New York, but remained stable elsewhere. Year-by-year estimates of state-level climate opinions can be used to support sub-national mitigation and adaptation efforts that depend on public support and engagement.

Since AR5, climate-change impacts have become more frequent, intense and have affected many millions of people from every region and sector across North America (Canada, USA and Mexico). Accelerating climate-change hazards pose significant risks to the well-being of North American populations and the natural, managed and human systems on which they depend (high confidence1). Addressing these risks has been made more urgent by delays due to misinformation about climate science that has sowed uncertainty and impeded recognition of risk (high confidence). {14.2, 14.3} Without limiting warming to 1.5°C, key risks to North America are expected to intensify rapidly by mid-century (high confidence). These risks will result in irreversible changes to ecosystems, mounting damages to infrastructure and housing, stress on economic sectors, disruption of livelihoods, and issues with mental and physical health, leisure and safety. Immediate, widespread and coordinated implementation of adaptation measures aimed at reducing risks and focused on equity have the greatest potential to maintain and improve the quality of life for North Americans, ensure sustainable livelihoods and protect the long-term biodiversity, and ecological and economic productivity, in North America (high confidence). Enhanced sharing of resources and tools for adaptation across economic, social, cultural and national entities enables more effective short- and long-term responses to climate change. {14.2, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, 14.7}

Economists advocate carbon pricing as the primary tool to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, very few governments have adopted a carbon tax high enough to meet international emission targets. Political challenges may stem from a number of areas, including political mobilization by policy opponents, consumers’ willingness to pay and the regressivity of many carbon pricing schemes, which might be addressed through rebates. We use a novel carbon tax calculator to provide residents in the US and Switzerland with personalized estimates of the financial costs and benefits associated with carbon pricing policies. Our results indicate that, absent political messaging, rebates increase public support for carbon taxes in both countries by building support among lower income groups. In the US, we find majority support in our sample for both low ($50/tCO2) and high ($230/tCO2) carbon taxes when rebates are included; in Switzerland public support is lower. However, policy is always politicized, and when respondents are exposed to political messages about carbon pricing the effects associated with rebates are dampened or eliminated.

As climate change accelerates, governments will be forced to adapt to its impacts. The public could respond by increasing mitigation behaviours and support for decarbonization, creating a virtuous cycle between adaptation and mitigation. Alternatively, adaptation could generate backlash, undermining mitigation behaviours. Here we examine the relationship between adaptation and mitigation in the power sector, using the case of California’s public safety power shut-offs in 2019. We use a geographically targeted survey to compare residents living within power outage zones to matched residents in similar neighbourhoods who retained their electricity. Outage exposure increased respondent intentions to purchase fossil fuel generators while it may have reduced intentions to purchase electric vehicles. However, exposure did not change climate policy preferences, including willingness to pay for either wildfire or climate-mitigating reforms. Respondents blamed outages on their utility, not local, state or federal governments. Our findings demonstrate that energy infrastructure disruptions, even when not understood as climate adaptations, can still be consequential for decarbonization trajectories. Climate change adaptation policies could influence public decarbonization behaviours positively or negatively, impacting further mitigation and adaptation efforts. This study examines public responses to planned power outages in California and finds that the outages shaped some energy behavioural intentions but did not alter climate or energy policy preferences.

Few contemporary crises have reshaped public policy as dramatically as the COVID-19 pandemic. In its shadow, policymakers have debated whether other pressing crises—including climate change—should be integrated into COVID-19 policy responses. Public support for such an approach is unclear: the COVID-19 crisis might eclipse public concern for other policy problems, or complementarities between COVID-19 and other issues could boost support for broad government interventions. In this research note, we use a conjoint experiment, panel study, and framing experiment to assess the substitutability or complementarity of COVID-19 and climate change among US and Canadian publics. We find no evidence that the COVID-19 crisis crowds out public concern about the climate crisis. Instead, we find that the publics in both countries prefer that their governments integrate climate action into COVID-19 responses. We also find evidence that analogizing climate change with COVID-19 may increase concern about climate change.