Matt Sleat’s research while affiliated with The University of Sheffield and other places

Is it possible to do ideology critique without morality? In recent years a small group of theorists has attempted to develop such an account and, in doing so, makes claim to a certain sort of “radical realism” distinguished by the ambition to ground political judgments and prescriptions in nonmoral values, principles, or concepts. This essay presents a twofold critique of this realist ideology critique (RIC) by first offering an internal critique of the approach and then arguing that the very attempt to do political theory generally—and ideology critique more specifically—in a way that abjures morality is misguided. In doing so, I contribute both to current debates around “new” ideology critiques and to contested questions about what it means to do political theory realistically.

This paper explores the relationship between truth and loyalty as it pertains to epistemic issues within contemporary Western politics. One now familiar concern is how an increasing number of people determine their beliefs according to what demonstrating loyalty to their group requires instead of the facts of an independent and objective reality, as a proper concern for truthfulness demands. Whereas “they” base their beliefs on what is required to demonstrate loyalty to their group, “our” beliefs are justified by facts and evidence. Such contrasts pit loyalty and truth as necessarily antagonistic. This paper gives us further reason for thinking that putting loyalty against truthfulness at some very general or conceptual level is deeply misguided. More significantly, it seeks to show that the more helpful contrast to make is between those who are loyal to identities that value truthfulness in such a way that there are no other parts of that identity which are not revisable if they come into conflict with truth, and those who are loyal to identities that subordinate truth to other ends or goals. Acknowledging this allows us to better appreciate various aspects of how the relationship between truth and loyalty is playing out in contemporary politics. Chief among these is how our own commitment to truthfulness is itself embedded in a particular identity, an identity that we not only often fail to acknowledge as such but which necessitates us thinking harder about the ways in which it might itself sustain the dynamics of conflict and contestation, antagonizing those who do not share it and driving them farther away from the truthfulness we extol.

A prevailing understanding of realism, chiefly among its critics, casts realists as those who seek a ‘distinctively political normativity’, where this is interpreted as meaning nonmoral in kind. Moralists, on this account, are those who reject this and believe that political normativity remains moral. Critics have then focused much of their attention on demonstrating that the search for a nonmoral political normativity is doomed to fail which, if right, would then seem to fatally undermine the realist endeavour. This paper makes the case that casting the difference between realism and moralism in these terms is a mistake, one which overlooks the substantial body of realist work which is clear that it has no such aspirations to develop a nonmoral political normativity. The hope is that in drawing attention to this mistake a line can be drawn under these unhelpful debates, and we can move on to more fruitful constructive and critical discussions between realists and their critics.

Contemporary political discourse is awash with concerns about truthfulness, understood as the virtue of making sure that our beliefs are true, in political life. The central argument of this paper is that it is not only possible for us to be self‐deceived as to our own truthfulness but that there is good reason to suspect certain aspects of the way we understand and value truthfulness make it something which we may be particularly prone to being self‐deceived about. If that is correct, then not only do we have further reason for thinking that self‐deception in politics may be more common than we might like to think, it also (a) helps us understand why claims about truthfulness seem more likely to perpetuate and intensify conflicts in politics; (b) suggests that the possibility of our being self‐deceived about our truthfulness stands sufficiently independent of our first‐order beliefs, be they true or false, such that it is likely to appear across the various political divides rather than being exclusive to one group; and (c) requires us to reconsider the problem represented by “post‐truth” politics and the responses that might be appropriate to it.

Central to the apocalyptic imaginary is the notion that history has some sort of purpose, or that it provides a perspective from which we can authenticate or redeem our human activities. As such, one might reasonably expect that realists would view such apocalypticism as precisely the sort of moralisation that they urge us to be deeply suspicious of. Yet in Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times Alison McQueen argues not only that the relationship between realism and apocalyptic visions is much more complex and nuanced than we might initially suspect, by exploring how it played out in the work of canonical figures in the realist tradition, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Hans J Morgenthau, but also that, at a time when we live in the shadow of several possible global disasters, realist thought might offer us something in the way of instruction ‘in living through an age of catastrophe’. While McQueen is admirably honest as to the limitations of the realist approaches in the thinkers she focuses on, this review suggests that there may be good reason to be even less enthusiastic about their prospects.

When we enquire into political legitimacy, we are, broadly speaking, exploring the question of whether a particular ruler or regime rules rightfully. We are interested in whether the rule is characterised by right or is merely a form of rule via coercion, a distinction that is usually put in terms of de jure and de facto order. While this question is basic to political experience, there nevertheless might be different ways in which it can be formulated which in turn will influence what is going to count as an adequate answer. In this chapter I want to express some concerns as to the way in which much contemporary modus vivendi theories have either raised the question of political legitimacy or the sort of answer that it takes to be sufficient. That is to say, it has either tended to get the question wrong or the answer, or both. In the end, I want to suggest that modus vivendi can only represent a coherent and distinct political theory if it takes its Hobbesian heritage seriously and accept that the provision of order is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of legitimacy. Whether that is an attractive way of thinking about politics is a different question.

Does the advent of cyber-war require us to abandon the traditional ethical framework for thinking about the morality of warfare - just war theory - and develop principles specific to the unique nature of cyber-attacks? Or can just war theory still provide an appropriate basis for thinking through the ethical issues raised by cyber-weapons? This article explores these questions via the issue of whether a cyber-attack can constitute a casus belli. The first half of the paper critically engages with recent attempts to provide a new theory of just information warfare (JIW) that is supposedly better suited to the unique character of cyber war insofar as it is grounded the broader meta-ethical framework of information ethics (IE). Yet the paper argues that not only is JIW fundamentally unsuitable as a way of thinking about cyber-war, but (in the second half) that it is possible to develop a different account of how we can understand a cyber-attack as constituting a casus belli in a way that is in keeping with traditional just war theory. In short, there is no need to reinvent just war theory for the digital age.

A common trait of all realistic political theories is the rejection of a conception of political theory as applied moral philosophy and an attempt to preserve some form of distinctively political thinking. Yet the reasons for favouring such an account of political theory can vary, a point that has often been overlooked in recent discussions by realism’s friends and critics alike. While a picture of realism as first-and-foremost an attempt to develop a more practical political theory which does not reduce morality to politics is often cited, in this paper we present an alternative understanding in which the motivation to embrace realism is grounded in a set of critiques of or attitudes towards moral philosophy which then feed into a series of political positions. Political realism, on this account, is driven by a set of philosophical concerns about the nature of ethics and the place of ethical thinking in our lives. This impulse is precisely what motivated Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss to their versions of distinctively realist political thought and is important to emphasise because it demonstrates that realism does not set politics against ethics (a misunderstanding typically endorsed by realism’s critics) but is rather an attempt to philosophise about politics without relying on understandings of morality which we have little reason to endorse.