Martina Valković’s research while affiliated with Leibniz Universität Hannover and other places

Recently there has been a rise in the application of concepts and methods from biological evolutionary theory to human cultures and societies where the aim is to explain these by describing them as population-level phenomena reducible to individual-level processes. I argue against this type of view by using Mesoudi's Cultural Evolution as a case study. I claim that Mesoudi’s ontological assumptions about cultures and societies are dubious and his methodological assumptions inadequate when it comes to addressing cultural and social phenomena. A consequence is that this approach to studying culture is, at the very least, incomplete and of limited application.

The ideas Darwin published in On the Origin of Species and The Descent of Man in the nineteenth century continue to have a major impact on our current understanding of the world in which we live and the place that humans occupy in it. Darwin’s theories constitute the core of the contemporary life sciences, and elicit enduring fascination as a potentially unifying basis for various branches of biology and the biomedical sciences. They can be used to understand the biological ground of human cognition, common behavioral patterns and disorders, and psychopathology more generally in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience. Perhaps the best known expression of this fact is Dobzhansky’s famous dictum that “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution” (Dobzhansky T. Am Zool 4:443–452, 1964: 449; Am Biol Teach 35:125–129, 1973: 125), and given that all human behavior supervenes on some biological basis, evolutionary thinking has a vast scope even just in this regard.

In a recent article, Kyle Stanford gives an account of what he terms “externalisation”, understood as our tendency to objectify or externalise moral demands and obligations. According to Stanford, externalisation is a distinctive feature of our moral psychology which is adaptive since it enables and preserves cooperation. I claim that the main issue with this account is that it assumes an overly psychological and individualist, inward-to-outward looking perspective. I advocate taking an alternative perspective that turns the spotlight to social practices and the social reality they create. I show how, seen in this light, norm externalisation becomes a side-effect instead of an adaptation deserving of a special explanation.

In this article, classic game theory and evolutionary game theory are used to explain how social norms might come into existence. The norm of distributive fairness is taken as a case in point, and illustrated by a simple example of dividing a cake.

Lewis [3] argues that, generally, we ought to conform to conventions because that answers (1) our own preferences, and (2) the preferences of others. While (1) is based on instrumental rationality, (2) is based on a moral principle or norm: other things being equal, we should do what answers others’ preferences. Bicchieri [1] claims there is a third kind of normativity, neither rational nor moral, that applies to social norms. I argue that conventions draw their normativity from instrumental rationality and other independent moral principles or norms, and that it is unclear what further normativity could there be.