Mark S. Mizruchi’s research while affiliated with Concordia University Ann Arbor and other places

It is broadly accepted among political scientists, political sociologists, and social movement theorists that a unified group will have a higher probability of success than a group that experiences internal divisions or fragmentation. Similarly, it has been assumed that in a society with a relatively unified elite, the elite will experience disproportionately higher benefits relative to the larger population. We take issue with this claim. In the mid-twentieth century, large American corporations exhibited a relatively high level of unity but the relative economic benefits accruing to the elite were at historic lows. In more recent years, American big business has become increasingly fragmented, yet the economic benefits that these elites have received have reached historic highs, and the average American’s standard of living has stagnated. Drawing on Padgett and Ansell, we introduce the concept of inadvertent robust action to explain how a relatively fragmented, disorganized elite can reap benefits that exceed those that its more unified counterparts experienced in an earlier era. We conclude with a discussion of the conditions under which our formulation can be expected to hold.

The actions of societal elites exert a disproportionate impact on events and outcomes in their home societies. These actions are driven by a combination of factors internal and external to their nation. Using the leaders of large American corporations—the group I call the American corporate elite—as an example, I examine the extent to which these two forces affected the character and orientation of the group, from the period immediately following World War II to the present. I argue that this elite was both constrained and enabled by a series of domestic and global forces, and I attempt to disentangle the role of both. Globally, American corporations benefited from the unique strength of the United States following the war, but their actions were constrained by both the Cold War with the Soviet Union and domestic forces, including an active and highly legitimate federal government and a relatively strong labor movement. An increase in foreign economic competition, along with domestic turmoil, in the 1970s helped trigger a decline in American strength and a conservative shift among the corporate elite. Although observers have attributed the group’s increasing conservatism and fragmentation in recent years to the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization, I argue that neither of these factors can account for these outcomes. I conclude by discussing the implications of this argument for the corporate elite, and American society as a whole.

It is broadly accepted among political scientists, political sociologists, and social movement theorists that a unified group will have a higher probability of success than a group that experiences internal divisions or fragmentation. Similarly, it has been assumed that in a society with a relatively unified elite, the elite will experience disproportionately higher benefits relative to the larger population. We take issue with this claim. In the mid-twentieth century, large American corporations exhibited a relatively high level of unity but the relative economic benefits accruing to the elite were at historic lows. In more recent years, American big business has become increasingly fragmented, yet the economic benefits that these elites have received have reached historic highs, and the average American’s standard of living has stagnated. Drawing on Padgett and Ansell, we introduce the concept of inadvertent robust action to explain how a relatively fragmented, disorganized elite can reap benefits that exceed those that its more unified counterparts experienced in an earlier era. We conclude with a discussion of the conditions under which our formulation can be expected to hold.

Economic actors confront various forms of uncertainty making decisions, and how they deal with these obstacles may affect their success in accomplishing their goals. This study examines the means by which relationship managers in a major commercial bank attempt to close transactions with their corporate customers. It is hypothesized that under conditions of high uncertainty, bankers will rely on colleagues with whom they are strongly tied for advice on and support of their deals. Drawing on recent network theory, it is also hypothesized that transactions in which bankers use relatively sparse approval networks are more likely to successfully close than are transactions involving dense approval networks. Both hypotheses are supported. Bankers are faced with a strategic paradox: Their tendency to rely on those they trust in dealing with uncertainty creates conditions that render deals less likely to be closed successfully. This paradox represents an example of unanticipated consequences of purposive social action.

Organizational theorists studying executives of large corporations have long theorized that top management is dominated by elites of upper social class background. Organizations reflect the class system in the societies they are situated in by advantaging those of higher social class background. If organizations are perpetuating societal inequality by favoring those from higher social class and positioning them to dictate organizational outcomes, it is important to understand ways to reduce inequality by increasing social class diversity, and theorize on the implications of this diversity for business and society. This article brings together scholars on the forefront of social class research to understand the influence of social class on the corporate elite. The scholars explore the effect of social class in attaining access to the most influential managerial positions, conditions that enable greater diversity, and how the corporate elite can affect firm strategic actions and key societal outcomes.

Why do firms re-establish previously dissolved relations with other firms? In this paper we explore this phenomenon in a customer-supplier context. Organization and strategy theorists have focused primarily on the formation, evolution, and dissolution of interfirm ties, but few have examined their reconstitution, despite evidence that tie reconstitution can have benefits for firms. We address this gap through an examination of strategic customer-supplier relations among 26 Scandinavian firms. Based on 95 open-ended interviews with executives of these firms, we show that four factors promote the reconstitution of previously dissolved ties: the existence of relation-specific investments in the prior relation, accompanied by a history of reliability and coordination; concerns regarding the uncertainty and risk associated with the initiation of a new relation from scratch; the maintenance of social ties between firm officers during the period of dormancy; and a major structural change such as a reorganization, merger, or acquisition in one or both firms. The results suggest that reconstituted interfirm relations represent a type distinctly different from newly-formed, currently active, or repeated ties. Successful reconstitution requires that the firms overcome whatever difficulties led to the cessation of their relation in the first place. How the ties were dissolved has an impact on their reconstitution at a later stage. A dormancy stage may provide new and unexpected knowledge, novel information, and other new resources that can lead to substantial benefits after the firms achieve a successful reconstitution.

One of the most widely held views about American political life is that business is hostile to the welfare state. In the 1970s, David Vogel asked why American businessmen “distrusted their state.” Kim Phillips-Fein has written of the “businessmen's crusade against the New Deal.” Jane Mayer and Nancy MacLean have recounted the efforts of the Koch Brothers and their wealthy allies to remake American politics in a more conservative direction. What could be more uncontroversial than the view that American business is broadly opposed to government social policies?