September 2000
·
25 Reads
·
24 Citations
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
This page lists works of an author who doesn't have a ResearchGate profile or hasn't added the works to their profile yet. It is automatically generated from public (personal) data to further our legitimate goal of comprehensive and accurate scientific recordkeeping. If you are this author and want this page removed, please let us know.
September 2000
·
25 Reads
·
24 Citations
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
September 2000
·
41 Reads
·
8 Citations
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
September 2000
·
2 Reads
·
18 Citations
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
September 2000
·
957 Reads
·
593 Citations
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
September 2000
·
13 Reads
·
21 Citations
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
April 2000
·
27 Reads
·
482 Citations
Philosophical Review
January 1999
·
4 Reads
·
1 Citation
The Philosophers Magazine
February 1998
·
28 Reads
·
990 Citations
This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on to offer a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism.
January 1996
·
10 Reads
·
18 Citations
Philosophical Studies
July 1993
·
17 Reads
·
39 Citations
Ethics
... As I will explain, some of the diagnosis criteria of BPD such as emotional instability or impulsivity 3 might serve as excusing factors targeting the "control condition" on moral responsibility. The control condition on moral responsibility claims that S is responsible for x only if S had control over the happening of x (Fischer & Ravizza 1998). This condition has, implicitly or explicitly, been at the center of the debate of whether people with certain personality disorders could be held responsible for their actions. ...
February 1998
... This view is modified fromFischer and Ravizza (1998). For attempts to extend this view to attitudes, seeMcCormick (2014) andMcHugh (2017).12 ...
April 2000
Philosophical Review
... With the most prominent one being that ofFisher and Ravizza (2000). But for a beautiful analysis of reason sensitivity see alsoNomy Arpaly (2004). ...
Reference:
The incentives account of feasibility
September 2000
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
... If the kleptomaniac is unable to modulate her behavior in response to reasons that she takes to be decisive (say, public humiliation), she probably does not exercise enough control to count as responsible. If she only responds to extraordinary reasons (like the agent in Mele's (2000) example of an agoraphobic who would leave the house but only if it were on fire), then she is not responsible for failing to respond to ordinary moral reasons. Some degree of control is not enough for moral responsibility: we need to assess whether an agent has enough control to count as morally responsible. ...
September 2000
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
... Fischer and Ravizza's theory of MRR may give such an answer for this kind of contradiction. MRR reveals that humans who have mechanisms that are responsive and reactive to reason can be said to be eligible for an assessment of responsibility for their actions (Bratman, 2000). Accordingly, Faulkner's response and reactions against the subject of race evoked his moral responsibility to promote a narrative discourse of moderation. ...
September 2000
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
... 4 See, e.g., Ravizza (1994), Fischer and Ravizza (1998, chp. 6), Warfield (1996), Stump and Fischer (2000), Stump (2000), McKenna (2001), Stump (2002), Widerker (2002), Fischer (2004Fischer ( , reprinted in his 2006, Haji (2008), Haji (2010), Shabo (2010a), Hermes (2014b), and Capes (2016). For a helpful review, see Widerker and Schnall (2014). ...
September 2000
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
... The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). This doctrine is mentioned in quite a few discussions about the trolley problem (Boyle 1980;Davis 1984;Fischer and Ravizza 1992a;Reibetanz 1998;McIntyre 2001;Shaw 2006;Edmonds 2013). The doctrine says that there is a moral difference between the intentional harm as a means and the foreseen harm as a side-effect (Quinn 1989b). ...
April 1992
Philosophical Review
... Van Inwagen has argued that "no one is able to do anything if he wants very much not to do that thing and has no countervailing desire to do it" (1989, p. 406). I will offer a new defense of his argument against an objection from Fischer and Ravizza (1992), then try to show that if his argument is sound, my bolder thesis is also true. My thesis implies that free will, when defined as the ability to do otherwise than one does, is at most possible in situations where (1) one has no strongest desire, (2) one has a strongest desire but no strongest desire about how to secure its object. ...
Reference:
Free Will and Desire
January 1992
Philosophical Perspectives
... MIT Press. For a response to these positions, see, e.g., Fischer, J. M., Ravizza, M., and Copp, D. (1993). Quinn on double effect: The problem of "closeness". ...
July 1993
Ethics
... See alsoWaller's (1990), (2011), and (2015), Pereboom's (2001) & (2014), and Honderick's (2002). 4 John Martin Fischer argues against the symmetry of PPA and PAP in his (1985) as well as in his and MarkRavizza's (1991). They argue that PAP is false but PPA true. ...
Reference:
Indecision and Buridan’s Principle
January 1991
Ethics