May 2025
International Journal of Political Economy
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May 2025
International Journal of Political Economy
March 2025
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4 Reads
The Antitrust Bulletin
This article demonstrates that there is not now, and there should not be, an efficiencies rebuttal, defense, or exception in merger cases. A textualist analysis demonstrates that it does not exist in the plain words of the anti-merger statute, which prevents mergers that “may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.” The relevant Supreme Court cases explicitly hold that no efficiency rebuttal exists. Although holdings in subsequent lower court cases are mixed, none provided a sound justification for ignoring Supreme Court precedent. The article also shows that antitrust economists have redefined efficiencies in a manner that conflicts with mainstream economic theory. But even under the conventional approach, economic studies show that mergers only extremely rarely result in efficiencies, and there is no evidence that merger efficiencies are ever passed to consumers. For these and other reasons, including the unpredictability, cost, and difficulties of efficiency analysis, sound public policy requires no efficiency rebuttal in merger cases. When the federal antitrust enforcers released their 2023 Merger Guidelines, they shocked the antitrust world by asserting, for the first time in more than forty years, that no efficiency rebuttal is available for mergers challenged under the “tend to create a monopoly” half of the anti-merger statute. Our article demonstrates that not only were the new Merger Guidelines authors correct to do this, but they should also have gone further. They should have abolished the efficiency rebuttal completely, for all corporate mergers.
January 2025
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1 Read
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1 Citation
Journal of Law and Political Economy
January 2025
SSRN Electronic Journal
January 2024
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2 Reads
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1 Citation
SSRN Electronic Journal
January 2024
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2 Citations
SSRN Electronic Journal
January 2024
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1 Read
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1 Citation
SSRN Electronic Journal
January 2023
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2 Reads
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2 Citations
SSRN Electronic Journal
January 2023
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9 Reads
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1 Citation
SSRN Electronic Journal
January 2022
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1 Read
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6 Citations
SSRN Electronic Journal
... 16 This approach leads to "efficiency" being defined as Potential Pareto Efficiency, a particular notion with strong, but rarely acknowledged or understood, ideological content. As we discuss elsewhere, the CWS/Potential Pareto Efficiency approach was thoroughly debunked by mainstream neoclassical welfare economists, 17 yet it survives in antitrust economics because of its ideological value (Glick et al. 2024). Antitrust policy based on the CWS is reduced to concerns about price and output (or demand growth via innovation). ...
Reference:
Antitrust’s Right Turn in the Late 1970s
January 2024
SSRN Electronic Journal
... Bowles and Carlin (2020) and Aghion et al. (2020) have criticized neoclassical economic theory on the basis of its failure to consider social behavior and institutions. Glick and Lozada (2021) state that the original fundamental principle of law and economics is that legal decisions should be based on maximizing efficiency. However, in the judicial system, there are always winners and losers. ...
February 2021
... The company has access to the best researchers, including great talents such as Demis Hassabis, Shane Legg, and Mustafa Suleyman. One benefit of accessing great talent and innovation is that Google significantly reduced energy consumption [6]. The element led to reduced costs and thus improved revenues. ...
January 2020
SSRN Electronic Journal
... Besides, in the tradition of Chicago Schools the real concern in terms of acquisitions emerges when the operation ends up in a monopoly. Otherwise, the merger becomes a efficiency increasing operation (Glick and Ruetschlin, 2019;Anderson and Purnell, 2023). ...
October 2019
... (p. 132) Lastly, it should be noted that Bork's interpretation of this criterion prevents any sanction of undue transfers of welfare compared with a 44 However, these two criteria are challenged on their theoretical grounds by welfare economists (Glick, 2019b hypothetical situation of perfect competition (i.e., if the firms were price-takers) and does not protect the competitive process itself. Therefore, it departs significantly from the decisional practice of us antitrust until the 1970s and the ordoliberal foundations of European competition policy. ...
July 2019
... Footnote 14 (continued) addressed to GAFAM corporations which receive favorable tax regimes and lax antitrust policies (Rikap and Lundvall 2021; see also Glick 2019;Kahn 2017) and which also benefit from "colossal public investments in R&D and the strengthening and broadening of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 17 " (Rikap and Lundvall 2021, p. 10). This means that the regulation activity itself is involved in the multi-agent process in which the capitalist, since he possesses the means to preserve the collective and public interest, uses them as a bargaining chip to regulate himself. ...
September 2019
The Antitrust Bulletin
... Une part de la littérature interroge la possibilité de répondre à ces problèmes en recourant à des démantèlements de firmes (Khan, 2019 ;Lamoreaux, 2019). Une autre discute de l'adéquation du critère du bien-être du consommateur et de l'approche par les effets (Glick, 2018 ;Melamed et Petit, 2019). La tension entre un antitrust technique basé sur une approche plus économique et un antitrust politique prenant à sa charge des objectifs plus larges, tels l'accès au marché des tiers, la liberté de choix des consommateurs, est-elle aggravée par la numérisation des activités ou les outils algorithmiques peuvent-ils euxmêmes permettre de meilleures décisions concurrentielles ? ...
December 2018
The Antitrust Bulletin