Mark Glick’s research while affiliated with University of Utah and other places

... 16 This approach leads to "efficiency" being defined as Potential Pareto Efficiency, a particular notion with strong, but rarely acknowledged or understood, ideological content. As we discuss elsewhere, the CWS/Potential Pareto Efficiency approach was thoroughly debunked by mainstream neoclassical welfare economists, 17 yet it survives in antitrust economics because of its ideological value (Glick et al. 2024). Antitrust policy based on the CWS is reduced to concerns about price and output (or demand growth via innovation). ...

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Antitrust’s Right Turn in the Late 1970s

... Bowles and Carlin (2020) and Aghion et al. (2020) have criticized neoclassical economic theory on the basis of its failure to consider social behavior and institutions. Glick and Lozada (2021) state that the original fundamental principle of law and economics is that legal decisions should be based on maximizing efficiency. However, in the judicial system, there are always winners and losers. ...

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Human-nature interaction approached from a bibliometric analysis of Malthus and Boserup

... The company has access to the best researchers, including great talents such as Demis Hassabis, Shane Legg, and Mustafa Suleyman. One benefit of accessing great talent and innovation is that Google significantly reduced energy consumption [6]. The element led to reduced costs and thus improved revenues. ...

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The Impact of Technology and COVID-19 on Mergers and Acquisitions: Implications for Supply Chain Management

... Besides, in the tradition of Chicago Schools the real concern in terms of acquisitions emerges when the operation ends up in a monopoly. Otherwise, the merger becomes a efficiency increasing operation (Glick and Ruetschlin, 2019;Anderson and Purnell, 2023). ...

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Market Structure and Management of Technological Monopolies

... (p. 132) Lastly, it should be noted that Bork's interpretation of this criterion prevents any sanction of undue transfers of welfare compared with a 44 However, these two criteria are challenged on their theoretical grounds by welfare economists (Glick, 2019b hypothetical situation of perfect competition (i.e., if the firms were price-takers) and does not protect the competitive process itself. Therefore, it departs significantly from the decisional practice of us antitrust until the 1970s and the ordoliberal foundations of European competition policy. ...

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Is the Consumer Welfare Obsolete? A European Union Competition Law and Competition Perspective

... Footnote 14 (continued) addressed to GAFAM corporations which receive favorable tax regimes and lax antitrust policies (Rikap and Lundvall 2021; see also Glick 2019;Kahn 2017) and which also benefit from "colossal public investments in R&D and the strengthening and broadening of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 17 " (Rikap and Lundvall 2021, p. 10). This means that the regulation activity itself is involved in the multi-agent process in which the capitalist, since he possesses the means to preserve the collective and public interest, uses them as a bargaining chip to regulate himself. ...

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An analysis of informational power transformations: from modern state to the new regime of performativity

... Une part de la littérature interroge la possibilité de répondre à ces problèmes en recourant à des démantèlements de firmes (Khan, 2019 ;Lamoreaux, 2019). Une autre discute de l'adéquation du critère du bien-être du consommateur et de l'approche par les effets (Glick, 2018 ;Melamed et Petit, 2019). La tension entre un antitrust technique basé sur une approche plus économique et un antitrust politique prenant à sa charge des objectifs plus larges, tels l'accès au marché des tiers, la liberté de choix des consommateurs, est-elle aggravée par la numérisation des activités ou les outils algorithmiques peuvent-ils euxmêmes permettre de meilleures décisions concurrentielles ? ...

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Algorithmes et décision concurrentielle : risques et opportunitésAlgorithms and antitrust decisions: Risks and opportunities