Manisuli Ssenyonjo’s research while affiliated with Brunel University London and other places

In recent years there has been a significant increase in trafficking in human beings as a global phenomenon. COVID-19 pandemic created conditions that increased the number of persons who were vulnerable to human trafficking and disrupted current and planned anti-trafficking initiatives. Human trafficking treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labour often for lower or no payment. This constitutes a modern form of de facto slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. This article provides an overview of international law on human trafficking and considers response to human trafficking in Africa. It further considers whether diplomats can be held accountable for exploitation of migrant domestic workers in receiving States. It further examines whether diplomatic immunity can be used as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by domestic courts and tribunals of a state which hosts the diplomat (the ‘receiving state’) in cases of employment of a trafficked person by a former or serving diplomat. It ends by considering whether trafficked persons should be held to bear individual criminal responsibility for crimes they have committed (or were compelled to commit) in the course, or as a direct consequence, of having been trafficked. Such crimes may include unlawful entry into, presence or residence in another country of transit or destination, working without a work permit, sex work, and use of false identity/false passport.

This chapter examines the contribution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987–2018) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2006–2018) to the protection of human rights and the development of international human rights law. The focus of the chapter is limited to the consideration of the Commission’s contribution with respect to: decisions on admissibility of communications concerning mainly exhaustion of domestic remedies; decisions on merits of communications; adoption of resolutions, principles/guidelines, general comments, model laws, and advisory opinions; special rapporteurs and working groups dealing with thematic human rights issues; consideration of State reports and conducting on-site visits; and referral of communications to the African Court involving unimplemented interim measures, serious or massive violations of human rights, or the Commission’s findings on admissibility and merits. It also considers some difficulties faced by the African Commission and Court.

This chapter examines the contribution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987–2018) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2006–2018) to the protection of human rights and the development of international human rights law. The focus of the chapter is limited to the consideration of the Commission’s contribution with respect to: decisions on admissibility of communications concerning mainly exhaustion of domestic remedies; decisions on merits of communications; adoption of resolutions, principles/guidelines, general comments, model laws, and advisory opinions; special rapporteurs and working groups dealing with thematic human rights issues; consideration of State reports and conducting on-site visits; and referral of communications to the African Court involving unimplemented interim measures, serious or massive violations of human rights, or the Commission’s findings on admissibility and merits. It also considers some difficulties faced by the African Commission and Court.

This article examines the main achievements and challenges of Africa’s two regional bodies established to ensure the implementation of human rights in Africa. It makes an assessment of the role of Africa’s oldest regional human rights body, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) in the last 31 years of its operation (from 1987–March 2018). It also considers the judicial role of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) in the last 12 years of its operation (from 2006–March 2018). The increasing contribution of both the Commission and the Court to the protection of human rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is rarely subjected to scrutiny in mainstream human rights literature. The article is limited to the consideration of the Commission’s contribution with respect to: (i) decisions on admissibility of communications concerning mainly exhaustion of domestic remedies; (ii) decisions on merits of communications; (iii) adoption of resolutions, principles/guidelines, general comments, model laws and advisory opinions; (iv) special rapporteurs and working groups to deal with thematic human rights issues; (v) consideration of State reports and conducting on-site visits; and (vi) referral of communications to the African Court involving unimplemented interim measures, serious or massive human rights violations, or the Commission’s findings on admissibility and merits.

In 2016 three African states namely South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia submitted written notifications of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Article 127 of the Rome Statute. Although the African Union welcomed and fully supported the three withdrawal notifications and considered them as ‘pioneer implementers’ of its ‘Withdrawal Strategy’, The Gambia and South Africa withdrew their notifications of withdrawal. Some other states – Kenya, Namibia and Uganda – have made threats to submit withdrawal notifications. This article examines four issues arising out of the said withdrawal notifications. First, why did the three states submit withdrawal notifications from the Rome Statute? Second, what is the impact of the three states’ withdrawal notifications? Third, is the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (or the yet-to-be-established African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights) a suitable African regional ‘alternative’ to the ICC? Finally, what steps might be taken to avoid, or at least minimise, further withdrawals in the future and to avoid impunity of perpetrators of international crimes in states that have withdrawn from the Rome Statute?

In 2016 three African states, namely South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia submitted written notifications of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Article 127 of the Rome Statute. Although the African Union (au) welcomed and fully supported the three States' withdrawal notifications and considered them as 'pioneer implementers' of the au's 'Withdrawal Strategy', The Gambia and South Africa withdrew their notifications of withdrawal before they became effective. This article examines three issues arising out of the said withdrawal notifications. It begins by examining the reasons as to why the three states submitted withdrawal notifications from the Rome Statute. It then considers the impact of the three states' withdrawal notifications. It concludes by identifying steps that might be taken to ensure constructive engagement between African States and the icc.

Half a century ago, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted two great covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which brought force of law to the rights declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both covenants have been widely ratified by the vast majority of African States. However, a largely neglected area of study has been assessing the influence of the ICESCR in various parts of the world including Africa. This article assesses the influence of the ICESCR in Africa. It seeks to show how the ICESCR, as interpreted by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has, through the 50 years since its adoption, had influence on the regional and domestic protection of economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights) in Africa. The article begins by considering the influence of the Covenant on the regional protection of human rights in Africa. This is followed by an analysis of the influence of the Covenant on the protection of ESC rights in domestic legal systems in Africa focusing primarily on the constitutional protection of ESC rights. It then considers the limited influence of the Covenant on national courts’ jurisprudence in African States applying dualist and monist approaches to international treaties. It ends by making recommendations to maximize the influence of the ICESCR in the future.

The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa critiques the three main models of constitutionally protecting economic, social and cultural rights in Africa - direct, indirect and hybrid models. It examines the choices that states have made, how the models have worked, whether they have been tested in litigation and the jurisprudence that has arisen. The book analyses the protection of the economic, social and cultural rights in a range of African countries: Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. Leading legal academics explore how these rights feature at the regional and sub-regional levels, as well as the link between domestic and international mechanisms of enforcement.

On 27 June 2014 the African Union (AU) Assembly adopted a protocol entitled ‘Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’. This Protocol contains an annex entitled ‘Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights’. The Protocol and the Statute annexed to it provide for the establishment of a regional court in Africa to be known as the ‘African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (African Court). This Court will, among others, exercise criminal jurisdiction over a wide range of international crimes involving individual criminal responsibility and corporate criminal liability over legal persons (with the exception of States), which goes beyond any other international court or hybrid tribunal. This article considers reasons for establishing a regional court in Africa with criminal jurisdiction and examines the likely effectiveness of the African Court focussing on the wide jurisdiction conferred on the Court; the impact of immunity from criminal prosecution granted to serving AU heads of State and other undefined ‘senior State officials’; and the need to strengthen national criminal jurisdictions to enable them to prosecute international crimes in Africa.

During the last thirty years the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission) has decided several communications on economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights protected under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter). While the Commission was initially reluctant to develop the content of these rights, it has since 2001 been developing, at an expanding pace, the scope, content and nature of state obligations under African Charter to respect, protect and fulfil ESC rights. This article seeks to provide a critical analysis of the burgeoning case law concerning the development of ESC rights by the African Commission and the legal impact thus far it has had on the enjoyment of ESC rights in Africa, encompassing rights of hitherto marginalised and excluded individuals and groups, a topic which is relatively given less attention in the existing literature. The article examines the legal bases and content of key communications decided by the African Commission. Conclusions are then drawn concerning the reasons for the development of ESC rights obligations by the African Commission and areas of potential clarification and expansion are identified.