Luke Dimitrios Spieker’s research while affiliated with Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and other places

Many legal scholars and practitioners consider the German judiciary to be a reliable and cooperative interlocutor of the Court of Justice. German judges refer more and more constructive references than their peers in other Member States – or so the prevailing narrative runs. The present study seeks to dispel and correct this image as reference champion. It identifies three challenges to the preliminary reference procedure in German courtrooms: a complex procedural framework restricting the discretion and obfuscating the duty to refer (1), a reluctant judiciary (2), and instrumental uses as a tool of judicial contestation (3). The study proceeds in four steps. Starting from a doctrinal perspective, it sketches the intricacies of the German procedural framework and analyses how it may obstruct preliminary references. Taking a quantitative perspective, it places German references in relation to other indicators, such as population size, incoming cases, or the number of judges. Under such a lens, Germany finds itself at the lower end of the spectrum. This reluctance can be traced back to a bundle of factors, such as judicial hierarchies, workload, or lack of knowledge and trust. Shifting to a qualitative perspective, the study then explores the instrumental uses of references as a tool of judicial contestation, both externally regarding the EU and internally regarding the German judicial architecture. The study concludes by focusing on a new actor in the reference game – the federal constitutional court. Its two senates have approached the preliminary reference procedure with diametrically opposed logics: the second senate underlines the power of the last, the first senate the potential of the first word. It remains to be seen whether the first senate will carry the day and herald – as a model for the entire German judiciary – a more cooperative future for the preliminary reference procedure.

This volume develops the constitutional approach in Union law. It shows how, in the light of the basic provisions of the EU Treaties a new, principled constitutionalism replaces the earlier functional constitutionalism. The authors discuss central doctrinal and theoretical questions of Union constitutional law. The contributions are based on the text and systematic order of the EU Treaties, which concretize a constitutional core laid down in their first provisions and contribute to the development of a European society shaped by the constitutional principles of Article 2 of the EU Treaty. With contributions by Prof. Dr. Jürgen Bast | Prof. Dr. Philipp Dann, LL.M. | Prof. Dr. Anuscheh Farahat | Prof. Dr. Claudio Franzius | Prof. Dr. Matthias Goldmann, LL.M. | Dr. Michael Ioannidis, LL.M. | Prof. Dr. Stefan Kadelbach, LL.M. | Dr. Karen Kaiser | Hannes Krämer | Dr. Christoph Krenn | Dr. Isabelle Ley | Prof. Dr. Anna Katharina Mangold, LL.M. | Prof. Dr. Christoph Möllers, LL.M. | Prof. Dr. Mehrdad Payandeh, LL.M. | Dr. Giacomo Rugge | Prof. Dr. Robert Schütze | Dr. Luke Dimitrios Spieker, LL.M. | Prof. Dr. Jelena von Achenbach | Prof. Dr. Armin von Bogdandy | Dr. Ferdinand Weber | Prof. Dr. Mattias Wendel

This chapter centres on the question of how to address violations of EU values in judicial proceedings before the Court of Justice. Instead of relying on fundamental freedoms, EU secondary legislation or the Charter, this chapter explores a more promising path—engaging with Article 2 TEU itself. Yet this path rests on a crucial premise: the judicial applicability of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Such a judicial applicability is far from self-evident and needs to be carefully construed. Based on recent jurisprudential developments, this chapter will propose ways to operationalise Article 2 TEU without curtailing its unrestricted scope of application. The judgments of Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses , Minister for Justice and Equality ( L.M. ) and Commission v. Poland will be at the heart of this contribution.

Wenn die Regierung eines Mitgliedstaates beginnt mittels einer gleichgeschalteten Justiz gegen Regierungskritiker vorzugehen, sind die von Art. 2 EUV geschützten Werte auf neue Weise bedroht. Dieser Beitrag zeigt auf, wie Richter gegenüber solchen Versuchen reagieren können und müssen. Neben einer Pflicht zu wertkonformer Auslegung nationalen Rechts, schlagen wir insbesondere eine Vorlagepflicht bei mitgliedstaatlichen Wertverstößen vor. Sollten nationale Richter hingegen bewusst gegen Unionswerte verstoßen, kommt auch eine strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit in Betracht. Diese Vorschläge implizieren die gerichtliche Anwendbarkeit von Art. 2 EUV. Daher werden wir in einem zweiten Schritt zeigen, wie eine solche gerichtliche Anwendbarkeit von Art. 2 EUV durch das Wechselspiel mit spezifischen Bestimmungen des Unionsrechts konstruiert werden kann. Um dabei das föderale Gleichgewicht zu erhalten sind diese Vorschläge in die umgekehrte Solange-Doktrin eingebettet, die im Lichte der neueren Rechtsprechung fortgeschrieben wird.

The EU faces one of the deepest crises since its formation. A dangerous rule of law backsliding in several Member States undermines the Union’s common values and puts Europe to the test. This raises the question of how to substantially address violations of EU values in judicial proceedings before the Court of Justice. Unfortunately, relying on fundamental freedoms, EU secondary legislation and even the Charter will not help much to resolve this value crisis. This Article takes a different path and calls for engaging with Article 2 TEU itself. Yet this proposal rests on a crucial premise: The judicial applicability of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Based on recent jurisprudential developments, this Article will elaborate a framework for the operationalization of Article 2 TEU values and demonstrate how their judicial applicability can be construed. The judgments of Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses , Minister for Justice and Equality (“L.M.”) and Commission v. Poland will be at the heart of this proposal.

EU Rule of law crisis – Article 2 TEU – EU values – EU fundamental rights – Freedom of speech – Member state courts – Interpretation of national law in conformity with Article 2 TEU values – Preliminary reference – Duty of referral – Criminal liability of judges – Reverse Solange – ASJP judgment – Judicial applicability of Article 2 TEU – Value-oriented interpretation of EU law – Mutual Amplification – Essence of EU fundamental rights – L.M . judgment – Aranyosi judgment – Federal balance – Red lines – Systemic deficiencies – Solange presumption – Mutual trust