Louis O. Kattsoff's research while affiliated with University of North Carolina at Pembroke and other places
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Publications (11)
There are many things to be said about the ultimate structure of what there is that cannot be derived merely from an analysis of the structure of the language in which we strive to speak about it. After all, what the real is like is not determined by our language, but, as I have repeatedly urged, the converse is true. In fact much more can be said....
I have now considered the ontological correlates of all the various parts of the function ‘fx’ except the functor f. This appears to me to be the most interesting of the symbols used in expressing the function. It is easy enough to see that the ‘x’ in ‘fx’ intends an object of some sort and serves as a proper name. When we replace ‘f’ by constant e...
In this chapter I want to consider the following problem. Suppose we have a metaphysical language (called ‘M’) and a statement in it ‘S’; under what conditions can we say that S in M is verified? It is important to note that I am not asking under what conditions we can say that S is verified in M, but under what conditions S which occurs in M may b...
All I was concerned to do in Chapter 1 was to point out that the use of linguistic analysis as a mode of philosophical investigation has meant an inevitable return to metaphysical problems. In this chapter I propose to examine the relation between metaphysics and language. In a sense much of what I will say in this chapter has been implied in the p...
There is a widespread belief that the senses give us knowledge of particulars and the mind (or reason) gives us knowledge of meanings and universals. I want to examine this belief in order to indicate the various modes of knowledge and their sources. This should help us arrive at a better understanding of intuition and how it functions.
In the preceding chapter I have treated words of a certain sort as names of particuler and universal events. But both words and sentences are not only names but bearers of meanings. An event as an unique, simple and undiluted event which can only be indicated cannot, in a sense, be known at all. If all we could do was to recognize the events named,...
I must now return to the basic metaphysical unit — the event — represented by the function ‘fx.’ Much of what needs to be said now cannot be derived simply from a consideration of the linguistic element but if anything can be said significantly it can be only on the basis of an intuiting of what there is. The problem as I see it now seems to be thi...
I am now confronted with another problem. If it is granted that “there are events (whatever their ontological status)” is indubitable, I think it will also be conceded that we never find unrelated events. So although the ultimate metaphysical unit is symbolized by the expression ‘fx’, we never do find ‘fx’ alone and we should be tempted to conclude...
Not the least interesting thing about the beginnings of a revival of metaphysical interest is the source of that renewed interest. When Carnap developed the distinction between the formal and material modes of speech and with that his various formulations of syntactics, it was felt by him and his disciples that the confusions of the metaphysicians...
In order that my argument should not go astray it seems to me necessary to ask what ‘metaphysics’ means. To make clear what I shall do in this chapter I want first of all to indicate that this question really is three questions. First it will be necessary to ask what historically the word ‘metaphysics’ has meant. I presume that what the formalists...
There is one other relation in logic that needs to be considered. That is the relation symbolized by ‘ → ’ and interpreted as ’implies, or ‘if ..., then ...’ These two interpretations reveal the existence of an ambiguity in the semantics of ‘ →. ’ My problem may be stated somewhat in this fashion: what, if anything, about what there is does the rel...
