Lisa M. Fairfax’s research while affiliated with George Washington University and other places

This article considers the effect that increased shareholder activism may have on non-shareholder corporate stakeholders such as employees and consumers. One of the most outspoken proponents of increased shareholder power has argued that such increased power could have negative repercussions for other corporate stakeholders because it would force directors to focus on profits without regard to other interests. This article critically examines that argument. The article acknowledges that increased shareholder power may benefit some stakeholders more than others, and may have some negative consequences. However, this article demonstrates that shareholders not only have interests that align with other stakeholders, but also introduces empirical evidence suggesting that shareholders may use their increased power to advance the interests of other stakeholders. Thus, this article debunks the notion that increased shareholder power is necessarily problematic for non-shareholder stakeholders.

Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 414 (2002), explores corporate fiduciary duties in the context of for-profit companies that operate in traditionally non-profit spheres. The rise in “privatization”—a conversion from certain businesses being operated by nonprofit and government entities to operation by for-profit companies—has sparked considerable opposition, particularly when it occurs within industries that deliver some societal good such as health care or education. Opponents claim that for-profit companies cannot pay heed to their social or charitable commitments because they must focus on generating profits. In a related debate, many corporate scholars disagree about the proper aim of the corporation—with some insisting that it should serve the interests of its shareholders only, and others contending that the corporation should serve the interests of all of the various constituents on which it impacts. By evaluating the extent to which corporate fiduciary law allows directors and officers of recently privatized firms to make decisions that benefit their public constituencies, even at the expense of shareholder profit, my article explores the corporate law debate through the prism of privatization. My article concludes that corporate law is more flexible than many experts suggest, and hence that it allows directors of newly privatized firms to advance the interests of their beneficiaries even with those interests are in conflict with shareholder concerns. This article was selected to be reprinted in the Corporate Practice Commentator (Robert B. Thompson, ed.).

This article argues that the modern Supreme Court is engaging in Plessy-like reasoning to permit segregation. The article argues that the Supreme Court relies on three rationales, all consistent with Plessy, that have resulted in the erosion of school integration: 1) segregation reflects private preferences, 2) we should defer to local governments, and 3) separate schools can result in equal quality of education for all children. The article provides an overview of the case law demonstrating this pro-Plessy bent of the Court and insists that the Court return to the reasoning of Brown to better ensure high quality education for all children.

This article focuses on the phenomenon of securitizing future royalties of entertainers, illustrating why securitzation of such royalties has not been embraced more enthusiastically. The article begins by describing the securitization process in general and the differences between mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities. The article then examines the benefits of securitization as applied to entertainment royalties. Benefits of securitization include immediate liquidity, less expensive capital, and diversification of the suppliers of the originator’s funding. However, securitization does not make sense for many entertainers unless they need large sums of cash. Moreover, securitizing royalties may not be viable because it creates a host of copyright issues.

Post Enron has witnessed renewed concern regarding corporations’ failure to behave responsibly, both in terms of their ethical responsibility and in terms of their responsibilities to advance issues beyond financial matters, such as those that impact employees, customers, and the broader community. Many scholars, legislators, and members of the business community have struggled to find strategies for restoring corporate responsibility. This Article argues that a corporation’s own words or rhetoric may be useful in solving its behavioral defects. In fact, the vast majority of corporations issue statements or otherwise engage in rhetoric that suggest a commitment to issues and concerns beyond financial matters. Most people dismiss this rhetoric as meaningless speech, and as a result there has been very little attempt to analyze its relevance to corporate conduct. This Article insists that such dismissals are shortsighted. First, by critically examining the available empirical evidence, this Article demonstrates that corporate rhetoric has a greater connection to corporate behavior than most would presume. Second, this Article draws on social psychology literature to illuminate how corporate rhetoric on responsibility can be used strategically to increase the likelihood that corporations will engage in behavior consistent with that rhetoric. By highlighting the behavioral significance of corporate rhetoric, this Article offers a unique and novel solution to the problem of corporate irresponsibility.

The Legal Origins Theory purports to predict how countries respond to economic and social problems. Specifically, the legal origins of the United States should strongly influence the manner it approaches economic problems and its approach should be distinct from the response of civil law countries. If the theory is accurate, America's legal tradition should have a profound impact on its response to the crisis. This Article seeks to test the boundaries of the theory by assessing whether it could have predicted the manner the U.S. responded to the current economic crisis. After analyzing the U.S. response to the crisis, this article reveals that such response runs fundamentally counter to its legal origins. This inconsistency suggests that political, social, and economic forces do more to explain the U.S. response to significant turmoil than its legal origins. It also suggests that the current crisis may have been so severe that it overwhelmed any explanatory or predictive value potentially derived from the legal origins theory.

One question posed by the 2010 SEALS Roundtable on Re-Evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability was: "Is corporate regu-lation sufficient to handle corporate misconduct?" My remarks and this Article seek to address that question and its implications for corporate criminal liability. In so doing, I will make two points about corporate regulation. First, the corporate regime has essen-tially removed personal liability of directors and officers from the range of remedies used to shape corporate conduct. 1 Second, as a result of this first point, corporate regulation of corporate miscon-duct is sufficient only if we have confidence that the imposition of such personal liability is not necessary to deter or otherwise pre-vent corporate malfeasance. After making these points, I will discuss their implications for corporate criminal liability.