Larry L. Jacoby’s research while affiliated with Washington University in St. Louis and other places

A number of recent studies have shown that older adults are more susceptible to context-based misperceptions in hearing (Rogers, Jacoby, & Sommers, Psychology and Aging, 27, 33–45, 2012; Sommers, Morton, & Rogers, Remembering: Attributions, Processes, and Control in Human Memory [Essays in Honor of Larry Jacoby], pp. 269–284, 2015) than are young adults. One explanation for these age-related increases in what we term false hearing is that older adults are less able than young individuals to inhibit a prepotent response favored by context. A similar explanation has been proposed for demonstrations of age-related increases in false memory (Jacoby, Bishara, Hessels, & Toth, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 131–148, 2005). The present study was designed to compare susceptibility to false hearing and false memory in a group of young and older adults. In Experiment 1, we replicated the findings of past studies demonstrating increased frequency of false hearing in older, relative to young, adults. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated older adults’ increased susceptibility to false memory in the same sample. Importantly, we found that participants who were more prone to false hearing also tended to be more prone to false memory, supporting the idea that the two phenomena share a common mechanism. The results are discussed within the framework of a capture model, which differentiates between context-based responding resulting from failures of cognitive control and context-based guessing.

Cognitive control constrains retrieval processing and so restricts what comes to mind as input to the attribution system. We review evidence that older adults, patients with Alzheimer's disease, and people with traumatic brain injury exert less cognitive control during retrieval, and so are susceptible to memory misattributions in the form of dramatic levels of false remembering.

Change has been described as detrimental for later memory for the original event in research on retroactive interference. Popular accounts of retroactive interference treat learning as the formation of simple associations and explain interference as due to response competition, perhaps along with unlearning or inhibition of the original response. By such accounts, providing additional study time for a changed response in a classic A–B, A–D learning paradigm should increase retroactive interference. In contrast, our experiments show that changing a response produces retroactive facilitation rather than retroactive interference but that outcome requires that the change be detected in the form of a reminding. When reminding does not occur, retroactive interference is observed. Increasing time to study the changed response increases the likelihood of being reminded. Accounts in terms of simple associations cannot explain the importance of reminding. We do so by assuming that being reminded results in a recursive representation that includes both the original and changed response along with the order in which they occurred. We discuss the importance of our results for application as well as for theory.

Dual-process models of episodic retrieval reveal consistent deficits of controlled recollection in aging and Alzheimer disease (AD). In contrast, automatic familiarity is relatively spared. We extend standard dual-process models by showing the importance of a third capture process. Capture produces a failure to attempt recollection, which might reflect a distinct error from an inability to recollect when attempted (Jacoby et al. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134(2), 131–148, 2005a). We used multinomial process tree (MPT) modeling to estimate controlled recollection and capture processes, as well as automatic retrieval processes, in a large group of middle-aged to older adults who were cognitively normal (N = 519) or diagnosed with the earliest detectable stage of AD (N = 107). Participants incidentally encoded word pairs (e.g., knee bone). At retrieval, participants completed cued word fragments (e.g., knee b_n_) with primes that were congruent (e.g., bone), incongruent (e.g., bend), or neutral (i.e., &&&) to the target (e.g., bone). MPT models estimated retrieval processes both at the group and the individual levels. A capture parameter was necessary to fit MPT models to the observed data, suggesting that dual-process models of this task can be contaminated by a capture process. In both group- and individual-level analyses, aging and very mild AD were associated with increased susceptibility to capture, decreased recollection, and no differences in automatic influences. These results suggest that it is important to consider two distinct modes of attentional control when modeling retrieval processes. Both forms of control (recollection and avoiding capture) are particularly sensitive to cognitive decline in aging and early-stage AD.

It has often been shown that intentional recollection is influenced by context manipulations, such as context reinstatement (e.g., Smith, 2013; Smith & Vela, 2001), but whether or not automatic retrieval (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) is likewise context dependent remains an open question. Here, we present two experiments that examined effects of context manipulations on indirect measures of memory. The first experiment tested anagram completion, and the second experiment used word fragment completion to test effects of context reinstatement; both experiments found reinstatement effects. To address potential problems of explicit contamination, we also asked participants if they were aware of the priming manipulations. Separating participants according to their test awareness showed effects of context manipulations for both aware and unaware participants. A greater effect size was found for aware participants only in Experiment 1, in which participants had enough time on each test trial for recollection to be used. We conclude that context reinstatement does affect automatic retrieval.

Most metacognition research has focused on aggregate judgments of overall performance or item-level judgments about performance on particular questions. However, metacognitive judgments at the category level, which have not been as extensively explored, also play a role in students’ study strategies, for example, when students determine what topics to study for an exam. We investigated whether category learning judgments (CLJs) were sensitive to differences in the difficulty of general knowledge categories. After either studying or being tested on facts from several categories (e.g., Shakespeare, Astronomy), participants estimated the likelihood that they could correctly answer new questions from those categories on a later test (i.e., they made CLJs). Results of two studies showed that CLJs were sensitive to differences in category difficulty. Further, participants gave lower or more conservative CLJs when they took an initial test as compared to studying questions from the categories. Results are discussed in terms of the value and relevance of CLJs both in educational settings and in theories of metacognition.

Three experiments contrasted recollection of change with differentiation as means of avoiding retroactive interference and proactive interference. We manipulated the extent to which participants looked back to notice change between pairs of cues and targets (A-B, A-D) and measured the effects on later cued recall of either the first or second response. Two lists of word pairs were presented. Some right-hand members of pairs were changed within List 2, whereas others were changed between lists. Participants in a Within-List Back condition were instructed to detect changes that occurred only during List 2, in an effort to reduce noticing changes in pairs between lists while simultaneously differentiating the 2 lists. In contrast, participants in an N-Back condition were instructed to detect both within-list and between-list changes. Recall of first list responses that changed between lists produced retroactive facilitation for the N-Back condition but not for the Within-List Back condition. Similarly, recall of second list responses that changed between lists produced proactive facilitation for the N-Back condition but not for the Within-List Back condition. The greater extent of looking back increased detection of change and later recollection of change, which produced facilitation. When change was not recollected, detected change produced proactive interference. The recursive reminding produced when change is noticed contrasts with the simple associations of classic interference theory, and memory performance when change is recollected contrasts with the predictions of interference theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

Three experiments examined the issue of whether faces could be better recognized in a simultaneous test format (2- alternative forced choice [2afc]) or a sequential test format (yes-no). all experiments showed that when target faces were present in the test, the simultaneous procedure led to superior performance (area under the roc curve), whether lures were high or low in similarity to the targets. However, when a target- absent condition was used in which no lures resembled the targets but the lures were similar to each other, the simultaneous procedure yielded higher false alarm rates (experiments 2 and 3) and worse overall performance (experiment 3). this pattern persisted even when we excluded responses that participants opted to withhold rather than volunteer. We conclude that for the basic recognition procedures used in these experiments, simultaneous presentation of alternatives (2afc) generally leads to better discriminability than does sequential presentation (yes-no) when a target is among the alternatives. However, our results also show that the opposite can occur when there is no target among the alternatives. an important future step is to see whether these patterns extend to more realistic eyewitness lineup procedures. the pictures used in the experiment are available online at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/ajp/media/testing_recognition/.

Declarative concepts (i.e., key terms with short definitions of the abstract concepts denoted by those terms) are a common kind of information that students are expected to learn in many domains. A common pedagogical approach for supporting learning of declarative concepts involves presenting students with concrete examples that illustrate how the abstract concepts can be instantiated in real-world situations. However, minimal prior research has examined whether illustrative examples actually enhance declarative concept learning, and the available outcomes provide weak evidence at best. In the three experiments reported here, students studied definitions of declarative concepts followed either by illustrative examples of those concepts or by additional study of the definitions. On a subsequent classification test in which learners were presented with examples and were asked to identify which concept the example illustrated, performance was greater for students who had studied illustrative examples during learning than for students who only studied definitions (ds from 0.74 to 1.67). However, the effects of illustrative examples on declarative concept learning depended in part on the conditions under which those examples were presented. Although performance was similar when examples were presented after versus before concept definitions (Experiments 1a–1b), classification accuracy depended on the extent to which examples of different concepts were interleaved and whether definitions were presented along with the examples (Experiment 2).

During political campaigns, candidates often change their positions on controversial issues. Does changing positions create confusion and impair memory for a politician's current position? In 3 experiments, two political candidates held positions on controversial issues in two debates. Across the debates, their positions were repeated, changed, or held only in the second debate (control). Relative to the control condition, recall of the most recent position on issues was enhanced when change was detected and recollected, whereas recall was impaired when change was not recollected. Furthermore, examining the errors revealed that subjects were more likely to intrude a Debate 1 response than to recall a blend of the two positions, and that recollecting change decreased Debate 1 intrusions. We argue that detecting change produces a recursive representation that embeds the original position in memory along with the more recent position. Recollecting change then enhances memory for the politician's positions and their order of occurrence by accessing the recursive trace.