Larisa Heiphetz’s research while affiliated with Columbia University and other places

Humans behave more prosocially toward ingroup (vs. outgroup) members. This preregistered research examined the influence of God concepts and memories of past behavior on prosociality toward outgroups. In Study 1 (n = 573), participants recalled their past kind or mean behavior (between-subjects) directed toward an outgroup. Subsequently, they completed a questionnaire assessing their views of God. Our dependent measure was the number of lottery entries given to another outgroup member. Participants who recalled their kind (vs. mean) behavior perceived God as more benevolent, which in turn predicted more generous allocation to the outgroup (vs. ingroup). Study 2 (n = 281) examined the causal relation by manipulating God concepts (benevolent vs. punitive). We found that not only recalling kind behaviors but perceiving God as benevolent increased outgroup generosity. The current research extends work on morality, religion, and intergroup relations by showing that benevolent God concepts and memories of past kind behaviors jointly increase outgroup generosity.

The motive domains of control and truth align with conceptions of God's omnipotence and omniscience, but the link between control-versus truth-dominant motives and God concepts remains unclear. A convergence account predicts a positive association between these variables; a divergence account predicts an inverse association. Furthermore, the causal direction of an association under either account is unknown. To test between these competing accounts, Study 1 investigated whether people with God concepts dominant in control versus truth report motives that are also control- (vs. truth-) dominant. To investigate causality, Study 2 manipulated God concepts and measured motive dominance; Study 3 manipulated motives and measured God concepts. Study 4 replicated Study 1 with methodological enhancements. Collectively, results supported the convergence account, indicating that God concepts influence motive predominance. By integrating motivation and religious cognition research, this work elucidates the relations between beliefs about God's attributes and personal motives.

Laypeople often believe that God punishes transgressions; however, their inferences about God's punishment motives remain unclear. We addressed this topic by asking laypeople to indicate why God punishes. We also examined participants' inferences about why humans punish to contribute to scholarly conversations regarding the extent to which people may anthropomorphize God's mind. In Studies 1A to 1C, participants viewed God as less retributive than humans. In Study 2, participants expected God (vs. humans) to view humans' true selves more positively; this difference mediated participants' views of God as less retributive than humans. Study 3 manipulated agents' views of humans' true selves and examined how such information influenced each agent's perceived motives. Participants viewed a given agent as less retributive when that agent regarded the true self as good (versus bad). These findings extend scholarship on lay theories of punishment motives and highlight links between religious and moral cognition.

Beliefs play a central role in our lives. They lie at the heart of what makes us human, they shape the organization and functioning of our minds, they define the boundaries of our culture, and they guide our motivation and behavior. Given their central importance, researchers across a number of disciplines have studied beliefs, leading to results and literatures that do not always interact. The Cognitive Science of Belief aims to integrate these disconnected lines of research to start a broader dialogue on the nature, role, and consequences of beliefs. It tackles timeless questions, as well as applications of beliefs that speak to current social issues. This multidisciplinary approach to beliefs will benefit graduate students and researchers in cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, political science, economics, and religious studies.

Adults often respond negatively toward children with incarcerated parents. Yet, the developmental foundations for such negativity remain unclear. Two studies (N = 331 U.S. residents; plurality White; plurality male; data collected between Winter 2019 and Spring 2021) addressed this topic. Study 1 probed 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds' and 7‐ to 8‐year‐olds' inferences about peers with and without incarcerated parents. Children reported less certainty that peers with, versus without, incarcerated parents possess moral beliefs. Study 2 showed that among older children, inferences about parental absence did not fully account for this pattern of results. Across studies, children behaved less generously toward peers with, versus without, incarcerated parents. These studies illuminate how early socio‐moral judgment may contribute to negativity toward children with incarcerated parents.

Adults commonly conceptualize intentional harms as worse than accidental harms. We probed the developmental trajectory of this pattern and asked whether U.S. children (4 – to 7-year-olds) and adults expected other agents – including another person and God – to share their views. In contrast with some prior work, even the youngest children in the present study considered intent when making moral judgments. Although children did not distinguish among the agents when indicating how severely they would punish intentional and accidental transgressors, adults reported that God would punish less severely than would they themselves or another person. Furthermore, children and adults differed in their evaluation of how the agents would react to the transgressors: Adults and older children were more likely than younger children to attribute spiritual and religious reactions to God. These findings suggest that even young children’s moral judgments are sensitive to information about intent but that the propensity to distinguish others’ focus on intent from one’s own emerges more gradually across age.

Recent research has shown that a religious upbringing renders children receptive to ordinarily impossible outcomes, but the underlying mechanism for this effect remains unclear. Exposure to religious teachings might alter children's basic understanding of causality. Alternatively, religious exposure might only affect children's religious cognition, not their causal judgments more generally. To test between these possibilities, 6- to 11-year-old children attending either secular (n = 49, 51% female, primarily White and middle-class) or parochial schools (n = 42, 48% female, primarily White and middle-class) heard stories in which characters experienced negative outcomes and indicated how those characters could have prevented them. Both groups of children spontaneously invoked interventions consistent with natural causal laws. Similarly, when judging the plausibility of several counterfactual interventions, participants endorsed the intervention consistent with natural laws at high levels, irrespective of schooling. However, children's endorsement of supernatural interventions inconsistent with these laws revealed both group similarities and differences. Although both groups of children judged divine intervention (i.e., via prayer) as more plausible than mental (i.e., via wishing) and magical (i.e., via magical powers) interventions, children receiving religious (vs. secular) schooling were more likely to do so. Moreover, although children with a secular upbringing overwhelmingly chose naturalistic interventions as the most effective, children with a religious upbringing chose divine as well as naturalistic intervention. These results indicate that religious teaching does not alter children's basic understanding of causality but rather adds divine intervention to their repertoire of possible causal factors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Members of stigmatized groups often face dehumanization. Chapter 6 investigates whether individuals may also dehumanize perpetrators of bigotry. Three main findings emerge. First, participants perceive racists as less than fully human. This finding also generalizes to sexists, suggesting that the propensity to dehumanize perpetrators of bigotry is not limited to racists. Second, the extent to which participants dehumanize racists predicts the degree to which they report that ambiguous behaviors performed by strangers reflect racial bias. Third, this association does not emerge when participants evaluate behaviors performed by their friends, suggesting that views of “racists” in general may not be linked with evaluations of behaviors performed by at least some close others. These findings demonstrate that dehumanization extends to perpetrators of bias and predicts evaluations of their behaviors.

Like its predecessor, the fourth volume of Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy showcases the growing depth and breadth of the field. Epistemology and moral psychology have been important foci of past work in experimental philosophy, and the contributions in this volume attest to the ways in which empirical methods are being used to add nuance to previous claims, both theoretical and empirical. Alongside this progress on familiar topics, we see an expansion to new areas in mind and metaphysics, with studies exploring how people typically conceptualize different aspects of mind and different kinds of minds, including the extension of agentive modes of thinking well beyond the mental. The volume concludes where the field began: with explicit attention to philosophical methodology, and the ways in which empirical results can inform philosophical debates.

Research has probed the consequences of providing people with different types of information regarding why a person possesses a certain characteristic. However, this work has largely examined the consequences of different information subsets (e.g., information focusing on internal versus societal causes). Less work has compared several types of information within the same paradigm. Using the legal system as an example domain, we provided children (N=198 6- to 8-year-olds) with several types of information—including information highlighting internal moral character, internal biological factors, behavioral factors, and societal factors—about why a specific outcome (incarceration) might occur. We examined how such language shaped children’s attitudes. In Study 1, children reported the most positivity toward people who were incarcerated for societal reasons and the least positivity toward people who were incarcerated for their internal moral character; attitudes linked with behavioral information fell between these extremes. Studies 2a-2b suggested that Study 1’s effects could not be fully explained by participants drawing different about individuals in Study 1. Study 3 replicated Study 1’s results and showed that information linking incarceration with internal biological factors led to more positivity than information linking incarceration with internal moral character. Finally, Study 4 suggested that the patterns found in Studies 1 and 3 generalize to non-punitive contexts. Moreover, Study 4 found that the effects in Studies 1 and 3 emerged regardless of whether information was communicated via explanations or descriptions. These results demonstrate that how we express our beliefs about social phenomena shape the realities in which others live.