Kotaro Suzumura’s research while affiliated with Waseda University and other places

This innovative history of welfare economics challenges the view that welfare economics can be discussed without taking ethical values into account. Whatever their theoretical commitments, when economists have considered practical problems relating to public policy, they have adopted a wider range of ethical values, whether equality, justice, freedom, or democracy. Even canonical authors in the history of welfare economics are shown to have adopted ethical positions different from those with which they are commonly associated. Welfare Theory, Public Action, and Ethical Values explores the reasons and implications of this, drawing on concepts of welfarism and non-welfarism developed in modern welfare economics. The authors exemplify how economic theory, public affairs and political philosophy interact, challenging the status quo in order to push economists and historians to reconsider the nature and meaning of welfare economics.

Social Choice and Welfare has a tradition of interviewing pioneering contributors to welfare economics and social choice theory to keep their recollections on the formative stages of their seminal work, their current views on the past and present states of the art, and their perspectives on the agendas to be pursued in this branch of normative economics officially on record.

Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos.: D71, D72.

The paper proposes a general definition of positionalist voting rules. Unlike the commonly-employed scoring rules, our notion of positionalism allows for non-linear criteria to be included in the requisite class. We define a voting rule as positionalist if, for any profile of strict individual orderings, any two alternatives are compared collectively solely on the basis of their positional scores according to the individual rankings. In contrast to the class of scoring rules, however, we do not restrict attention to linear aggregation procedures. Two plausible unanimity properties are examined in the context of our new class of positionalist rules and, moreover, we characterize the lexicographic extensions that refine the plurality rule and its inverse counterpart.

Despite the importance of pioneering work by such precursors as Jean-Charles de Borda and Marquis de Condorcet in the 18th century, it was Kenneth Arrow and his general impossibility theorem that elevated the scientific status of social choice theory into an unprecedented plateau. This paper tries to highlight several unique features of his research program of social choice theory vis-à-vis the classical contributions of Borda and Condorcet, on the one hand, and the “new” welfare economics à la Bergson and Samuelson, on the other hand, as well as to identify several channels through which his impossibility impasse could be circumvented. It is concluded with several personal reminiscences of Kenneth Arrow based on the author’s own experiences with him over four decades.

We examine voting rules that are inspired by Dodgson’s method of marks (to be distinguished from the procedure that is commonly referred to as Dodgson’s rule) by means of two criteria. Each voter decides how to allocate a vote budget (which is common to all voters, and need not be exhausted) to the candidates. Our first criterion is a richness condition: we demand that, for any possible preference ordering a voter may have, there is a feasible allocation of votes that reflects these preferences. A (tight) lower bound on the vote budget is established. Adding a strategy-proofness condition as a second criterion, we recommend that the vote budget be given by the lower bound determined in our first result.

We propose an alternative articulation of the Benthamite greatest-happiness-of-the-greatest-number principle. With ordinally measurable and interpersonally non-comparable utilities, the rule chooses those feasible alternatives that maximize the number of individuals who end up with their greatest element. This rule is tantamount to the plurality rule. Furthermore, in the spirit of Rawls’s maximin principle, we propose the greatest-unhappiness-of-the-least-number principle. In analogy to the greatest-happiness principle, the least-unhappiness principle is formally equivalent to the anti-plurality rule. Our main result is a characterization of the least-unhappiness principle.

We propose an alternative articulation of the Benthamite greatest-happiness-of-the-greatest-number principle. With ordinally measurable and interpersonally non-comparable utilities, the rule chooses those feasible alternatives that maximize the number of individuals who end up with their greatest element. This rule is tantamount to the plurality rule. Furthermore, in the spirit of Rawls’s maximin principle, we propose the greatest-unhappiness-of-the-least-number principle. In analogy to the greatest-happiness principle, the least-unhappiness principle is formally equivalent to the anti-plurality rule. Our main result is a characterization of the least-unhappiness principle.