Koichiro Misawa’s research while affiliated with Gunma University and other places

Paul Hirst’s philosophical ‘conversion’ from forms of knowledge to forms of social practices was largely prompted by his radical reappraisal of the philosophical underpinnings that had validated his classic conception of liberal education. The primary motivation for Hirst’s later works was to remedy his own neglect of practical reason, whose sharp distinction from theoretical reason he acknowledged he had failed to appreciate. There is much to commend in his ‘practical’ turn. The main challenge that remains, however, is that the social practices view is something of a ‘foundationalist’ two-part picture, where overwhelming priority is given to practical reason. I appreciate the importance of the two issues Hirst puts on the table, in his debate with Wilfred Carr particularly and in his later works more generally: the issues of cultivating phronesis and of making sense of the practical character of critical-reflective activities. But I argue that addressing these issues fully requires us to recognize that neither theoretical nor practical rationality can be intelligible apart from the other. To press the point home, I review the analogous debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell over whether to accept, and how to understand, the view that rational conceptuality in a relevant sense pervades not only deliberation and propositional thinking but also perception and embodied coping skills. I conclude by briefly considering the prospect that the legacy of Hirst and recent discussions around human nature, practical rationality, and the formation of reason will interactively enrich our philosophical-educational scholarship.

Michael Bonnett’s highly regarded Environmental Consciousness (2021) is an admirable extension of the phenomenology of nature inaugurated in his previous work Retrieving Nature (2004). To fully capture the essentials of his environmental thinking, I locate the set of ideas he has developed in his phenomenology of nature (such as ‘environmental consciousness’ itself) within a wider context, by situating Environmental Consciousness as a sequel not just to Retrieving Nature but also to Children’s Thinking (1994). While broadly sympathetic with how his thinking has evolved into the environmental philosophy of education articulated in his new book, I argue that the notion of rationality has been alienated from his environmentalising project. Given the alliance Bonnett acknowledges with John McDowell’s re-conceptualisation of nature, I contend that the latter’s view that human experience is pervaded by conceptual rationality in a relevant sense can make room to integrate rationality with Bonnett’s on-going project; put differently, I wager that rationality should be ‘environmentalised’.

At the heart of our current environmental predicament lies the issue of our relationship with nature. Michael Bonnett’s educational rehabilitation of nature, which might be called a ‘metaphysical’ turn in nature-related issues, brings us back to the core question of educational-philosophical thinking: how we are to understand ourselves and our relation to the world. In this paper, by confronting his environmental philosophy of education with what John McDowell, in his debate with Hubert Dreyfus, terms the ‘pervasiveness thesis’ – that conceptual rationality in a relevant sense pervades human lives – I try to offer an analytical supplement to the notion Bonnett entertains: that a phenomenological project to ‘retrieve’ nature and ‘ecologise’ education can have massive implications for the character of philosophy of education and the whole enterprise of education. I also argue a confluence of their nature-related ideas adds an educational nuance to the traditional picture of human beings as rational animals.

How concerned should we be about the state and status of philosophy of education? To this familiar worry, I maintain that there is no need to worry. In this essay, I try to secure this conclusion, not by shoring up the authority and identity of the discipline, but by asking the fundamental question: Who is and should be the audience for philosophers of education, and what does philosophy of education owe to whom? I argue that to be worthy of that name, philosophy of education ought to have educational significance and continue being philosophical, requiring the discipline to serve the interests of all the three audiences—other philosophers of education, non-philosophical educators, and non-educational philosophers. Through a close analysis of several important scholarly materials concerning the range, quality and relevance of philosophy of education, I urge that working out its disciplinary nature in a broad context of philosophy makes the discipline capable of fulfilling that promise.

Michael Bonnett has long attempted to rehabilitate the concept of nature, thereby challenging us to reconsider its profound implications for diverse educational issues. Castigating both ‘postmodern’ and ‘scientistic’ accounts of nature for failing to appreciate that nature is at once transcendent and normative, Bonnett proposes his phenomenology-inspired view of nature as the ‘self-arising’, which is bound up with the notion of ‘our experience of nature’. Despite its enormous strengths, however, Bonnett’s argument might obscure the ways in which the real issue involved in nature is addressed: the issue of our nature, which enables our experience of nature in the first place. In this paper, after reviewing Bonnett’s view of nature and considering his criticism of Richard Rorty’s assault on the reality of nature, I will try to show how the Aristotelian notion of second nature that John McDowell has reanimated can supplement Bonnett’s project and render plausible the idea that the naturalness of our sensibility is unique to human beings; through this approach, the issue of human nature can be (re)located in discussions of nature at large and, connectedly, brought again within the scope of the philosophical study of education in the present-day intellectual climate that increasingly marginalises non-scientific, intellectual endeavours. I will also briefly reflect on the relevance of the notion of second nature to Stephen Boulter’s recently proposed idea of ‘education from a biological point of view’.

In this article, I examine recent developments of socio-historical conceptions in Anglo-American analytic philosophy by focusing, via Richard Rorty and John McDowell, on the notions of the world and human experience. While how and whether McDowell’s ideas are really more than an echo of the insights within the activity-theoretical framework might be up for debate, I end by briefly considering the ways that McDowell’s philosophy enriches socio-historical research with reference to two ongoing attempts: what David Bakhurst calls McDowell’s “transformational view” of human development and learning and David Macarthur’s project of McDowellian “liberal naturalism.”

The ever-growing development of modern science and its understanding of nature have disjoined the domain of the natural from the domain of the normative, accordingly disjoining nature from nurture and making the concept of human nature resemble an oxymoron. Yet, what is really at stake in the long-running nature-nurture controversy is human nature and the question of whether human nature is nearer to nature or nurture is fundamentally misplaced. This chapter casts light on the notion of ‘second nature’, through which we aim to appreciate the sense in which human beings are natural animals in a normative environment.

David Bakhurst's 2011 book ‘The Formation of Reason’ explores the philosophy of John McDowell in general and the Aristotelian notion of second nature more specifically, topics to which philosophers of education have not yet given adequate attention. The book's widespread appeal led to the symposium ‘Second Nature, Bildung and McDowell: David Bakhurst's The Formation of Reason’, which appeared in the first issue of the 50th anniversary volume of the Journal of Philosophy of Education in 2016. Despite its obvious educational relevance, whether and how Bakhurst's McDowellian line of philosophical argument shapes the domain of educational enquiry or discourse remains up for debate. The rich contributions of Sebastian Rödl, Paul Standish and Jan Derry help us confront this issue. Proceeding with an analysis that is partly explanatory and partly critical of the central aspects of their respective views, I try to show that the basic attraction of the McDowellian/Bakhurstian line of argument concerning educational thinking is that it enables us to address education in the proper context of the natural and the social. In other words, their depiction of a human being as a natural animal in a normative world allows us not to be perturbed either by the natural-scientific conception of the natural or by the social constructivist thinking of the social, both of which have occasionally distorted how education is addressed and therefore impoverished our understanding of education itself. I conclude with a brief word on the significance of continuing and advancing the conversation initiated by the symposium by noting two viable examples of future work.

Approaches to studying the ‘social’ are prominent in educational research. Yet, because of their insufficient acknowledgement of the social nature of human beings and the reality we experience, such attempts often commit themselves to the dualism of scheme and content, which in turn is a by-product of the underlying dualism of reason and nature that has characterised modern thinking. Drawing largely on John McDowell’s argument, this paper attempts to illuminate the sense that nature, nurture and human nature are interconnected and that the capacity to be responsive to reasons is a necessary prerequisite for the essential nature of human beings as social and natural animals at the same time. It ends by acknowledging the importance of philosophy in the study of education as a primary discipline that highlights distinctive features of human beings that make us the kind of beings we are, and by briefly mentioning how we could do more than draw obvious but trivial ‘educational implications’ from McDowell’s argument.