Koichi Inoue’s research while affiliated with Osaka Sangyo University and other places

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Publications (67)


Accident Sequence Analysis of Fault Tree with Event Sequence Dependency
  • Chapter

January 2004

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12 Reads

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2 Citations

Takehisa Kohda

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Weimin Cui

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Koichi Inoue

Conventional fault trees composed of AND and OR logic gates do not consider event sequence dependency. This paper presents a simple evaluation method for fault trees containing AND and OR gates plus priority AND gates, which restrict the occurrence order of basic events. Basic logical operations of priority AND gates with conventional logic gates are given. Due to these simple operations, not only the minimal cut set derivation procedure, but also the inclusion-exclusion method can be applied in the same way as coherent fault trees. An illustrative example of a standby system shows the merits and characteristics of the proposed method.


Probability evaluation of system-failure occurrence based on minimal cut-sets

February 2002

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20 Reads

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5 Citations

A minimal cut set (MCS) of FTA (fault tree analysis) shows a minimal combination of component failures leading to system failure, based on which system failure probability can be evaluated. However, the conventional inclusion-exclusion method based on MCSs does not necessarily give the system failure occurrence probability. This paper proposes an analytical probability evaluation method of system failure occurrence based on critical states for each basic event. System failure occurrence is caused by a basic event if it occurs at its critical state. Critical states for a basic event can be obtained using logical expression in terms of MCS's. Thus, the system failure occurrence probability can be obtained as the sum of system failure occurrence probabilities caused by basic events. The proposed method assumes any general distribution for component failure probability. An illustrative example shows the details and merits of the method


Fault-tree analysis considering latency of basic events

February 2001

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370 Reads

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9 Citations

Severe accidents can occur even in advanced systems such as airplanes and nuclear power plants. In the accident analysis, most of the attention focuses on the active failure which initiates the occurrence of system failure, but the latent condition which allows the active failure to cause system failure must be considered. This paper proposes a simple method to deal with latent conditions in FTA (fault tree analysis) based on the detectability of basic events. In FTA analysis, the system failure occurs if all basic events in a minimal cut set occur, but all the event sequences leading to the occurrence of a minimal cut set do not always occur without their detection. Using the detectability index of a basic event, it is evaluated whether the critical state of a basic event is latent where its occurrence can cause the system failure. Based on the number/probability of critical states that can be detected by the detectability of a basic event, a new measure of its importance in contributing to the reduction of system failure is proposed. A simple illustrative example shows these properties


Safety Assessment of Large-Scale Systems( Safety of Large-Scale Systems)

December 1999

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6 Reads

This paper introduces the basic concept of Probalilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) , which evaluates the safety of large-scale systems. Firstly, the use of probability concept in the design of technical system is briefly reviewed, and then the concept of risk is defined. Then, PRA procedure is reviewed which is composed of risk analysis and risk assessment. Risk analysis obtains accident sequences and estimates their probabilities and effects using Event Tree Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis. Risk assessment examines whether the risk analysys result satisfies the risk acceptance level. If the risk acceptance level is not achieved, some measure must be taken to reduce the risk. PRA continues until the risk acceptance is achieved. Human plays an important role not only in the safety assessment, but also in accident sequences leading to system failure. Finally, the human-related problems in PRA are discussed from three viewpoints: the definition and evaluation of probability, the risk acceptance, and human error analysis.


Design Methods of Robust Feedback Controllers by Training Neural Networks

October 1999

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4 Reads

Transactions of the Institute of Systems Control and Information Engineers

This paper proposes two efficient methods to design a robust feedback control system by use of neural networks. The first method is based on L2 gain, and two different neural networks are used. The controller is trained to be robust as a result of competition between neural networks. The second method is based on MiniMax optimization, and is useful to treat parametric uncertainties. In both methods, robustness of the neural network can be quantified. It is very easy to combine proposed methods so that effective methods for various problems can be derived.


Operator's Mental Images on Teamwork Plant Operation

September 1998

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10 Reads

IFAC Proceedings Volumes

Yoshihiko Nojiri

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Takehisa Kohda

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Atsushi Kawamoto

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[...]

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Hideo Noda

The interaction between/among operators must be considered in research domains such as a task analysis or human modeling of a teamwork operation. This paper shows that the interaction between/among operators can be represented by three kinds of "Mental Images" and operator's cognitive activity can be analyzed by using these mental images. Furthermore, it also shows (1) how mental images are formed in an operator's mind and (2) what kind of action would be taken when he/she senses a discrepancy between mental images. Finally, an illustrative example of an airplane accident shows how to make use of mental images in human error analysis.


Failure Diagnosis Support Using Bond Graph with Means-Ends Hierarchy Structure

September 1998

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5 Reads

IFAC Proceedings Volumes

Failure diagnosis is generally composed of three activities: (1) failure detection, (2) cause identification, and (3) protective action. This paper proposes the use of bond graphs with a means-ends hierarchy structure for the support of the entire failure diagnosis process. Bond graphs represent the system behavior from the viewpoint of energy flow, which makes it easy to model not only physical phenomena or components, but also abnormal events. Though the relations among state variables represented by the system bond graph can support the detection of an abnormal event and the identification of its cause, they cannot support the evaluation of its effect on the system function explicitly. Using means-ends hierarchy structure, the diagnosis result in the state variable space is transformed into the system functional space, which can help the system analysts select an preventive action and predict its effect. An illustrative example of a water flow control system shows the details and merits of the proposed method.



A Design Method of Optimal State Feed-Back Control Systems by Use of Neural Network

January 1997

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10 Reads

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4 Citations

Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers

This paper proposes a generic design method to develop an optimal state feed-back control system using multilayered neural networks. Because Back-Propagation can not be applied to this case, two new methods are proposed for training neural networks: one is based on gradient method and the other on Powell's conjugate direction method. These two methods can be applied to various problems such as ones for non-linear systems where the feed-back controller can not be obtained by conventional methods. Especially, the method based on the direction method can deal with criterion functions whose derivatives can not be obtained analytically. Illustrative examples of optimal regulator and minimal time control problems show the effectiveness of the proposed methods.


Reliability Analysis of Operating Procedure in Team Performance

January 1996

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5 Reads

To prevent the effect of human errors in a team of multiple members who execute a given task, how they take actions to achieve it must be clarified. This paper proposes a framework for qualitative analysis of a team performance based on a human behavior model. Each member goes around a hierarchical problem-solving structure to achieve his current task goal. The effectiveness of a team performance depends on a kind of collaboration, communication. A communication is assumed to occur when a member needs help from others to achieve his current goal. An illustrative example of a tank filling task show the representation of a team performance model and its simulation result.


Citations (25)


... A bow-tie model also becomes problematic when multiple events which cause hazards have themselves common causes and thus are dependent in the probabilistic sense. In these cases, which are commonplace, special software tools are needed to adequately build the fault tree side and perform the probability calculations [21,22], thus there must be some way to check that these tools can be relied upon. Furthermore, on the consequence side of the bow-tie, the complication happens when multiple consequences of an event are neither mutually exclusive nor concomitant. ...

Reference:

Safety Analysis Methods for Complex Systems in Aviation
Accident Sequence Analysis of Fault Tree with Event Sequence Dependency
  • Citing Chapter
  • January 2004

... In order to describe how accidents appear, the term hazard is used as an anterior notion i.e. a hazard may result in an accident. For industrial robotics, hazard was defined as an energy transfer [18] , which is similar to MORT (Management Oversight and Risk Tree) [15]. Leveson [21] define hazard as "a state or set of condition of a system that, together with other conditions in the environment of the system, will lead inevitably to an accident". ...

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN-ROBOT SYSTEMS.
  • Citing Book

... The second terms of first, second, and third expressions in Eq. (8), tanh(b b b k ) for k = 0, 1, 2, are subtracted to impose zero output on the NN model at the origin of input features. This type of NN model was introduced in [44]. The constraints enable us to consider that the accelerations must be zero in principle without the existence of external forces and vessel speeds. ...

A Design Method of Optimal State Feed-Back Control Systems by Use of Neural Network
  • Citing Article
  • January 1997

Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers

... But there is a possibility that the observed output incorrectly becomes p(y ~ r) due to the occurrence of faults in the system or abnormal conditions. A safety monitoring system [2] such as an automatic fire alarm system and a safety confirmation system [3] of automatic equipments such as robotics which never issues any signal for permission until safe situation is confirmed are examples of 2-valued output systems. A reactor protection system in a nuclear power plant issues any one of three signals corresponding to normal, warning, and reactor shut-down conditions-it is an example of a 3-valued output system. ...

Optimal Logical Structure of Safety Monitoring Systems with Two Failure Modes
  • Citing Article
  • Full-text available
  • January 1981

Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers

... The first data-driven fault diagnosis that became famous was developed in the 1980s with the use of expert systems [19]. This method utilizes a technique that requires the expert to learn a set of rules from previous experiences. ...

Application of Expert System Techniques to Fault Diagnosis
  • Citing Article
  • August 1984

The Chemical Engineering Journal

... The LoA concept was introduced originally by Sheridan and Verplank (1978) to suggest a wide variety of automation modes that replace functions previously carried out by the human. It has been applied to various human-machine systems in the real world, such as teleoperation, aviation, surface transport, nuclear and process plants, manufacturing, mobile robots (Inagaki 2005;Sheridan 1992;Endsley and Kaber 1999;Inagaki and Inoue 1993;Kaber and Endsley 2007;Lindstrom and Winroch 2010;Inagaki et al. 2007;Moray et al. 2000;Pacaux et al. 2011;Parasuraman et al. 2000;Jou et al. 2009). Table 2 shows LoA in an 11-point scale, ranging from LoA 1 through LoA 10, with LoA 6.5 (Inagaki et al. 1998) between LoA 6 and LoA 7 in the original 10-point scale defined in Sheridan (1992Sheridan ( , 1999. ...

Adaptive choice of a safety management scheme upon an alarm under supervisory control of a large-complex system
  • Citing Article
  • December 1993

Reliability Engineering & System Safety

... Earliest of these was based on fault tree analysis and was given by Esary and Ziehms (1975). Phased algebra rules were derived by Dazhi and Xiaozhong (1989), Kohda et al. (1994), and Trivedi (1994, 1997). The techniques of phased algebra and fault trees methods were used by La Band and Andrews (2004) for determining the unreliability in individual phases. ...

A simple method for phased mission analysis
  • Citing Article
  • December 1994

Reliability Engineering & System Safety

... If one has no clue on where 1 φ(X)>S = 1 in the input space, the method of stratied sampling is not applicable and can increase the Monte-Carlo relative deviation if Q i and n i are not adapted to φ. Table 9 sums up the characteristics of stratied sampling estimator. An extended version of SS called coverage Monte-Carlo method in [120,121] has been proposed for specic systems represented by a fault tree or a network using its minimal cuts to improve the probability estimation. For the same kind of systems, recursive variance reduction methods described in [122,123], have also been proposed and have some links with SS. ...

A New Monte Carlo Method for Evaluating System-Failure Probability
  • Citing Article
  • May 1987

IEEE Transactions on Reliability

... When the safety protective system fails to detect an abnormal plant state and make an appropriate protective action, a system accident occurs. This type of failure is called as failed-dangerous (FD) (Kohda et al. 1984). On the other hand, the safety protective system should issue no alarm when the plant is normal, because the false alarm issued by the safety protective system causes an unnecessary inspection or maintenance loss, a kind of economical loss. ...

Optimal Shut-Down Logic for Protective Systems
  • Citing Article
  • May 1983

IEEE Transactions on Reliability