Kelsey A. Heslin’s research while affiliated with Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai and other places

Photometry and electrophysiology are powerful tools for investigating brain-behavior relationships. Combining these techniques would allow us to ask previously un-addressable questions, such as how neuromodulators impact neuronal firing rates. Current options are highly limited—requiring a substantial loss in data-quality or severely restricting naturalistic-movement. These drawbacks arise from engineering-limits on devices that allow optically-tethered subjects to move freely. Here, we introduce a device that overcomes these challenges. Its automated orientation-tracking system allows subjects to move freely for multiple-hours with minimal supervision and without sacrificing data-quality. The device is modular and adaptable, being compatible with most recording systems and equipped for added functionality (e.g., optogenetics). To demonstrate its utility, we simultaneously tracked extracellular striatal dopamine and single-neuron firing as mice performed a reward-learning task. Mice showed excellent mobility, and we observed robust trial-by-trial correlations between striatal firing and dopamine signaling. This device provides a powerful tool that outperforms current commercial solutions.

The involvement of the cerebellum in suprasecond interval timing (i.e., timing in the seconds to minutes range) is controversial. A limited amount of evidence from humans, nonhuman primates, and rodents has shown that the lateral cerebellum, including the lateral cerebellar nucleus (LCN), may be necessary for successful suprasecond timing performance. However, many existing studies have pitfalls, such as limited timing outcome measures and confounded task demands. In addition, many existing studies relied on well-trained subjects. This approach may be a drawback, as the cerebellum is hypothesized to carry out ongoing error correction to limit timing variability. By using only experienced subjects, past timing studies may have missed a critical window of cerebellar involvement. In the experiments described here, we pharmacologically inactivated the rat LCN across three different peak interval timing tasks. We structured our tasks to address past confounds, collect timing variability measures, and characterize performance during target duration acquisition. Across these various tasks, we did not find strong support for cerebellar involvement in suprasecond interval timing. Our findings support the existing distinction of the cerebellum as a subsecond interval timing brain region. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

To act proactively, we must predict when future events will occur. Individuals generate temporal predictions using cues that indicate an event will happen after a certain duration elapses. Neural models of timing focus on how the brain represents these cue-duration associations. However, these models often overlook the fact that situational factors frequently modulate temporal expectations. For example, in realistic environments, the intervals associated with different cues will often covary due to a common underlying cause. According to the 'common cause hypothesis,' observers anticipate this covariance such that, when one cue's interval changes, temporal expectations for other cues shift in the same direction. Furthermore, as conditions will often differ across environments, the same cue can mean different things in different contexts. Therefore, updates to temporal expectations should be context-specific. Behavioral work supports these predictions, yet their underlying neural mechanisms are unclear. Here, we asked whether the dorsal hippocampus mediates context-based timing, given its broad role in context-conditioning. Specifically, we trained rats with either hippocampal or sham lesions that two cues predicted reward after either a short or long duration elapsed (e.g., tone-8s / light-16s). Then, we moved rats to a new context and extended the long cue’s interval (e.g., light-32s). This caused rats to respond later to the short cue, despite never being trained to do so. Importantly, when returned to the initial training context, sham rats shifted back toward both cues’ original intervals. In contrast, lesion rats continued to respond at the long cue’s newer interval. Surprisingly, they still showed contextual modulation for the short cue, responding earlier like shams. These data suggest the hippocampus only mediates context-based timing if a cue is explicitly paired and/or rewarded across distinct contexts. Furthermore, as lesions did not impact timing measures at baseline or acquisiton for the long cue’s new interval, our data suggests that the hippocampus only modulates timing when context is relevant.

To act proactively, we must predict when future events will occur. Individuals generate temporal predictions using cues that indicate an event will happen after a certain duration elapses. Neural models of timing focus on how the brain represents these cue-duration associations. However, these models often overlook the fact that situational factors frequently modulate temporal expectations. For example, in realistic environments, the intervals associated with different cues will often covary due to a common underlying cause. According to the 'common cause hypothesis,' observers anticipate this covariance such that, when one cue's interval changes, temporal expectations for other cues shift in the same direction. Furthermore, as conditions will often differ across environments, the same cue can mean different things in different contexts. Therefore, updates to temporal expectations should be context-specific. Behavioral work supports these predictions, yet their underlying neural mechanisms are unclear. Here, we asked whether the dorsal hippocampus mediates context-based timing, given its broad role in context-conditioning. Specifically, we trained rats with either hippocampal or sham lesions that two cues predicted reward after either a short or long duration elapsed (e.g., tone-8s / light-16s). Then, we moved rats to a new context and extended the long-cue's interval (e.g., light-32s). This caused rats to respond later to the short cue, despite never being trained to do so. Importantly, when returned to the initial training context, sham rats shifted back toward both cues' original intervals. In contrast, lesion rats continued to respond at the long cue's newer interval. Surprisingly, they still showed contextual modulation for the short cue, responding earlier like shams. These data suggest the hippocampus only mediates context-based timing if a cue is explicitly paired and/or rewarded across distinct contexts. Furthermore, as lesions did not impact timing measures at baseline or acquisiton for the long cue's new interval, our data suggests that the hippocampus only modulates timing when context is relevant.

Predicting when future events will occur and adjusting behavior accordingly is critical to adaptive behavior. Despite this, little is known about the brain networks that encode time and how this ultimately impacts decision-making. One established finding is that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and its non-human analogues (e.g., the rodent prelimbic cortex; PL) mediate timing. This provides a starting point for exploring the networks that support temporal processing by identifying areas that interact with the PFC during timing tasks. For example, substantial work has explored the role of frontostriatal circuits in timing. However, other areas are undoubtedly involved. The mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus (MD) is an excellent candidate region. It shares dense, reciprocal connections with PFC-areas in both humans and non-human species and is implicated in cognition. However, causal data implicating MD-PFC interactions in cognition broadly is still sparse, and their role in timing specifically is currently unknown. To address this, we trained male rats on a time-based, decision-making task referred to as the 'peak-interval' procedure. During the task, presentation of a cue instructed the rats to respond after a specific interval of time elapsed (e.g., tone-8 seconds). We incorporated two cues; each requiring a response after a distinct time-interval (e.g., tone-8 seconds / light-16 seconds). We tested the effects of either reversibly inactivating the MD or PL individually or functionally disconnecting them on performance. All manipulations caused a comparable timing deficit. Specifically, responses showed little organization in time, as if primarily guided by motivational systems. These data expand our understanding of the networks that support timing and suggest that MD-PL interactions specifically are a core component. More broadly, our results suggest that timing tasks provide a reliable assay for characterizing the role of MD-PL interactions in cognition using rodents, which has been difficult to establish in the past.

Helping behavior tasks are proposed to assess prosocial or “empathic” behavior in rodents. This paradigm characterizes the behavior of subject animals presented with the opportunity to release a conspecific from a distressing situation. Previous studies found a preference in rats for releasing restrained or distressed conspecifics over other controls (e.g., empty restrainers or inanimate objects). An empathy account was offered to explain the observed behaviors, claiming subjects were motivated to reduce the distress of others based on a rodent homologue of empathy. An opposing account attributes all previous results to subjects seeking social contact. To dissociate these two accounts for helping behavior, we presented subject rats with three simultaneous choice alternatives: releasing a restrained conspecific, engaging a nonrestrained conspecific, or not socializing. Subjects showed an initial preference for socializing with the nonrestrained conspecific, and no preference for helping. This result contradicts the empathy account, but is consistent with the social-contact account of helping behavior.

We report two experiments investigating why learners, in making metacognitive judgments, often seem to ignore or otherwise fail to appreciate that feedback following retrieval practice provides a restudy opportunity. Learners practiced word pairs for a final cued-recall test by studying each pair initially, making a judgment of learning (JOL), and then deciding whether to practice the pair again after a short or long spacing interval, or not at all. For different groups in Experiment 1, additional practice involved restudying, retrieval practice without feedback, or retrieval practice with feedback (the full pair). We used procedures (long feedback duration and covert retrieval practice) designed to rule out the possibility that feedback is ignored because it is usually brief or because participants’ choices are influenced by a desire to look good by performing well on overt practice tests. In the relearning condition, learners preferred a long spacing interval for items at all JOL levels. Despite the feedback duration and the covert retrieval practice, learners in both retrieval-practice conditions preferred a short spacing interval for hard, low-JOL items and a long spacing interval for easy, high-JOL items, even though this may not be an effective strategy when feedback is provided. In Experiment 2, instructions framed feedback either as a presentation of the correct answer or as a restudy opportunity preceded by retrieval practice. Framing feedback as a restudy opportunity markedly changed the choices learners made. Apparently, the restudy function of feedback does not occur to learners unless they are specifically alerted to it.

‘Helping behavior’ tasks are proposed to assess prosocial or ‘empathic’ behavior in rodents. This paradigm characterizes the behavior of subject animals presented with the opportunity to release a conspecific from a distressing situation. Previous studies found a preference in rats for releasing restrained or distressed conspecifics over other controls (e.g., empty restrainers or inanimate objects). An empathy account was offered to explain the observed behaviors, claiming subjects were motivated to reduce the distress of others based on a rodent homologue of empathy. An opposing account attributes all previous results to subjects seeking social-contact. To dissociate these two accounts for helping behavior, we presented subject rats with three simultaneous choice alternatives: releasing a restrained conspecific, engaging a non-restrained conspecific, or not socializing. Subjects showed an initial preference for socializing with the non-restrained conspecific, and no preference for helping. This result contradicts the empathy account, but is consistent with the social-contact account of helping behavior.

Reduced activity of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is seen in mood disorders including depression and anxiety. The mechanisms of this hypofrontality remain unclear. Because of their specific physiological properties, parvalbumin-expressing (PV+) inhibitory interneurons contribute to the overall activity of the PFC. Our recent work using a chronic stress mouse model showed that stress-induced increases in prefrontal PV expression correlates with increased anxiety-like behaviors in female mice. Our goal is now to provide a causal relationship between changes in prefrontal PV+ cells and changes in emotional behaviors in mice. We first show that, in addition to increasing overall level of PV expression, chronic stress increases the activity of prefrontal PV+ cells. We then used a chemogenetic approach to mimic the effects of chronic stress and specifically increase the activity of prefrontal PV+ cells. We observed that chemogenetic activation of PV+ cells caused an overall reduction in prefrontal activity, and that chronic activation of PV+ cells lead to increased anxiety-related behaviors in female mice only. These results demonstrate that activity of prefrontal PV+ cells could represent a novel sex-specific modulator of anxiety-related behaviors, potentially through changes in overall prefrontal activity. The findings also support the idea that prefrontal PV+ cells are worth further investigation to better understand mood disorders that are more prevalent in female populations.

Converging lines of evidence suggest that the cerebellum plays an integral role in cognitive function through its interactions with association cortices like the medial frontal cortex (MFC). It is unknown precisely how the cerebellum influences the frontal cortex and what type of information is reciprocally relayed between these two regions. A subset of neurons in the cerebellar dentate nuclei, or the homologous lateral cerebellar nuclei (LCN) in rodents, express D1 dopamine receptors (D1DRs) and may play a role in cognitive processes. We investigated how pharmacologically blocking LCN D1DRs influences performance in an interval timing task and impacts neuronal activity in the frontal cortex. Interval timing requires executive processes such as working memory, attention, and planning and is known to rely on both the frontal cortex and cerebellum. In our interval timing task, male rats indicated their estimates of the passage of a period of several seconds by making lever presses for a water reward. We have shown that a cue-evoked burst of low-frequency activity in the MFC initiates ramping activity (i.e., monotonic increases or decreases of firing rate over time) in single MFC neurons. These patterns of activity are associated with successful interval timing performance. Here we explored how blocking right LCN D1DRs with the D1DR antagonist SCH23390 influences timing performance and neural activity in the contralateral (left) MFC. Our results indicate that blocking LCN D1DRs impaired some measures of interval timing performance. Additionally, ramping activity of MFC single units was significantly attenuated. These data provide insight into how catecholamines in the LCN may drive MFC neuronal dynamics to influence cognitive function.