Jules Holroyd’s research while affiliated with The University of Sheffield and other places

What is this page?


This page lists works of an author who doesn't have a ResearchGate profile or hasn't added the works to their profile yet. It is automatically generated from public (personal) data to further our legitimate goal of comprehensive and accurate scientific recordkeeping. If you are this author and want this page removed, please let us know.

Publications (24)


The Retributive Emotions: Passions and Pains of Punishment
  • Article

November 2010

·

378 Reads

·

11 Citations

Philosophical Papers

Jules Holroyd

It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering of the wrong-doer, and the aim to bring this about, can (contra recent arguments from Hanna 2008) be morally justified. It has been suggested that by reflecting on the role of the retributive emotions in interpersonal relationships, and the alleged legitimacy of the aim for the suffering of the wrong-doer within them, support can be garnered for retributive practices of punishment by the state (Duff 1986 and 2001, Bennett 2002 and 2003). The conclusion of the second line of argument in the paper is that whilst the retributive responses can permissibly aim at suffering, the way in which this is so in interpersonal relationships cannot provide support for retributive state punishment.



Substantively Constrained Choice and Deference

February 2010

·

14 Reads

·

3 Citations

Journal of Moral Philosophy

Substantive accounts of autonomy place value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice. According to such views, not all sober and competent choices can be autonomous: some things simply cannot be autonomously chosen. Such an account is developed and appealed to, by Thomas Hill Jr, in order to explain the intuitively troubling nature of choices for deferential roles. Such choices are not consistent with the value of self-respect, it is claimed. In this paper I argue that Hill's attempt to explain the problem with such a choice, and Marcia Baron's interpretation and defence of his view, fail in this task. The troubling nature of some choices for deference cannot be explained in terms of a substantive self-respect condition for autonomy.


Relational Autonomy and Paternalistic Interventions

November 2009

·

104 Reads

·

31 Citations

Res Publica

Relational conceptions of autonomy attempt to take into account the social aspects of autonomous agency. Those views that incorporate not merely causally, but constitutively necessary relational conditions, incorporate a condition that has the form: (RelAgency) A necessary condition for autonomous agency is that the agent stands in social relations S. I argue that any account that incorporates such a condition (irrespective of how the relations, S, are spelt out) cannot play one of autonomy’s key normative roles: identifying those agents who ought to be protected from (hard) paternalistic intervention. I argue, against objections from Oshana, that there are good reasons for maintaining the notion of autonomy in this role, and thus that such relational conceptions should not be accepted. This rejection goes beyond that from John Christman, which holds only for those relational conditions which are value-laden.


Citations (13)


... Existing accounts that acknowledge praise can be oppressive advocate two approaches to reforming the practice. Michelle Ciurria (2020) sees apt praise as a matter of equalizing the redistribution of praise according to positions of advantage or disadvantage, while Jules Holroyd (2021Holroyd ( , 2023 sees it as reoriented to serve emancipatory goals. These accounts call for a redistribution or reorientation of praise. ...

Reference:

From Oppressive to Progressive Praise: How, Why, and When to Praise in Conditions of Oppression
Proleptic praise: A social function analysis
  • Citing Article
  • Full-text available
  • November 2023

Nous

... At least, it is mistaken as a statement about what criminal justice can, and should, achieve-as opposed to what it currently achieves. Philosophical work on epistemic injustice has shown that epistemic oppression-that is, any unjust exclusion that prevents individuals or groups from participating in interpersonal epistemic enterprises-is 71 See Sullivan (2017, p. 297) and Owusu-Bempah (2022a, p. 148 (2017) and Scaife et al. (2020). The latter study shows that a blaming response to an individual's implicit bias can reduce this individual's IAT score in the short term and can motivate the individual to change behaviour influenced by implicit bias. ...

To Blame? The Effects of Moralized Feedback on Implicit Racial Bias

Collabra Psychology

... The homogeneity of the committees making decisions will have been shaped in part by biases. And biases play a crucial role in the credibility deficits and surpluses guaranteeing that some people's voices are heard more easily than others (Dotson 2014;Fricker 2007;Medina 2012;Saul 2017). And these help to hold in place the structural injustices Haslanger describes. ...

Implicit bias and epistemic injustice
  • Citing Chapter
  • June 2019

... Sin embargo, otros autores asignan al concepto una connotación negativa, es decir, para ellos se trata de un concepto normativo (Stafford et al., 2018). Así, los sesgos son vinculados a evaluaciones distorsionadas y negativas de determinados sujetos o grupos. ...

Confronting bias in judging: A framework for addressing psychological biases in decision making
  • Citing Preprint
  • September 2018

... It is common for these stereotypes to manifest in beliefs* such as Asians excelling in mathematics or male Italians being sexist. However, these beliefs, as indicated by the asterisk, need not be explicitly endorsed; they are often held implicitly, as discussed by Holroyd et al. (2017) and Schwitzgebel (2010). Importantly, these stereotypical features are not viewed as necessary for the application of a concept. ...

What is implicit bias?
  • Citing Article
  • October 2017

Philosophy Compass

... It should be noted that to my knowledge, Fricker has not explicitly agreed with the suggestion that implicit bias is a collective vice. However, given that she takes Holroyd's (2012) conception of implicit bias as starting point, this further claim is at least compatible with her theory. 5. Implications for embracing the second horn of the dilemma As I have argued, there are two ways in which we can resolve the Responsibility Problem for Fricker's no-fault responsibility view: either by excluding implicit bias as an epistemic vice altogether, or by maintaining that the vice operates merely at a collective level. ...

Responsibility for implicit bias
  • Citing Article
  • March 2017

Philosophy Compass

... Reading scholars of color, informal self-assessments and privilege inventories, and formal assessments like the Harvard Implicit Association Test (IAT) are also useful at this stage. While there are limitations to the awareness that may achieved through self-reflection alone (Holroyd, 2015), ideally, this kind of introspection can help one identify areas of growth that when attended to, would allow them to become more effective and inclusive in their therapeutic practices, ultimately benefiting their clients and fostering a more equitable therapeutic environment. For example, data obtained through empirically validated measures such as the IAT that use response latency to uncover implicit bias may provide the impetus for more honest reflections concerning one's attitudes and beliefs about elements of identity measured by the test such as race, gender, religion, sexuality, or weight (Steele, 2024b). ...

Implicit bias, awareness and imperfect cognitions

Consciousness and Cognition

... It occurs when the person is viewed as an object. In this context, over and above the denial of their humanity, i.e., passivity, denial of subjectivity and denial of autonomy, the person is viewed through their use, i.e., instrumentalization, possession or interchangeability, or their form, i.e., reduction to appearance, body or silence (Langton, 2011). In the workplace, objectification consists in behaving with an employee as if the latter had no thoughts or emotions, as if they had to be controlled in order to act, deprived of initiative, exploitable and malleable at will. ...

Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification, by Rae Langton
  • Citing Article
  • June 2011

European Journal of Philosophy

... Así, el pensador crítico ideal es autosuficiente en su provisión de razones tanto para perseverar en sus creencias como para delegar y confiar en el criterio de otros. La candidez de esta definición ha sido denunciada por la literatura interdisciplinar acerca de la insuficiencia de la introspección para la autocrítica, sobre todo en lo que concierne a la detección de sesgos (Holroyd, 2012;Kelly, 2022). Esta crítica encaja con la definición individualista del fenómeno de la burbuja epistémica: "Un agente cognitivo X ocupa una burbuja epistémica precisamente cuando es incapaz de dominar la distinción entre su pensamiento de que conoce P y su conocimiento de P" (Woods, 2005, p. 740). ...

Responsibility for Implicit Bias
  • Citing Article
  • September 2012

Journal of Social Philosophy