Joshua D. Wright’s research while affiliated with University of Economics and Law and other places

... NCTs can vary along several dimensions, including duration, geographic scope, income level, occupation, and triggering conditions. [3][4][5][6][7][8][9] And the conditions under which states permit firms to obtain court orders enforcing NCTs also vary along several dimensions: several states broadly prohibit enforcement by declaring NCTs void; other states limit enforcement for some category of employees, such as low-wage earners, health care practitioners, or tech workers; and most states permit enforcement more widely, typically subject to some sort of "reasonableness" test. 3,5,6,10 Federal NCT regulations have been proposed, if not adopted or applied. ...

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A Competition Perspective on Physician Non-compete Agreements

... Consequently, an increasing number of companies have faced substantial fines (Thatchenkery & Katila, 2023). Despite this fact, companies that are trying to digitally transform their businesses are often exposed to pressure from large digital platform enterprises to sign mostly unfavourable contracts (Raskovich et al., 2023). The abuse of market power may have an adverse effect on consumer welfare as well as digital innovation (Raskovich et al., 2023). ...

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Competition as a Catalyst for Innovation? Assessing SMEs' Attitudes towards Digital Market Regulation and Competition

... The significance of market regulation is to ensure that consumers are protected from unfair practices in the market. Thus, an effective consumer regulation should address market failures in an inexpensive manner without hampering the competitive process so that consumers have choices regarding prices and products, and it should ensure that there are fewer barriers of entry and exit in the market (Koopman et al. 2015;Wright and Helland 2013). Apart from addressing market failure, market regulation also enhances the efficiency of the government programs, promotes civil rights, or provides for universal access to services deemed important (Dudley et al. 2017). ...

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Consumer Protection and Market Regulations in Solomon Islands and Fiji, Comparative Analysis

... Kennedy, 2017), with some scholars claiming that big data-based companies should not be seen as threats but rather as sources of innovation. Under the risk that ex-post instruments may be ineffective and untimely, regulations should also incorporate ex-ante mechanisms (Kobayashi and Wright, 2020). Ex-post mechanisms have achieved limited efficiency in digital markets (OECD, 2021). ...

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Regulating data platforms from a value of data approach

... Ibid., p. 299. 45 Ibid., p. 305.46 Ginsburg and Wright (2020).What is an "Effective" ASEAN Competition Law? 13Singapore Econ. ...

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What is an 'Effective' ASEAN Competition Law? - A Methodological Note

... Bhattacharya's work [1] explores the "Nash Program," which aims to bridge cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic models [18], illustrating asymmetric bargaining power in the VirnetX case. Wright and Yun [21] write about various instances in which bargaining models were used in litigation. Furthermore, Kankanhalli and Kwan's study [8] delves into the sources of bargaining power in royalty negotiations, enhancing understanding of how bargaining power impacts royalty allocations. ...

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Applying the Nash Bargaining Solution for a Reasonable Royalty II

... Il s'agit, dans une logique conservatrice, de préserver les acquis d'une politique menée depuis les années 1970 et vue comme un gage d'efficacité économique et de prévention de la capture de la politique antitrust par des groupes d'intérêts ou par les pouvoirs publics dans une perspective interventionniste. La contribution présentée en mai 2020 par des économistes et des juristes réunis autour de l'International Center for Law and Economics 1 pour la commission constituée par la Commission des Lois de la Chambre des Représentants sur la situation des règles de concurrence et ses implications pour la protection de la concurrence dans les marchés numériques incarne cette conception (Barnett et al., 2020). L'ère jeffersonienne y est présentée comme un chaos initial (« un corpus juridique sans principe et incohérent, entaché de contradictions internes ») qu'un apport économique « moderne » a « transformé en un système gérable qui contribue positivement à la compétitivité américaine et au bien-être du consommateur » 2 . ...

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La concentration du pouvoir économique depuis la pandémie

... The recent update by the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission to the Vertical Merger Guidelines has intensified the debate with respect to vertical merger enforcement, 1 with some commenters asserting that vertical mergers are relatively harmless. These arguments often rely heavily on surveys of the empirical economic literature as justification for a procompetitive presumption for vertical mergers (e.g., Lipsky et al., 2020;Wong-Ervin, 2019). For example, Wong-Ervin (2019, p. 1) states: "The generally accepted belief underlying modern antitrust analysis of vertical mergers … has been that they are generally procompetitive or neutral. ...

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Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers

... The sustainability obligations of Qualcomm are in particular [3][4][5][6][7][8][9], [14]: A. GOVERNANCE  During all activities and relationships with the staking parties the company shows responsibility, honesty, transparency and ethical company methods.  The company constantly improving its sustainable management, including better transparency, reporting, communications and measurable objectives. ...

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Wireless Technology Leading Innovator-A Case Study of Qualcomm

... On the side of Qualcomm, through this settlement, Qualcomm has not only achieved the purpose of maintaining its core business model but also Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research,volume 182 demonstrated the rationality, certainty, and stability of its business model to the outside world through the hand of Apple, and almost eliminated the possibility of any threat of lawsuits to overturn its business model in the future [10]. The six-year technology licensing agreement, which includes an option to extend for two years, essentially ties Apple into Qualcomm's boat. ...

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The Patent Dispute Between Apple, Samsung, and Qualcomm: Was Apple, a Good Negotiator?