Joseph Nevo’s research while affiliated with University of Haifa and other places

As a member of his father’s court in the Hijaz Abdallah had been familiar with the intricacies of ‘the question of Palestine’ even before he decided to pitch his tent in Amman. Early in 1918, a British envoy had arrived in Jedda to allay his father’s apprehension regarding the Balfour Declaration and to persuade him that the pledges made to the Jews did not contradict the promises previously given to the Arabs. A year later his brother Faysal concluded a draft agreement with the chairman of the Zionist Commission in Palestine, Chaim Weizmann, which separated Palestine (apparently under Jewish control) from the designated regional Arab state. Hence, when Churchill offered him the Amirate of Transjordan in 1921, Abdallah was well aware of the territorial ramifications and up to date with the human aspects of the Palestine issue.

On the night of 14–15 May two Arab Legion brigades entered Palestine via the Allenby and Damya bridges. Within forty-eight hours their 5000 soldiers were deployed between Nablus and Hebron. Together with Iraqi units, they occupied most of the territories allocated by the UN to the Arab state, that is, excepting the Galilee, the southern coastal plain and the north-west Negev. Advancing more or less in accordance with the revised Arab invasion plan, these forces met no apparent resistance as those areas were practically devoid of Jews.

The congress of Jericho ipso facto altered neither Abdallah’s official nor his practical position vis-à-vis Arab Palestine. De facto annexation had begun in May 1948 when the Arab Legion took over the territory of Arab Palestine; de jure incorporation of that territory into his kingdom was still some sixteen months ahead. Together with the endorsement of its resolutions by the Transjordanian authorities, the congress constituted a change merely on the declarative level. It became a landmark in Abdallah’s Palestinian policy only in the sense that it precipitated and to some extent lent legitimacy to the practice that had existed since May 1948 of ‘creeping annexation’.1

The general strike which broke out in Palestine in April 1936 was, in a way, an emulation of the Syrian nationalist outburst earlier that year. The latter had come in response to French reluctance to conclude a bilateral treaty and Abdallah had not hesitated to try to use it to his own ends. He let it be known to both the British and the French that he was willing to accept the Syrian crown as a means of putting an end to the upheavals. Both powers, however, were less than enthusiastic about the prospect. Britain’s High Commissioner in Palestine, Arthur Wauchope, was rather explicit in his advice to the Amir: ‘I suggest it would be wiser in future if Your Highness refrains … from all discussions of the situation in neighbouring countries.’1

From the moment he put up his tent in Transjordan, in 1921, Abdallah manifested a strong drive for territorial expansion. Almost thirty years later, a British official called him ‘a born land grabber’.1 During the 1920s he had no preference for any particular territory that neighboured Transjordan, though already then Palestine seemed to offer considerable economic and political advantages. Only when it had become clear to him that the idea of taking over either Iraq, Syria or the Hijaz was impracticable did he turn the full focus of his attention on Palestine. The ideology intended to underpin his claim over the Holy Land was only worked out after the political decision had been taken.

The Arab armies that entered Palestine on 15 May 1948 were empowered by an Arab League resolution. Ostensibly, they acted under a unified command coordinated within a joint plan, but in actual fact each army was making its own operational decisions. Still, although the League did not interfere with those decisions or with the military steps as a collective body, it did make the major resolutions regarding war and peace. Thus, it was the League which made the decision to invade Palestine and which, later on, would rule whether or not to accept truce proposals or to resume hostilities. Beyond that battles were fought independently, even to the extent that while operational cooperation was virtually absent, military moves were sometimes decided by political considerations, for example, to foil the efforts of a fellow army.

Historically speaking, the area that in 1921 became the Amirate of Transjordan had never been a separate, self-contained political or administrative unit. Through the 400 years of Ottoman rule, various parts had fallen under different administrative centres, some governed from Damascus, others from Medina, Tiberias, or Nablus.1 When occasionally territories east of the river Jordan were subordinated to administrative centres in Palestine, this was not the result merely of bureaucratic whim, but reflected social and demographic realities. Migration through the years from Palestine to Transjordan created familial ties between neighbouring towns on opposite sides of the Jordan or even the Dead Sea. Nablus and Salt, and Hebron and Kerak are the most telling instances.2

That Abdallah was successful in implementing his territorial designs — as manifested by the Jericho congress and its aftermath — had much to do with the inability of the Arab states and, of course, the Palestinians to foil them. A third factor which helped make the final stage of Abdallah’s de facto annexation possible was Israel’s acquiescence. After she had temporarily been relegated to the sidelines, Israel’s importance for his designs increased with the dynamic course of events between May and December 1948, especially those between October and December.

The first truce ended on 9 July. Within three days Lydda and Ramle had been taken by the IDF. The fall to the Israelis of these two purely Arab towns in the heart of Palestine was a grave setback for Abdallah’s plans, not so much because of their actual loss, but because of the political repercussions. The fall of Lydda and Ramle not only marked a dramatic turning point in the making of the Palestinian refugee problem, it led to serious accusations that the Arab Legion had deliberately abandoned the towns prompted by what were sheer political considerations of the government of Transjordan. This was a belief shared by many Palestinian Arabs and caused the first major rift between them and Abdallah. The credibility of the King was seriously challenged, whereby both his image and his standing among them were at stake.

In practical terms, the conclusion of the Rhodes armistice agreement furnished Abdallah with the clearest form of external recognition of his standing in Palestine. He now had to consolidate and formalize that position from within while working to extend and enhance recognition from the outside world. Encouraged by the Rhodes agreement, the King again contemplated a formal annexation ceremony. Circumstances, however, were to interfere once more and force its postponement for another year.