Jon Hurwitz’s research while affiliated with University of Pittsburgh and other places

Social psychological theories of social stereotyping are used to generate a series of predictions about the conditions under which whites' stereotypes of African-Americans are likely to bias their evaluations of blacks in the context of crime. Stereotypes of African-Americans should influence attitudes on crime policy primarily when criminals are black, crimes are violent, policies are punitive, and no individuating information seriously undercuts the stereotype. Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) procedures are used to administer a series of survey experiments where the race and other characteristics of the target (e.g., criminal suspects, furlough programs, etc.) are manipulated in interviews with Lexington, Kentucky residents in a 1994 probability survey. Consistent with our expectations, we find a strong relationship between whites' images of African-American and judgments of crime and punishment, but only for black criminals who commit violent crimes, and only for punitive (vs. preventive) policies. Because these are the circumstances which typically surround the crime issue, we conclude that much of public opinion in this domain is influenced by racial concerns.

Theory: Social psychological theories of social stereotyping are used to generate a series of predictions about how and when whites' stereotypes of African-Americans are likely to bias their evaluations of blacks in the areas of welfare and crime. Hypotheses: The degree to which whites endorse negative stereotypes of blacks not only tends to bias their judgments of black (versus white) welfare recipients and criminal suspects, but also affects the way they respond to counter-stereotypical information about the target. Methods: Regression analysis and analysis of variance of data from a series of survey experiments with 1,841 whites in which the race and other attributes of welfare mothers, welfare recipients, and drug suspects were manipulated. Results: Whites holding negative stereotypes are substantially more likely to judge blacks more harshly than similarly described whites in the areas of welfare and crime policy. We also find that even whites with strongly negative perceptions of blacks respond quite favorably to them when confronted with individuating information that clearly contradicts their stereotype. By way of contrast, respondents who reject negative stereotypes of African-Americans display a remarkable consistency in their responses across both the race and the individuating information of the target.

The hierarchical model of foreign policy belief systems (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987) stipulates that attitudes toward specific foreign policies (e.g., defense spending or support for new weapon systems) are constrained by more general foreign policy beliefs (postures and images of other nations) which, in turn, are constrained by even more general core values (e.g., patriotism). In this way, U.S. citizens were found to exhibit consistency and structure in their foreign policy attitudes, despite possessing little information in the domain. To test the generalizeability of the hierarchical model, we deliberately selected a polity which poses a dramatic contrast to the citizens in the United States-Costa Rica; here we found individuals who are far more pacific and isolationist in their beliefs relative to North Americans. To what degree do Costa Ricans and North Americans exhibit a common belief structure, despite possessing different attitudes? Analysis of analogous models in the two countries reveals that the most important structuring dimension in the United States-militarism-does not serve to constrain specific foreign policy beliefs of Costa Ricans, probably because of their nation's lack of experience in dealing with national security issues. However, anticommunism and, importantly, images of salient nations (e.g., Cuba, Nicaragua, and the U.S.) do structure Costa Ricans' policy attitudes, leading us to conclude that, as found in the U.S., general beliefs provide constraint to foreign policy belief systems abroad.

A relatively recent innovation in research on attitude constraint is the specification of hierarchical models of mass belief systems, where general orientations are assumed to determine or constrain more specific policy attitudes. But while this research has been able to demonstrate a strong correlation between general and specific idea elements, the causal direction of the relationship has been assumed rather than tested. Using panel data collected during a period of constancy in the international environment, we attempt to untangle the causal ordering of general orientations and specific policy attitudes in the realm of international politics. In accord with hierarchical models, we find, first, that general orientations (e.g., militarism and containment postures) are more stable than many specific policy preferences (e.g., attitudes toward defense spending and U.S. involvement in Central America) and, second, much of the over-time consistency in policy attitudes is generated by these more general orientations. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this work for studies of attitude constraint, one of which is thegeneral applicability of the procedure for investigating top-down versus bottom-up models of constraint in domains outside the international realm.

Recent studies of racial attitudes have focused on traditional values, such as individualism, as important antecedents of Americans'' opinions on racial issues, with mixed results. We focus on another set of values that has its roots in an older research tradition examining the psychological sources of racial prejudice, which suggests that prejudice against blacks is part of a more encompassing set of values regarding one''s acceptance of social diversity. We find that these social values—conformity and social intolerance—are much stronger predictors of racial stereotypes and racial policy attitudes than traditional values of individualism and equalitarianism. We also find these social values to condition an ethnocentric response toward international outgroups in a domain as diverse as foreign affairs, thus providing additional evidence of the pervasive and general nature of values related to a rejection of diversity. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future research.

How do citizens respond to dramatic foreign policy events, such as the recent changes in Soviet U.S. relations, when a traditional foe exhibits strong signs of conciliatory behavior? Using panel data collected before and after the nuclear arms summits of 1987 and 1988, we explore both the consequences and antecedents of changing images of the Soviet Union. Having shown in a prior cross-sectional study that Soviet images constrain policy attitudes in a static sense, the current panel study finds evidence of what Converse (1964) labeled dynamic constraint, in that softening perceptions of the Soviet Union appeared to precipitate more "dovish" policy attitudes. Our study also extends earlier work on enemy images in finding that some people are more resistant to change than others, notably political experts with extremely negative (i.e., "bad faith") initial images. The general importance of studying enemy images in the post-Cold War era is discussed.

How do citizens organize, and make sense of, a complex policy domain such as foreign policy? To a large extent, Americans base their policy choices on fundamental assumptions concerning the nature of the main U.S. postwar adversary—the Soviet Union. Our purpose in this paper is to examine both the antecedents and the consequences of these Soviet images. To what degree do basic understandings of the USSR shape individuals' foreign policy preferences? And what are the origins of strong anti-Soviet beliefs? We investigate these questions with survey data collected in June 1987 in the Lexington, Kentucky area (N = 610). Judgments of the Soviet Union on two important dimensions—trust and threat—are found to be closely related to foreign policy attitudes at both general and specific levels.

The great majority of analyses of presidential support utilize aggregate data and, consequently, are not appropriate for the analysis of individual-level changes in support in response to events within an administration. Using National Election Studies panel data, we investigate presidential support both before and after the major revelations of the Iran-Contra affair to determine the reasons behind the erosion of President Reagan's support base and the characteristics of individuals who did, and did not, adjust their views of the president subsequent to the revelations. While Reagan maintained his image of integrity, respondents did downgrade his competence; his performance was most seriously questioned by those disapproving of his Central American policy.

The great majority of analyses of presidential support utilize aggregate data and, consequently, are not appropriate for the analysis of individual-level changes in support in response to events within an administration. Using National Election Studies panel data, we investigate presidential support both before and after the major revelations of the Iran-Contra affair to determine the reasons behind the erosion of President Reagan's support base and the characteristics of individuals who did, and did not, adjust their views of the president subsequent to the revelations. While Reagan maintained his image of integrity, respondents did downgrade his competence; his performance was most seriously questioned by those disapproving of his Central American policy.

It has long been assumed that foreign-policy attitudes of the mass public are random, disorganized, and unconstrained if they exist at all. Further, foreign-policy thinking has not been found to be structured along standard ideological (liberal-conservative) lines, partisan lines, or class lines. We attempt to move the discussion from a question of whether foreign-policy attitudes are structured to a question of how they are structured. We propose and estimate (using a LISREL model) a hierarchically organized foreign-policy belief structure in which specific policy preferences are derived from postures (broad, abstract beliefs regarding appropriate general governmental strategies). These postures, in turn, are assumed to be constrained by a set of core values about the international community.