John Vogler’s research while affiliated with Keele University and other places

Examining a range of policy areas in which the European Union (EU) acts externally – notably trade, development, climate change and foreign and security policy – this article considers the notion that the years since the mid-2000s have witnessed a decline in EU actorness/effectiveness. In evaluating EU performance, the article employs the interrelated concepts of presence, denoting EU status and influence; opportunity, denoting the external context of EU action; and capability, referring to EU policy processes and instruments, with particular reference to the impact of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. It is contended that achievement of the increased capability envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty, together with resolution of the Eurozone crisis, with its deleterious effect upon the Union’s presence, would not fully compensate for the loss of opportunity provided by the changing international structure.

Global commons are areas and resources defined as being beyond sovereign jurisdiction. They are socially constructed and this article identifies four: the high seas and deep seabed, Antarctica, outer space and the global atmosphere although attempts to designate new areas as commons are also noted. The construction of global commons, it is argued, has been determined by shifts in human knowledge, capability and perceptions of scarcity. The commons problem, as defined by Hardin and other analysts arises from the ecological consequences of open access, but also from the renewed concerns of strategists about the military use of common spaces. In the international system a primary response has been to extend sovereignty and the degree to which the global commons have been enclosed is assessed. An alternative model is provided by the negotiation of common heritage status, but since the experiment with the deep sea bed this has not found favour in the Arctic, Antarctic and elsewhere. In terms of the continuing management of the commons the international community has resorted to an array of regulatory regimes of varying coverage and effectiveness

In international fora the European Union has been a proactive supporter of sustainable development; indeed it has aspired to a leadership role in this policy area. Nevertheless the Union’s frequently reiterated commitment to sustainable development and to poverty eradication in the world’s poorest countries faces many challenges. How can promotion of social and economic development be reconciled with the urgent need to address issues of environmental degradation, resource depletion and climate change? How can the differing policy preferences of the member states and the European Commission be reconciled to ensure the coherence and sustainability of EU external development efforts? This chapter uses the external dimensions of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) to critically examine EU efforts to pursue its sustainability agenda. Particular reference is made to the Union’s fisheries agreements with developing countries, which put into sharp focus the tensions between the need to protect the marine environment and conserve fish stocks, the desire to promote economic development in developing countries, and political pressure to protect the interests of the Union’s own fisheries industry. In effect, we have chosen a ‘hard case’ with which to test the notion of the EU as an ‘Enlightened Superpower’ in the making.

The contrast between the inadequacies of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the achievements of the Union in successfully promoting the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, in the face of outright US opposition, are striking. The Union provided the ambition that drove the search for an agreement based on targets and timetables under the 1995 Berlin mandate, implemented the world’s first international emissions trading system in response to its Kyoto obligations and performed the complex diplomacy that led to eventual entry into force of the Protocol on 16 February 2005. Since then, as scientific evidence of the onset of dangerous climate change has become ever more insistent, international discussions have turned to building a regime to supplement or replace Kyoto on the expiry of its commitment period in 2012.

This article reviews the options for future international climate policy after the 2009 Copenhagen conference. It argues that a major reassessment of the current approach to building a climate regime is required. This approach, which we refer to as the ‘global deal’ strategy, is predicated on the idea of negotiating a comprehensive, universal and legally binding treaty that prescribes, in a top‐down fashion, generally applicable policies based on previously agreed principles. From a review of the history of the ‘global deal’ strategy from Rio (1992) to Kyoto (1997) and beyond we conclude that this approach has been producing diminishing returns for some time, and that it is time to consider an alternative path – if not goal – for climate policy. The alternative that, in our view, is most likely to move the world closer towards a working international climate regime is a ‘building blocks’ approach, which develops different elements of climate governance in an incremental fashion and embeds them in an international political framework. In fact, this alternative is already emergent in international politics. The goal of a full treaty has been abandoned for the next climate conference in Mexico, which is instead aiming at a number of partial agreements (on finance, forestry, technology transfer, adaptation) under the UNFCCC umbrella. For this to produce results, a more strategic approach is needed to ensure that – over time – such partial elements add up to an ambitious and internationally coordinated climate policy which does not drive down the level of aspiration and commitment. Policy Implications The current approach to negotiating a comprehensive, universal and legally binding ‘global deal’ on climate change is unlikely to succeed. A strategic rethink is needed on how to advance global climate protection in the current global political and economic environment. An alternative approach is the ‘building blocks’ strategy, which develops different elements of climate governance in an incremental fashion and embeds them in a broader political framework. In fact, such an approach is already emergent in post‐Copenhagen international climate politics. The building blocks approach offers the hope of breaking the current diplomatic stalemate but remains a second best scenario. It promises no swift, short‐term solutions, risks strengthening the logic of free‐riding and may lead to excessive regulatory fragmentation. A more strategic, long‐term vision is required for the building blocks model to lead to the creation of an ambitious international architecture for climate protection and prevent the slide into a purely decentralised, ‘bottom‐up’ approach.

In the extensive literature on international environmental co-operation, trust is usually treated in terms of compliance and verification mechanisms, on the assumption that there will always be incentives for parties to international agreements to cheat or to 'free ride'. Indeed the establishment of adequate assurances that such behaviour will be detected and punished is frequently the sine qua non of agreement in the first place. Technical and legal compliance mechanisms have developed rapidly in environmental treaty-making over the last two decades. The climate regime is no exception and its provisions in this regard are briefly described and analysed. However, it will be argued that the development of trust amongst the parties goes well beyond formal compliance and depends upon the institutionalised relationships, often amongst officials and technical experts that have grown up, since the negotiations for a climate treaty commenced in the late 1980s.

The European Union has established itself as the leader of attempts to construct a global climate change regime. This has become an important normative stance, part of its self-image and international identity. Yet it has also come to depend on the Union's ability to negotiate internally on the distribution of the burdens necessitated by its external pledges to cut emissions. The paper considers institutionalist hypotheses on cooperative bargaining and normative entrapment in EU internal negotiations before the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations and the more recent approach to negotiations on a post-2012 regime. It finds that there is evidence to support the normative entrapment hypothesis in both cases, but that agreement in 1997 was facilitated by a very favourable context associated with a 1990 baseline.International Politics (2009) 46, 469–490. doi:10.1057/ip.2009.9

Promotion of sustainable development and poverty eradication in the world's poorest countries are interlinked and frequently reiterated commitments of the European Union. While their achievement depends upon successful implementation of the Union's policy coherence for development (PCD) strategy, they also epitomize the challenges facing that strategy. This article examines EU actorness in relation to sustainable development, using the external dimensions of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), with particular reference to fisheries agreements with West Africa, as an illustrative case. Given the many sources of incoherence identified in relation to the CFP, it is concluded that, while the Union is undoubtedly a global actor, implementation of the PCD strategy is insufficient to enable it to function effectively as a sustainable development actor.

For well over a decade, the European Union (EU) has proclaimed its leadership role in global environmental governance (GEG). In this article, we examine both the nature of its leadership and the underlying conditions for ‘actorness’ upon which leadership must depend. The EU’s record in the global conferences as well as its influence on the reform of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) are also investigated. We argue that the EU has frequently sought to shape international environmental negotiations and promote sustainable development as an organising principle of global governance. Despite its inadequate status at the UN and internal problems, it has had a significant effect on the global agenda. However, due to persistent diplomatic opposition from other coalitions, its real, directly visible influence has been more modest. For genuine directional leadership, which goes beyond the defence of self-interest, the Union will have to make internal policy coherence a greater priority. Moreover, apart from relying solely on its weighty presence in the international system or its potential capabilities, the EU needs to achieve a high level of credibility in order to enhance its powers of persuasion.