John M. Yun’s research while affiliated with George Mason University and other places

... NCTs can vary along several dimensions, including duration, geographic scope, income level, occupation, and triggering conditions. [3][4][5][6][7][8][9] And the conditions under which states permit firms to obtain court orders enforcing NCTs also vary along several dimensions: several states broadly prohibit enforcement by declaring NCTs void; other states limit enforcement for some category of employees, such as low-wage earners, health care practitioners, or tech workers; and most states permit enforcement more widely, typically subject to some sort of "reasonableness" test. 3,5,6,10 Federal NCT regulations have been proposed, if not adopted or applied. ...

Reference:

A Competition Perspective on Physician Non-compete Agreements

... Consequently, an increasing number of companies have faced substantial fines (Thatchenkery & Katila, 2023). Despite this fact, companies that are trying to digitally transform their businesses are often exposed to pressure from large digital platform enterprises to sign mostly unfavourable contracts (Raskovich et al., 2023). The abuse of market power may have an adverse effect on consumer welfare as well as digital innovation (Raskovich et al., 2023). ...

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Competition as a Catalyst for Innovation? Assessing SMEs' Attitudes towards Digital Market Regulation and Competition

... Both Twitter handles and hashtags associated with EdTech apps were used to search tweets. First, we listed apps from several authoritative sources: the most popular 100 EdTech apps on Android and iOS marketplaces, apps recommended by Common Sense Education, 1 top 100 apps ranked by SimilarWeb [6] that has been used in numerous prior research (e.g., [36,119]), and other popular online sources (see Appendix A.1). After removing duplicates, apps without an associated Twitter profile (e.g., Kiddopia), and apps that were not directly used for educational purposes (e.g., ...

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Understanding EdTech's Privacy and Security Issues: Understanding the Perception and Awareness of Education Technologies' Privacy and Security Issues

... Bhattacharya's work [1] explores the "Nash Program," which aims to bridge cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic models [18], illustrating asymmetric bargaining power in the VirnetX case. Wright and Yun [21] write about various instances in which bargaining models were used in litigation. Furthermore, Kankanhalli and Kwan's study [8] delves into the sources of bargaining power in royalty negotiations, enhancing understanding of how bargaining power impacts royalty allocations. ...

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Applying the Nash Bargaining Solution for a Reasonable Royalty II

... Il s'agit, dans une logique conservatrice, de préserver les acquis d'une politique menée depuis les années 1970 et vue comme un gage d'efficacité économique et de prévention de la capture de la politique antitrust par des groupes d'intérêts ou par les pouvoirs publics dans une perspective interventionniste. La contribution présentée en mai 2020 par des économistes et des juristes réunis autour de l'International Center for Law and Economics 1 pour la commission constituée par la Commission des Lois de la Chambre des Représentants sur la situation des règles de concurrence et ses implications pour la protection de la concurrence dans les marchés numériques incarne cette conception (Barnett et al., 2020). L'ère jeffersonienne y est présentée comme un chaos initial (« un corpus juridique sans principe et incohérent, entaché de contradictions internes ») qu'un apport économique « moderne » a « transformé en un système gérable qui contribue positivement à la compétitivité américaine et au bien-être du consommateur » 2 . ...

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La concentration du pouvoir économique depuis la pandémie

... The recent update by the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission to the Vertical Merger Guidelines has intensified the debate with respect to vertical merger enforcement, 1 with some commenters asserting that vertical mergers are relatively harmless. These arguments often rely heavily on surveys of the empirical economic literature as justification for a procompetitive presumption for vertical mergers (e.g., Lipsky et al., 2020;Wong-Ervin, 2019). For example, Wong-Ervin (2019, p. 1) states: "The generally accepted belief underlying modern antitrust analysis of vertical mergers … has been that they are generally procompetitive or neutral. ...

Reference:

Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers

... American Express Co. (2018), where the Supreme Court fully recognized the complexities of multisided platforms and the necessity of considering interdependencies between the different sides of the market (Evans and Schmalensee 2016;Rochet and Tirole 2006). Ohio and several other states sued American Express (Amex), arguing that its anti-steering provisions, which prevented merchants from directing customers to use lower-cost credit cards, had a foreclosure effect on competition: they effectively maintained and enhanced Amex's market power, resulting in higher fees for merchants, which were then passed onto consumers (Wright and Yun 2018). ...

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From Populism to Platforms: Antitrust Law and the AI Revolution

... In order to improve the scene service, new service projects will be continuously added to the original platform, which has blurred the original core services and causes difficulties in the selection of benchmark services. This has formed multiple commodity markets in non-trading platforms (Wright & Yun, 2019). In the complex platform service, a multi-level service sample has long been formed. ...

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Analysis of the Market Definition of Non-Intermediary Service Platform in Antitrust Law

... In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission has established a task force for the information technology sector, and the Australian TPCC has indicated awareness of the potential for competition and business practice issues in these industries. The EEC has fined Google almost EUR 1.5 billion for antitrust violations [46,50]. Though farm data firms are not yet mega-corporations of an equivalent scale to these corporations, their shares of their respective markets and their ability to exercise market power are still significant. ...

Reference:

A Future-Focused View of the Regulation of Rural Technology