John D. Huber's research while affiliated with Columbia University and other places
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Publications (35)
Civil conflicts, which have been much more prevalent than inter-state conflicts over the last fifty years, vary enormously in their intensity, with some causing millions of deaths and some far fewer. The central goal of this paper is to test an argument from previous theoretical research that high inequality within an ethnic group can make inter-et...
Why does ethnicity become a salient element of electoral politics in some places but not others? The authorsargue that in majoritarian systems, ethnic identity is most salient to electoral behavior when there are high levels of inequality between ethnic groups. Theytest this argument in the Indian states and find that state-level party system ethni...
I develop four related measures of the “ethnicization” of electoral behavior. Each measure increases as ethnic identity becomes more central to vote choice, but the measures differ along two theoretical dimensions. The first dimension contrasts a group‐based perspective (which focuses on cohesion in the voting patterns of group members) with a part...
We analyze how religion affects voting and redistribution. Our model directs attention away from the particular faith, belief or risk attitudes of religious individuals, and emphasizes instead how organized religion opens the door to standard group-based distributive politics. We argue that organized religion makes it possible for the rich and the...
This paper examines the empirical relationship between democracy and different forms of inequality. We argue that democracy creates incentives for targeted as opposed to general redistribution; that ethnic groups are often convenient targets for group-based distribution; and thus that democracy should reduced inequality between ethnic groups, but w...
Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on "wedge" issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically-based patronage or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multi...
We examine the stability of individual ministers across parliamentary democracies. Our data show that this stability is only loosely related to the stability of cabinets, making it impossible to rely primarily on arguments about cabinet duration to explain patterns of individual stability. We argue that to explain patterns of individual stability,...
"Cinnamylation-flavored" synthesis: Cross-metathesis (CM) reactions between an allylsilane andvinylarenes enable the rapidgeneration of various cinnamylsilanes, which may be usedin situ for the highly enantioselective, and diastereodivergent, cinnamylation of imines (see example in scheme). Under this new, simple, and efficient protocol, the potent...
The first general method for the enantioselective cinnamylation of aldimines is reported. The method utilizes a simple chiral cinnamylsilane reagent and is characterized by experimental simplicity and extraordinarily high levels of enantioselectivity. Further, a remarkable and unprecedented diastereochemical reversal has been realized whereby eithe...
We analyze how institutions that establish the level of separation of church and state should influence the political economy of redistribution. Our formal model describes how incentives for charitable giving, coupled with church-state institutions, create opportunities for the rich to form coalitions with the religious poor, at the expense of the...
We explore how the social and political context affect voting polarization by income, which is the difference in the propensity of poor and non-poor voters to support right-wing parties that espouse low taxes and low levels of government services. To this end, we draw on a range or arguments about the dimensionality of the policy space, the salienc...
This paper develops and tests arguments about how national-level social and institutional factors shape the propensity of
individuals to form attachments to political parties. Our tests employ a two-step estimation procedure that has attractive
properties when there is a binary dependent variable in the first stage and when the number of second-lev...
We analyze a model of delegation and policymaking in polities where bureaucratic capacity is low. Our analysis suggests that low bureaucratic capacity diminishes incentives for bureaucrats to comply with legislation, making it more difficult for politicians to induce bureaucrats to take actions that politicians desire. Consequently, when bureaucrat...
Although a large literature on delegation exists, few models have pushed beyond a core set of canonical assumptions. This approach may be justified on grounds of tractability, but the failure to grasp the significance of different assumptions and push beyond specific models has limited our understanding of the incentives for delegation. Consequentl...
Drawing on arguments about politics during the French Fourth Republic, the concept of cabinet instability is reconsidered. Rather than studying cabinet duration, the article examines the accumulation of experience by individual cabinet ministers. Two variables are measured in nineteen parliamentary democracies: portfolio
experience
the experience o...
Drawing on arguments about politics during the French Fourth Republic, the concept of cabinet instability is reconsidered. Rather than studying cabinet duration, the article examines the accumulation of experience by individual cabinet ministers. Two variables are measured in nineteen parliamentary democracies: portfolio experience (the experience...
We investigate how cabinet decision-making rules interact with political uncertainty to affect the outcomes of bargaining processes in parliamentary systems. Our formal models compare two types of decisions rules: (1) those that give prime ministers unilateral authority to demand a vote of confidence and (2) those that require prime ministers to ob...
Existing theories of legislative delegation to bureaucracies typically focus on a single legislature, often the U.S. Congress. We argue that this parochial focus has important limitations. If one contends that politicians respond rationally to their political environment when adopting strategies for controlling bureaucrats, then theories of control...
In most parliamentary democracies, two things are true: cabinet ministers delegate to bureaucrats and coalition governments replace cabinet ministers with little advance notice. Many people claim that cabinet instability (i.e., uncertainty about the timing of ministerial replacements) allows bureaucrats to ignore ministerial orders. To evaluate thi...
This article reviews institutionalarrangements that cabinet ministers and otherpolitical actors employ to influence civil servantbehavior in parliamentary democracies. I then discusshow unlike other theories of bureaucratic structure,the principal-agent framework can be employed togenerate testable hypotheses about systematiccross-national variatio...
Political scientists have long studied the relationship between legislatures and agencies-in particular, between Congress and the bureaucracy in the United States. In the past two decades, however, there has been a renewed interest in this topic along with a variety of new theoretical contributions and insights. We review these relatively recent co...
The left-right ideological positions of political parties play a central role in theorizing about many different aspects of democratic processes. Unfortunately, scholars are hindered in their ability to test existing theories by the limited availability of data that is comparable over time and across countries. This paper describes a simple 'vanill...
Abstract Most studies of legislative control of agencies have focused on national level institutions. In this paper we undertake a comparative study of political control by looking at state legislatures and the control of Medicaid policy. We develop and test a theory about the conditions under which state legislatures should opt to rely on detailed...
This article explores the relationship between cabinet instability and political performance in parliamentary democracies. I develop two theoretical arguments about how cabinet instability should affect government effectiveness, and I use these to define several measures of instability. The first argument suggests that instability in the partisan c...
Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to ben- et? Many scholars focus on \wedge" issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically-based patronage or pork. We examine the tension between redistri- bution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across mul...
Survey evidence reveals substantial cross-national differences in the degree to which individual religious beliefs are associated with individual decisions to participate in religious services. This paper develops and tests arguments about the source of these differences: belief has a larger effect on participation decisions in countries that are e...
We analyze the relationship between individual income and vote choice across 23 democracies. Our goal is to understand how the economic, social and institutional context affects support by low-, middle-and high-income voters for political parties that oppose taxes and redistribution. We examine how macro level variables related to ethnic heterogene...
Citations
... Despite the growing importance of regulatory discretion, we know very little about how democratic governments design discretion, and how it changes over time and across issues and polities. While other similar concepts, such as bureaucratic discretion, have been given considerable scholarly attention (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999;Franchino, 2007;Huber & Shipan, 2002;Vakilifathi, 2019;Vannoni et al., 2021;Williams, 2018), little is known about how legislative language formalizes regulatory discretion, while it maintains flexibility in exercising regulatory powers on the one hand, and imposes control mechanisms to avoid arbitrariness on the other hand. ...
... The assumption in most public administration literature is that patronage must be stamped out in favor of merit systems (Huber & Ting, 2021). That is an easy position to adopt but it may oversimplify the complexities of administration, especially when there is a limited talent pool available to governments. ...
... Most civil conflicts are rooted in ethnic, sectarian, or other identity groups ( Doyle and Sambanis, 2000;Fearon and Laitin, 2003), making it important to consider arguments about how economic inequality measured with respect to groups affects their propensity to participate in civil war. Huber and Mayoral ( 2019) distinguish between group-based economic inequality and the onset of civil conflict, on one hand, and group-based inequality and the intensity of civil conflict, on the other. In their empirical analysis, they find that there is a robust association between intragroup inequality and conflict intensity, but a much weaker link with conflict onset. ...
... Implementation necessitates administrative capacity. Capacity is the ability of an agency to perform the tasks delegated to it (Gailmard and Patty 2012;Huber and McCarty 2004;Ting 2011;Williams 2021). Agencies require expert workforces, appropriate processes and equipment, and efficient management to accomplish their missions and prevent government failures. ...
... Vertical inequality has a negative effect on economic efficiency [9], the production of public goods [10] and government quality [11]. Horizontal inequality promotes civil conflict between identity groups [24,26,[35][36][37][38][39], increases ethnic voting [27,40], reduces public good provision [10] and destabilizes democracy [19]. Though economic grievance is often believed to be a prime motivator [41], political exclusion provides leaders with the incentive to change the status quo, e.g. by exploiting the group's beliefs concerning its religion, history, sacred values, etc. [42]. ...
... The first approach, introduced by Huber and Shipan (2002, p. 52), measures discretion by the length of the legislative text, arguing that "with two statutes that address the same issue, the longer one typically places greater limits on the actions of other actors because it is filled with policy-specific details that constrain what these other actors can do." Despite this measure's popularity (Clinton et al., 2012;Huber et al., 2001;Randazzo et al., 2011), it has some limitations, mainly because longer laws do not necessarily delegate fewer powers (Williams, 2018). ...
... Auf dieser Grundlage entwickelt Weber (2021a) eine Operationalisierung, die die kontextsensible Verknüpfung von Parteibeinen und Wählerpositionen erlaubt. Konkret beginnt die Methode mit dem Ansatz von Gabel und Huber (2000), welcher die Kategorien der Manifestodaten einer Faktoranalyse unterzieht 7 . Dadurch werden jeder Kategorie eine Seite (links oder rechts) sowie ein quantitatives Gewicht zugewiesen. ...
... The importance of cabinet survival has been emphasized by many scholars, who have treated it as a measure of political performance (Linz, 1978;Strøm, 1990). In particular, John Huber (1998) underlined that high government instability could lead to difficulties in adopting and implementing policy programmes. ...
... Moreover, IO member states also rely on national administrations as agents supporting their activities. These shadow bureaucracies (see Dijkstra 2015) contribute to a multiple-agent setting with potential consequences of free riding or sabotage (Huber and Shipan 2000). The parallel or shadow bureaucratic support structure, particularly the resulting interactions between national administrations and IPAs, has been neglected, and there is a need to substantiate claims about IPAs' autonomy and influence from a delegation theory perspective. ...
... Any demand to (re)design and (re)structure modern welfare states is significantly based on the dynamics between inequality and redistribution. Therefore, it is important to show which groups (high-income, middle-income) are in favour of redistribution or not in different kinds of welfare states(Huber and Stanig, 2009;Otjes, 2018;Berthet et al, 2020; Rueda and Stegmueller,2016;Larcinese, 2007). ...