Joffrey Fuhrer’s research while affiliated with University of Geneva and other places

Objectives This study examined intraindividual change in satisfaction with life (SWL) in Swiss older adults before, during, and after COVID-19. It assessed whether predictors of adaptation influenced SWL stability, and whether this differed depending on adverse childhood experiences (ACE). Methods SWL was assessed eight times over a 21-month period. ACE, emotion regulation, meaning in life, and subjective socio-economic status (SES) were assessed as predictors. Data were analyzed using growth curve modeling. Results The sample consisted of two groups: A risk group (RG: n = 111, Mage = 69.4 years) comprised of individuals with a high risk of having been exposed to ACE, and a (low-risk) control group (CG: n = 120, Mage = 70.3 years). Intraindividual change in SWL was predicted by (presence of) meaning in life only in the RG, and by subjective SES only in the CG. Conclusion Results identified predictors of stable SWL trajectories and the potential for positive psychological functioning into later life, despite past and current prolonged adversity. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10902-024-00791-2.

We investigate whether belief in the meaning of life (that life as such has meaning) and the psychological experience of meaning in one’s own life constitute distinct empirical constructs. To this aim, we develop the Belief in the Meaning of Life Questionnaire (BiMoLQ) in Study 1 (N=315), confirming its factor structure, psychometric properties, and validity in Studies 2 (N=285) and 3 (N=436). Overall, the results confirm that meaning of life and meaning in life are distinct constructs. Studies 1 and 2 show that the former is more related to religiosity and spirituality, while the latter is more related to well-being and emotional experiences. Study 3 suggests that directly manipulating the presence of meaning of life and meaning in life in fictional scenarios differently impacts both constructs. We conclude that future research on the role of meaning in human psychology should differentiate the constructs, as they are conceptually and empirically separate.

The general consensus within the psychological literature on meaning in life stands for a tripartite view of this construct. In this article, we argue that a fourth dimension should be added: having a positive impact on others. In Studies 1 and 2, we find that individuals who have a positive impact on others are considered to have a more meaningful life than those who don’t. In Study 3, we find that when participants are asked to rate and rank definitions of meaning in life, having a positive impact on others is among the highest-ranked definitions. In Study 4, we show that people who see themselves as having a positive impact on others rate their life as more meaningful, and that this effect remains after controlling for the other three dimensions of Purpose, Coherence, and Significance. Overall, our results provide support for a 4-dimension conceptualization and operationalization of meaning in life.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, French public opinion has been divided about Pr. Didier Raoult and his hydroxychloroquine-based treatment against COVID-19. In this paper, our aim is to contribute to the understanding of this polarization of public opinion by investigating the relationship between (analytic vs. intuitive) cognitive style and trust in Didier Raoult and his treatment. Through three studies (total N after exclusion = 950), we found that a more intuitive cognitive style predicted higher trust in Didier Raoult and his treatment. Moreover, we found that Trust in Raoult was positively associated with belief that truth is political, belief in conspiracy theories, belief in pseudo-medicines and pseudo-medical and conspiratorial beliefs regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. We also found a negative association with knowledge of scientific methods and regard for scientific method over personal experience. However, higher trust in Didier Raoult was not associated with self-reported compliance with official regulations concerning the COVID-19 pandemic.

What leads people to believe in conspiracy theories? In this paper, we explore the possibility that people might be drawn towards conspiracy theories because believing in them might satisfy certain existential needs and help people find meaning in their life. Through two studies (N = 289 and 287 after exclusion), we found that participants higher in the need and search for meaning were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories. This relationship was not moderated by participants' feelings of control. We also found that believing in conspiracy theories was associated with more presence of meaning (Study 1), and more precisely with a heightened feeling of mattering in the grand scheme of things (Study 2). Additionally, we found that participants were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories that left them more agency and allowed them the possibility to make a difference. Overall, we argue that our results suggest that people might sometimes be drawn towards conspiracy theories because they allow them to feel as if they can make a difference and have a positive impact on the world, and thus that conspiracy theories can be used as tools to satisfy existential needs.

What leads people to believe in conspiracy theories? In this paper, we explore the possibilitythat people might be drawn towards conspiracy theories because believing in them mightsatisfy certain existential needs and help people find meaning in their life. Through twostudies (N = 289 and 287 after exclusion), we found that participants higher in the need andsearch for meaning were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories. This relationship wasnot moderated by participants’ feelings of control. We also found that believing in conspiracytheories was associated with more presence of meaning (Study 1), and more precisely with aheightened feeling of mattering in the grand scheme of things (Study 2). Additionally, wefound that participants were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories that left them moreagency and allowed them the possibility to make a difference. Overall, we argue that ourresults suggest that people might sometimes be drawn towards conspiracy theories becausethey allow them to feel as if they can make a difference and have a positive impact on theworld, and thus that conspiracy theories can be used as tools to satisfy existential needs.

It is often assumed that most people want their life to be “meaningful”. But what exactly does this mean? Though numerous research have documented which factors lead people to experience their life as meaningful and people’s theories about the best ways to secure a meaningful life, investigations in people’s concept of meaningful life are scarce. In this paper, we investigate the folk concept of a meaningful life by studying people’s third-person attribution of meaningfulness. We draw on hypotheses from the philosophical literature, and notably on the work of Susan Wolf (Study 1) and an objection Antti Kauppinen raised against it (Study 2). In Study 1, we find that individuals who are successful, competent, and engaged in valuable and important goals are considered to have more meaningful lives. In Study 2, we find that the perceived meaningfulness of a life does not depend only on its components, but also on how its elements are ordered and how it forms a coherent whole (the “narrative shape” of this life). Additionally, our results stress the importance of morality in participants’ assessments of meaningfulness. Overall, our results highlight the fruitfulness of drawing on the philosophical literature to investigate the folk concept of meaningful life. © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

Some people publicly pretend to be experts while not being ones. They are pseudoexperts, and their presence seems to be ubiquitous in the current cultural landscape. This manuscript explores the nature and mechanisms of pseudoexpertise. We first provide a conceptual analysis of pseudoexperts based on prototypical cases of pseudoexpertise and recent philosophical work on the concept of expertise. This allows us to propose a definition that captures real-world cases of pseudoexpertise, distinguishes it from related but different concepts such as pseudoscience, and highlights what is wrong with pseudoexpertise. Next, based on this conceptual analysis, we propose a framework for further research on pseudoexpertise, built on relevant empirical and theoretical approaches to cultural cognition. We provide exploratory answers to three questions: why is there pseudoexpertise at all; how can pseudoexperts be successful despite not being experts; and what becomes of pseudoexperts in the long run. Together, these conceptual and theoretical approaches to pseudoexpertise draw a preliminary framework from which to approach the very troubling problem posed by persons usurping the capacities and reputations of genuine experts.

It is often assumed that most people want their life to be “meaningful”. But what exactly does this mean? Though numerous researches have documented which factors lead people to experience their life as meaningful and people’s conceptions about the best ways to secure a meaningful life, investigations in people’s concept of meaningful life are scarce. In this paper, we investigate the folk concept of a meaningful life by studying people’s third-person attribution of meaningfulness. We draw on hypotheses from the philosophical literature, and notably on the work of Susan Wolf (Study 1) and Antti Kauppinen (Study 2). In Study 1, we find that individuals who are successful, competent, and engaged in valuable and important goals are considered to have more meaningful lives. In Study 2, we find that the meaningfulness of a life did not depend only on its components, but also on the order in which these elements were ordered to form a coherent whole (the “narrative shape” of this life). Additionally, our results stress the importance of morality in participants’ assessments of meaningfulness. Overall, our results highlight the fruitfulness of drawing on the philosophical literature to investigate the folk concept of meaningful life.